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INTRODUCTION
The collection of essays presented here has two parts. Part
one, consisting of four essays together with an appendix, deals
with optimizing the allocation of labour between the educational
sector and the rest of the economy over time. Part two,consisting
of four essays, deals with problems connected with optimal extrac-
tion of an exhaustible resource in a small, open economy. The
approach is dynamic in both parts, and the problems are studied
from a macroeconomic point of view. Except for the appendix to
Part 1, the essays are purely theoretical. The aim has been to
develop theories for the optimal dynamic management of the
economy within these two areas.
The first article in Part I, "On the Optimal Allocation of Labor
to the Educational Sector", was published in the Swedish Journal
of Economics in 1975. In this article, the optimal allocation
of labourto the educational sector is discussed within a simple
macroeconomic model. The model consists of two sectors, one
which produces knowledge - called educational capital in the
model - and another which produces goods. The amount of labour
allocated to the educational sector is optimized under the
assumption that the level of knowledge enters the social wel-
fare function. It is shown in this case that there is in general
no unique steady-state optimum for the allocation of labour
to the educational sector. Consequently, this assumption has
been dropped in all subsequent essays. The case when education
is regarded only as a means of increasing the production of
goods is then discussed. Finally, the solution obtained is
compared to the criterion for investment in education usually
proposed in the "economics of education" literature. The
distinction between the stock of educational capital and
its corresponding flow is shown to be crucial.
The second essay in Part I, "Economic Growth and the Allocation
of Labour between Education and Goods-Production: Positive
and Normative Aspects", has been published before as Discussion
2Paper 1/1976 from the Institute of Economics, The Norwegian
School of Economics and Business Administration (revised 18.6.
1976). This essay begins with a positive analysis of the inter-
dependence between the educational sector and the rest of the
economy during a process of economic growth. Another difference
from the first essay is that the labour-force is now assumed
to increase over time.
Based on two different behavioural relationships between demand
for education and the level of income in society, labour-
allocation over time is analyzed within a positive model of
economic growth incorporating the features of education. Both
of them yield a unique, globally stable steady-state where
"knowledge per capita" and the part of the labour-force going
into the educational sector are constant over time. The allocation
of labour over time is then optimized. It is shown that,
independent of initial conditions in the economy, there exists
a unique optimal path for the allocation of labour to the
educational sector with an associated optimal development for the
whole economy. A unique steady-state optimum exists, which is
reached only asymptotically along the optimal path. The value
of the variables in steady state is independent of the initial
situation and depends on the rate of social time preference,
the efficiency of the educational sector, the rate of depre-
ciation of knowledge and the rate of increase in population.
Along the optimal path the part of labour allocated to the
educational sector should be falling towards its stationary
level if the initial level of knowledge in society is less
than the optimal level. Further, a lower initial level of
knowledge will lead to a higher initial part of labour
allocated to education. The optimal development of the
economy is then confronted with the time-path implied by the
positive model. Investment criteria for allocating labour
to the educational sector are derived. Modifications in the
structure of the model and their effect on the optimal path of
the economy are considered. Special emphasis is here given to
the effect of different rates of technological change between
the educational sector and the goods-producing sector. It is
shown that the allocation pattern along the optimal path may
3be reversed in periods with rapid technological progress in
goods production.
The third essay in Part I, "Om optimal utvikling av ein kunn-
skapsbasert industrisektor" (in Norwegian), was published
in StatsØkonomisk Tidsskrift in 1976. Whereas, in the two
preceding essays, a1l goods production was aggregated into one
sector, this model is more disaggregated since the production
of goods and services now takes place in two sectors with
different knowledge intensity. The problem in this article
is therefore to find optimal paths for the allocation of labour
between the educational sector and the two goods-producing
sectors - the knowledge-intensive sector and the traditional
sector. There may now be more regimes in the optimal policy
and different optimal paths of labour allocation. It may now be
optimal not to develop a knowledge-based industrial sector
initially while at the same time the economy is building
up its educational capital. When the level of knowledge has
reached a certain level, time is ripe for beginning to allocate
labour to a knowledge-based industrial sector as well. Another
possibility is that if educational capital is initially abundant,
it may be optimal to have a knowledge-based industrial sector
initiallyeven if it would not be optimal for ever.When it is
optimal to allocate labour to all three sectors, the properties
of the solution are fairly similar to those found in the second
essay.
The fourth essay in Part I, "On the Optimal Development of
Knowledge-Based Industries and the Educational Sector in a Small,
Open Economy", was published in the International Economic Review
in 1978. The differences between this essay and the third are
that the instantaneous social welfare function is now based
on less restrictive assumptions and that export and import of the
educational-intensive and the traditional good is now allowed.
As a result, complete specialization in the production of one
of the goods is possible and may be optimal. If specialization
to knowledge-based production is optimal, the solution is
analogous to the solution in the second essay.lt may also be
optimal to specialize in traditional production. In this model
4there is then no reason to keep up an educational sector.
When non~pecialization is optimal, the results in this essay
coincide pretty much with those of the third CSS:lY.
As an appendix to Part I I have included the article "Returns
to Higher Education in Norway", published in the Swedish Journal
of Economics in 1972. While obviously outside the mainstream
of the argument in the first part of the essay collection, this
article has been included because it is an illustration of the
"returns to education" calculations undertaken in the economics
of education literature mentioned to in the two first essays
in Part I, where this article also has been referred to.
The first essay in Part II, "Optimal Savings and Exhaustible
Resource Extraction in an Open Economy", was published in the
Journal of Economic Theory in 1978. In this article,a macro-
economic model for an open economy where optimal savings
and exhaustible resource extraction can be determined
simultaneously, is presented. The model is applicable to an
economy with a considerable stock of exhaustible resources
which are exported. The results are somewhat more general than
those found in earlier contributions. The optimal extraction
path depends on conditions in the rest of the economy, and
the optimal path of capital accumulation depends on conditions
in the resource sector. With constant prices and the capital
intensity of the economy less than or equal to the modified
golden rule, extraction is either constant for some initial
period and then falling, or always falling, along any of the possible
optimal policy sequences for the economy. When the price
of the resource depends exponentially on time, it is optimal if,
and only if, the rate of increase in the price of the resource
is greater than some critical value, determined partly by the
capital intensity of the economy, to depart from the optimal
sequences mentioned above. In that case, resource extraction
is increasing over time, and it may be optimal toleave
the resource in the ground for some initial period. When the
capital intensity of the economy increases, the price rise
needed to make such a policy optimal is reduced. As the
initial capital stock of the economy increases, the extraction
5period is lengthened and the extraction level is reduced for
every t. The resource is exhausted when extraction ends and the
extraction period is always finite. Extraction should be reduced
gradually towards zero, where extraction ends. If a resource
is discovered and exploited, compared to a situation without
resource extraction, consumption gets an initial positive
shift, while its relative rate of growth along the optimal
path is reduced. Consumption and the capital stock will be
higher also in the postextraction period. With constant
marginal extraction costs - an assumption often made in the
literature - an interior solution for savings and resource
extraction at the same time cannot be optimal.
The second essay in Part IL'~esource Extraction, Financial
Transactions and Consumption in an Open Economy", has been
submitted to the Scandinavian Journal of Economics. At the
present time I do not know whether or not it will be published
there. Whereas in the first essay in Part II savings take the
form of physical capital accumulation,this article presents
a model of resource extraction in an open economy where
borrowing or lending abroad is possible. Optimal strategies
over time for consumption, financial transactions and resource
use are derived. The properties of these time paths are compared
to the results in earlier contributions. The main effect from
allowing financial investment or disinvestment in a model
of resource extraction in an open economy, is to separate
the optimal consumption stream over time from the optimal path
of resource extraction. If borrowing possibilities are unlimited,
the separation will be complete. Without borrowing restrictions,
optimal resource extraction is either zero or at its maximum.
Resource extraction at less than the maximal rate can only
be optimal if borrowing possibilities are exploited at its
maximum. In that case there is in general no reason a priori
to expect a falling optimal path of resource extraction in this
model.
The third essay in Part II, "On Labour Allocation, Savings
and Resource Extraction in an Open Economy", has been published
before as Discussion Paper 7/78 from the Institute of
Economics, The Norwegian School of Economics and Business
6Administration. This paper presents a dynamic model for an open
economy where labour allocation, savings and resource extraction
can be optimized simultaneously. In the two preceeding essays,
resource extraction is controlled directly by "turning the
tap", whereas in this model extraction is controlled by the
employment in the resource sector. Since labour must be released
from the rest of the economy in order to extract resources,
labour allocation over time between the two parts of the economy
must be optimized. Marginal extraction costs are increasing
due to the increasing alternative cost of labour. Properties
of the optimal paths are derived, and their dependence on prices,
parameters and initial conditions in the economy are examined.
It is shown that cet. par. a poor country should extract a
given resource faster than a rich country. Also, the widespread
notion that total savings should increase when a new resource
is discovered and exploited, is not substantiated in this model.
The optimal savings rate and also the absolute amount of
savings are always shifted down when exploitation of a new
resource begins, so that total consumption increases by more
than the value of the new resources extracted. The optimal
pattern of economic development is therefore to slow down
capital accumulation when resource extraction is started up
and for the period extraction lasts, compared to a situation
without resource extraction. When the resource extraction
period is over, the stock of physical capital is therefore
lower than it would have been at the same time without resource
extraction, but it is higher than when resource extraction
started.
The fourth ~ssay in Part II, "On the Optimal Development of
a Small, Open Economy With an Exhaustible Resource", is a
revised version of Discussion Paper 15/78 from the Institute
of Economics, The Norwegian School of Ecor.omics and Business
Administration.Savings may now take the form of physical and/or
financial capital accumulation. Borrowing abroad is also
possible. The purpose of ~his paper is to provide a more
general model of optimal resource use in an open economy where
7optimal paths of resource extraction, consumption, financial
transactions and savings in physical capital can be determined
simultaneously. We have distinguished between situations
with and without borrowing restrictions. Without borrowing
restrictions, the stock of physical capital is instantly adjusted
so that its net marginal productivity equals the real rate of
interest (given exogeneously). The depletion rate is then
determined by the nominal rate of interest in the world financial
markets and properties of the cost function in resource extraction.
International credit rationing at the going market rate of
interest may necessitate resource extraction for direct import
purposes. A liberalization or removal of credit limits there-
fore slows down optimal resource use. A positive shift in the
initial resource stock have similar effects since it increases
the total debt a country may incur; it may also ease or remove
existing borrowing constraints through improving the country's
international creditworthyness. Price trends for the resource
and for imported goods have been introduced in this model.
The effects of these trends on extraction and consumption
depend on whether borrowing restrictions are effective or not.
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II
ON THE OPTIMAL ALLOCATION OF LABOR TO
THE EDUCATIONAL SECTOR·
Jostein Aarrestad
Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration, Bergen, Norway
Summary
The optimal allocation of labor to the educational sector is discussed within a
simple macroeconomic model. The model consists of two sectors, one which produces
knowledge--ealled educational capital in the model-and another which produces
goods. The amount of labor allocated to the educational sector is optimized under
the assumption that the level of knowledge enters the social welfare function.
It is shown in this case that there is in general no unique steady-state optimum
for the allocation of labor to the educational sector.
We then discuss sufficient conditions for uniqueness, the case when education
is regarded only as a. means of increasing the production of goods, dependence
of the optimal policy on the initial situation in the non-uniqueness case and con-
sistency of the optimal policy. Finally, the solution obtained is compared to the
criterion for investment in education usually proposed in the "economics of
education" literature. The distinctionbetween the atock of educational capital and
its corresponding flow is shown to be crucial.
I. Introduction
Despite its importance in the current debate, very few attempts have been
made to discuss the optimal investment in education on a macroeconomicleveL
To my knowledge, the only paper that discusses this problem explicitly is
one by Uzawa [7]. He analyzes a-two-sector growth model where purely labor-
argumenting technical change is produced in the educational sector, and
where this output from the educational sector enters the goods-producing
sector as an input. By using the welfare criterion of maximizing the discounted
sum of consumption per capita, his problem is then to find the optimal alloca-
tion of labor between the two sectors and to choose the optimal savings path
over time. Education is regarded only as a. means of making labor more pro-
ductive. The level of education or knowledge in society is irrelevant to social
welfare.
• The main part of this paper was written while I was a visiting research associate at the
Economics Department, University of California, Berkeley. I am indebted to Ka.rl Shell,
K. P. Hagen, V. Norman and A. Uhdefor useful comments.
21-754813 Suied, J. of Economics 1975
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We propose and analyze a model whose structure is somewhat different
and less complex than Uzawa's although the objective function is perhaps
more interesting, since it is assumed that society is interested in the level of
knowledge as well as in the. aggregate production of goods. In addition, it
is easier to give our results a clear economicinterpretation.
II. The Model
The model consists of two sectors-an educational sector that produces
"knowledge", which we call "educational capital", and a sector that produces
goods. Of course, we would have preferred a model with many types of educa-
tion and many goods-producing sectors, but it seems very difficult to analyze
such a general case.
The main additional simplificationof the model is that we disregard physical
capital, sci that labor and educational capital are the only specified factors of
production. There is not technical change in the model and the production
period in the educational sector is not taken into account. The total amount of
labor, L, is given and constant over time. Labor in this context is understood
to be completely uneducated labor.
The amount of labor employed in the educational sector is denoted by LI
and the output in this sector is denoted by J(t), so tha.t at any point in time, t,
output in the educational sector is given by
(l)
where we assume
h' >0, hIt <O.
J(t) is net in the sense that any output in -the educational sector which is
subsequently used as input (such as students who become teachers a.fter
graduation) is not included in J(t).
The output in the goods-producingsector is assumed to be produced accord-
ing to the followingproduction function:
XC') = I(LI(t), E(t». (2)
X(t) is total production of goodsat time t,LI(t) is the amount of labor allocated
to the production of goods, and E(t) is the level of knowledge in society, a
stock called the stock of educational capital.
In (2) we assume that 1(0,E(t» = O,8::(t) = IL>O,
M ~I ~I
8E(t) = lE>O, 8LI(t)' = ILL<O, 8E(t)s=IEE <O,
Swed. J. of Eeonomic« 1975
13
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and
Inother words (2) says that the level of the production of goods in society
depends on the level of knowledge, which we call educational capital since
it is produced in the educational sector, and on the amount of labor allocated
to the goods-producing sector. Production functions that express the same
idea. can be found in [2] (see e.g. p. 14 and model 7.1, p. 36). Labor in this
instance refers to uneducated labor, so we have made the abstraction of com-
pletely separating the productivity of the level of education in society from
the productivity of "primitive" labor in the production process.!The problems
of measuring the educational capital in societywill not be dealt with in detail.
Inprinciple they are similar to the problems of measuring the:stock of physical
capital. Several attempts to measure the stock of educational capital in
different countries have been made, see e.g.)hose mentioned in [5] (Chapter
20, p. 523 and the discussion on p. 742). A~detailed estimate of educational
capital in Norway in 1950 and 1960 is presented in [I]. In this respect there
seems to be a better empirical basis for (2) than for the production function
used by Uzawa in [7].
The stock of educational capital is built up through gross:addition to the
existing stock J(t), given by (I). On the other hand, it also depreciates since
educated people die, knowledge becomes obsolete and people forget what
they once learned. E(t) is assumed to depreciate at a constant rate 1-'. The
equation of motion for the state variable of the problem, E(t), is therefore:
E(t) = J(t) - pE(t) (3)
where E(t) = dE(t)/dt is the net increase in E(t) at point in time t.We assume
that initially there is a stock of educational capital, Eo, so that
E(O) = Eo (4)
and that E(co) is free.
Finally, since the total amount of labor is constant, we have that
~(t)+LII(t) =L. (5)
The question now, is given the structure of this economy, described by equa-
tions (1)-(5), what is the optimal allocation of labor to the educational sector
over time, Le.what is the optimal trajectory of L2(t)1
The answer to this problem obviously depends on the objective function.
1 It thereby seems natural to assume ILB - o. Itmight be noted, however, that the analysis
also holds under the weaker assumption that the Hessian matrix of (2) is negative semi-
definite, i.e.ILLIEB-ULB)I~O. (This was pointed out to me by V. Norman.)
Swed. J. ol Economics 1975
14
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We analyze the problem under the assumption that the stock of educational
capital in society and the aggregate production of goods enter the socialwelfare
function. This assumption will probably strike the reader as reasonable. The
stock of educational capital is synonymous to the level of knowledge in society
and most societies aim at increasing the level of knowledge among its citizens.
The "instantaneous" socialwelfare function will therefore be of the form
'It = u(X(t), E(t», (*)
where we assume uz>O, uE>O, uzz<O and UEE<O.
(Here Uz means au/oX, Uzzmeans a2u/oX", etc.)
Suppose, therefore, that the aim of society is to maximize the present value
of its instantaneous utility function (*) from initial time, zero, and that
its planning horizon is infinity. The welfare functional will then be
(6)
where e >0 is the social rate of discount (the social rate of time preference),
assumed constant over time. The integral in (6)will converge since there is an
upper bound on u which will be reached when the given amount of labor is so
distributed between the produotion of goods and educational capital formation
that u is maximized.
III. Optimizing the Allocation of Labor
The problem for sooiety is to maximize (6), subject to the constraints (1) to
(5). A possible solution would be that L'J.(t)=0 for some t, in whioh oase there
would not be any produotion in the educational sector. This possibility will
be disregarded in what follows. The oasewhere L1(t) =0 is also ruled out by
the assumptions made with respect to the I funotion in connection with (2).
To simplify the problem, we can insert (5) into (1), so that
J(t) =h(L-L1(t»,
or that
(7)
where g' <O and gW <O.
Finally, by substituting for X(t) from (2) in (6), and using (7) in (3), we get
the following optimal control problem:
Swed. J. o/ Eoonomic8 1975
15
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Max EX>u(/(L1(t), E(t», E(t))e-Ilt dt
subject to
(i) E(t) = g(L1(t» - p.E(')
(ii) E(O) = Eo; E( 00) is free
(iii) O<L1(t)<L. (8)
The control variable is now L1(t) and the state variable is E(t). When the
optimal trajectory for L1(t) is found, the optimal allocation of labor to the
educational sector is given by (5).
In order to analyze (8), from the (current-value) Hamiltonian function
H(t, L1(t), E(t), p(t» = e-et[u(/(L1(t), E(t)), E(t» +p(t) (g(L1(t) - ,uE(t))]. (9)
Necessary conditions! for a maximum of (6), subject to the constraints «8),
(i), (ii), and (iii», are
E(t) =g(L1(t» - ,uE(t)
pet) = -(uz/g+ug)+<,u+e)p(t)
(10)
(11)
oH ,
oL
1
(1) = uzh +g pet)= o. (12)
In addition it will be seen that
(13)
is satisfied for the optimal path in this problem, although in general it is not
necessary for an optimal solution. (10) is merelya repetition of (3). (11) is
the optimal path of the shadow price of educational capital. (12) is the opti-
mality condition which says that for any t, the marginal product of labor
allocated to the goods-producing sector, evaluated in terms of the social
utility function, should equal the marginal product of labor allocated to the
educational sector times the shadow price of educational capital at the same
point in time, where the path of the shadow price is given from (11).
For any p(t), L1(t) is determined implicitly by (12). Implicit differentiation
yields
dL1(t) g'
apet) = - 11,=(1£)1 +Uz/LL+gli pet)" (140.)
According to (12), pet) must be positive.
From the assumptions with respect to the gand / functions, (140.) is there-
l The following e.naJ.ysisis based on the presentation of optimal control theory in [6],
Chapter 19.
Swed. J. o/ Economics 1975
16
308 J. Aarreetad
fore negative. The higher the shadow price of educational capital, the lower
the allocation of labor to the goods-producing sector and, hence, the higher
the allocation of labor to the educational sector.
LI(t) also depends on E(t), so that
aLI(t) = _ 'Un/ElL + 'UEzlL
fJE(t) 'Uzz(fL)1+ 'Uz/LL+ g" p(t)' (14b)
which is also negative for UEr~O. The dependence of LIon p and E will be
denoted by LI =L(p, E), and (14a) and (14b) by Lp and LE, respectively.
Since the optimal L1(t) is given as a function of p(t) and E(t) by (12), (10) and
(11) are two autonomous differential equations in two unknowns, p(t) and E(t).
We now want to see whether there is a unique rest point to the system of
two differential equations (10) and (11). For E(t) =0, it is easy to establish
that
dp(t) p- g' LE
dE(t) = g' Lp •
The slope of E(t) =O is not determined from (15).
For the slope of the curve p(t) =0 in the phase space, we obtain the follow-
ing, rather messy, expression:
(15)
dp(t) uzzl1+ 2UErIE+ UzIEE+ UEE+ (Uzr!LIE+ uEzfL)LE
dE(t)=- (p+e)-(urrIE+uEr)!LLp •
(16)
The sign of this slope is not determined from the assumptions made with
respect to the functions that enter it, or from a concavity condition on the
u-function in (*). Thus, in general, there may be any number of stationariea
to the two differential equations (10) and (11). This result is analogous to that
obtained by Kurz when wealth effects were introduced into the standard
model of optimal economic growth [4]. While it may be arguable whether the
stock of physical capital should enter the social welfare function along with
consumption, since this is in a sense "double counting", it would seem rather
reasonable that the stock of educational capital should. The problem of a
non-unique optimum would therefore seem to be more relevant to deciding on
investment in education than on investment in physical capital. However, we
postpone a discussion of the economic implications of non-uniqueness until
we have treated the simpler case of a unique solution to the two differential
equations (10) and (11).
Sufficient conditions for such a solution are
(**)
When (**) holds, (14 b) is zero so that (15) is positive and (16) negative.
Clearly, the case where only X(t) enters the social welfare function, i.e. when
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education is regarded only as a means of making labor more productive,
satisfies (**). Assuming that (**) holds, we can now make a graphic analysis
of the system (10) and (11) from which the optimal trajectory of L1(t), and
hence L2(t), will emerge.
Fig. l shows a phase diagram for the path of solutions to (10) and (U)
when (**) holds.
. ~I ~ISince now dE. <O and dE. >0,
p(I)-O E(t)-O
the curves p(t) =0 and E(t) =0 have a unique intersection and divide the
(E(t), p(t»-space into four regions, labelled by roman numerals.
In order to determine directions of the movements of points in phase space,
consider first the curve E(t) =O. For given E, E(t) increases with p. So,
E(t) >O(<O) for points above (below) E(t) =O. The same applies to the curve
p(t)==O. For given E,p(t) increases withp, sothatp(t»O«O) above (below)
p(t) =0. The movements of E(t) and p(t) in the different regions of the phase
space are indicated by arrows.
The equilibrium of the system is represented by the intersection of E(t) =0
and p(t) =0. At the equilibrium, the stock of educational capital is constant
over time and thislevel is denoted by Em. The same will hold for p(t), whose
equilibrium level is denoted by pm. pm determines an allocation of labor be-
tween the educational and goods-producing sectors, also constant over time.
It is easily realized that if we start from some arbitrary point in phase space,
we do not generally approach the equilibrium. Consider a point in region IV.
Here, both p(t) and E(t) are increasing. The only boundary of the region that
might be hit is E(t) =0, in which case the moving point would go back into
region IV. Hence, a point in region IV will remain there, p(t) and E(t) will
be steadily increasing and, according to (140.), L1(t) would tend toward zero.
This is clearly inoptima.l since, by assumption, 1(0, E(t» =0.
Consider, then, a point in region II. Here both p(t) and E(t) are decreasing.
Swed. J. of Economics 1975
18
310 J. Aarre.stad
The only boundary that might be hit is E(t) -=0, but then we would be back
in region ll.
The two remaining regions can be analyzed as follows. In region m, p(t)
is decreasing and E(t) is increasing. If the path remains in the region, it
eventually has to approach limits which can only be the equilibrium values of
p(t) and E(t). If it leaves the region, it can either crossP(t) =0 and enter region
IV, where it meets the fate described above. Or it can cross E(t) =0 and enter
region II, in which case its fate has alsobeen described above. Similar reasoning
applies to a path starting in region I; either it stays in the region and approaches
the equilibrium value, or it enters region II or IV.
It is intuitively clear that (pco, ECO)is a saddle point, i.e. there is one and
only one path in the (p, E) space which converges to the equilibrium, so that
to any given initial Eo there corresponds a unique Po' such that a pa.th starting
from the point (Po, Eo) will converge to the equilibrium (pCO,ECO).1
That this path is optimal is clear from the following."
a) The HamiUonian function (9) is concave in E(t) and L1(t} 8imuUanecYU8ly,
for given p(t} and t.
This is because (l) the u-function in (9) is strictly concave in E(t) and L1(t)
when fLE=O and (U) holds. The Hessian matrix of u is then negative definite
since its determinant is
which is positive; (2) g(L1(t» is concave since g" <O and -p,E is linear, hence
concave. Finally, the sum of two concave functions is a concave function.
b)
lim e-Il' p(t) (E(t) - r) =o.
~
(***)
This is so since, for t-+ 00, p(t) approaches pco while E(t) approaches s=.
Hence (***) must approach zero for t-+oo•
Since the path which satisfies (11) and (12) also satisfies a) and b), it is
optimal.
We may therefore conclude so far that when (**) holds there exists a unique
equilibrium, and to every initia.l Eo there corresponds a unique Po so that the
solution to (10), (11), and (12) with initial values (Po, Eo) converges to the
equilibrium (pco, ECO).Assuming the functions (10), (11) and (12) known and
Eo given, the development of (P(t), E(t» over time could be simulated for
alternative values of Po' By trial and error the unique Po that results in con-
vergence of (P(t), E(t» to (pco, ECO)could then be found. Along this optimal
path (p*(t), E*(t» the allocation of labor to the educational sector will be
l This is shown formally in the Appendix.
I See [6], theorem 19.5, p. 528.
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given as a function of p*(t) and the optimal trajectory for L2(t) can, in principle,
be computed from (12) and (5). If E(O) <r:', the optimal La(t) must be de-
creasing over time.
An optimal policy will therefore be as follows. If Eo happens to be equal to
ErD, choose Po =prD and the allocation of labor that corresponds to prD, La(prD).
Keep this allocation indefinitely. If E09=Eoo, find Po and reassign the alloca-
tion of labor to the educational sector continuously, using Equation (12).
The amount of labor allocated to the educational sector will then approach
the optimal amount La(poo) assymptotically.
Finally, let us examine the effects on the "steady-state" solution (poo, Eoo)
and LII(prD) due to changes in the parameters of the model, I-' and e.l By differen-
tiating (10) and (ll), with Ll(t) given as a function of p(t) from (12), we obtain
the following results for changes in the social rate of discount e (where the
derivatives are evaluated at p(t) =E(t) =0):
aE l
ae - D (pg' Lp) (17)
ap_! (I-'p).
ae D
(18)
(The time argument in the functions is omitted from now on.)
Since D =g'Lp('U~/EE+'UEE)-I-'(I-'+e) < O, aE/oe < O and op/oe <O.
This means that the optimal steady-state level of educational capital is
decreased (increased) if society chooses to evaluate the present, as opposed
to the future, production of goods higher (lower). Obviously, the same applies
with respect to the shadow price of educational capital p(t), so that the amount
of labor allocated to the educational sector decreases (increases) as the social
rate of discount increases (decreases).
For changes in the rate of depreciation of educational oapital jz, we find that
aE l
-"",-
aI-' D
ap =!
ap D
(g' Lp + (p + e)E) (19)
(20)
aE/al-' is negative, so the optimal steady-state level of E is decreased (increased)
if its rate of depreciation exhibits a postive (negative) shift. A priori, the effect
on the shadow price of educational capital is ambiguous for lEE <O.
Whether or not the amount of labor allocated to the educational sector
should rise or fall when the rate of depreciation changes is therefore not deter-
mined when 18E<0. If lEE~O in the relevant range, the allocation of labor to
the educational sector should be reduced if the rate of depreciation of eduoa-
tiona.l capital exhibits a positive shift.
1 The equilibrium growth path (pGO. EGO) is a (special) steady-state growth path in the
sense that all variable! grow at the uniform rate of zero.
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IV. On the Problem of Non-uniqueness
First of all, it should be noted that non-uniqueness may occur even if the
sufficiency conditions are satisfied. The Hamiltonian function would still be
concave if e.g. Uzz <O, although uniqueness is not guaranteed in this case.
Any non-unique rest point to (10)and (11)therefore still satisfies the necessary
and sufficientconditions for optimality as long as concavity of the Hamiltonian
is ensured.
Depending on the form of the utility-function u(E, X), phase diagrams
can, in general, be constructed in which there will exist an arbitrarily large
number of stationary points. In order to illustrate the optimal policy in the
case of multiple equilibria, a phase diagram was drawn where we assume
that :~IE-O>0 and that :Lo is oscillating so that the curves E(t) =0
and p(t) =0 have four intersections.
For a stationary (pCXl, ECXl) to be a saddle-point, we require that
dp(t) I - dp(t) I >0.
dE(t) i<P. E"'}-o dE(t) p(pCXl.E"'}
InFig. 2, EI and E. are saddle points while El and Es are totally unstable
points.
Directions of the movement of points in the phase space are again indicated
by arrows. ABshown by the arrows, the optimal allocation of labor to the
educational sector is now of the following form. li the stock of educational
capital initially happens to correspond to one of t~e totally unstable equilibria,
as e.g. Es in Figure 2, keep it there. Otherwise, the stock of educational capital
should converge to the value which corresponds to the nearest stationary with
the saddle point property. This would be EI in Figure 2 if the initial situation
was between El and Es. Itwould be E. if the initial situation was between
Es and E•. The conclusionhere is that the optimal stock of educational capital
and therefore also the optimal allocation of manpower depends on the initial
situation.
This means that ceteris paribu« a country with an initial stock of educa-
tional capital above the threshold level Es would optimally move towards
the higher level E., whereas a country with educational capital initially less
than E. would move towards EI'
Although it constituted a special example, this conclusionis clearlya feature
of all phase diagrams with multiple stationaries, when the planning horizon
is infinity.
This indicates that ceteris paribu8 it will not be "worth the eHort" for a
country with low educational capital initially to try to reach the level of
educational capital that is optimal for a country with a higher stock of educa-
tional capital initially. This somewhat discomforting conclusion is arrived at
Bwed. J. 0/ Economicø 1975
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L
Fig. fl
when the stock of educational capital is introduced into the social welfare
function. When education is regarded only as a means of increasing the pro-
duction of goods, identical countries would optimally move towards the same
level of educational capital, regardless of the initial situation.
With multiple equilibria, the optimal policy will still be consistent as long
as the instantaneous utility function is unchanged over time. This means that
there will not be any motive for revising the policy once it has been found.
This can be explained by thinking-for the sake of simplicity-in terms of a
discrete formulation. The reason is essentially that since the discount factor
takes the (discrete) form (l +r)-', the marginal rate of substitution between
the production of goods (or educational capital) in a pair of adjacent periods
is independent of the time at which they are viewed. This means that if an
optimal plan is found at point in time to, and checked with a view to a possible
revision at tl >to, the marginal rate of substitution between the production
of goods in a pair of future periods is the same viewed from either to or tl•
Hence the plan is still optimal at tl and no revision is made. (This argument is
diaeussed at length in Heal [3], Oh. 10.)
v. Interpretation. Relation to Cost-benefit Analysis
Let UB examine the necessary and sufficient conditions for optimality in the
case of a unique solution to the problem (8) more closely than was done in
connection with (11) and (12). An attempt will also be made to relate these
conditions to the criteria proposed for investment in education in the "econom-
ics of education" Iiterature.!
For this purpose it will be useful to begin with the special case when education
l See e.g. [8]. p. 276.
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is regarded only as a means of increasing the production of goods, i.e. when
'1£8=0 and, for simplicity, 'Uz=l .. (Of course this special case satisfies the
assumptions sufficient for a unique solution to problem (8).) After eliminating
p(t), we obtain from (11) and (12) that, along the steady-state
(21)
By making the intellectual experiment that at point in time zero we are in
the stady-state, (21) is equal to
fL = - f:lEU' e-<P+lllldt. (22)
(22) says that along the steady-state growth path the production of goods
forgone by allocating labor to the educational sector at time zero should,
at the margin, equal the present value of the increased production of goods
due to the increase in educational capital brought about by the marginal
amount of labor allocated to the educational sector. In other words, along the
steady-state path, labor is allocated between the two sectors in such & way
that the marginal cost of "investment in education" is equal to its marginal
benefits. When we are not in the steady-state optimum, this means that at a
given point in time the stock of educational capital should be increased or
decreased according to whether
ILS LooIE.g'e-<P+f1)tdt. (23)
Outside the steady-state, the exact path for the allocation of labor to the
educational sector is given by the optimal trajectory in Figure l, represented
by the dotted line through the intersection of p(t) =0 and E(t) =0. Along the
optimal trajectory, the optimal L2(t) is given as a function of the optimal
p(t).
In conclusion, let us compare (23) with the cost-benefit criterion most often
used in the economics of education. This requires some simplifications.
Assume therefore that", =0, g' is a constant and that educational capital
is computed as the total man years spent in the educational sector by the
work force. li, at point in time zero, we consider the question of whether or
not to educate one "marginal" person for one year, g' = l. Whether or not this is
a profitable investment project depends on whether
(24)
In cost-benefit analyses performed in the economics of education literature,
IL is set equal to earnings forgone and 18 is estimated as the difference between
Bwed. J. o/ Etm'IOmicB 1975
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earnings with and without the extra education (estimated from cross-section
data which is then also supposed to be applicable in the future). This diHerence
is then discounted over the rest of the individual's lifetime. The project is
profitable if earnings forgone are less than the present value of future in-
creases in earnings. Apart from the difficult-c-perhaps impossible-task of
measuring productivity from earnings data, the above shows that the criterion
used in cost-benefit analysis in education is based on the assumption that the
stock of educational capital, and therefore its marginal productivity, is un-
changed over time. So, for a singlemarginal "dose" of new educational capital,
the criterion used in cost-benefit analyses in education is consistent with our
model and its objective function.
At most, however, the criterion indicates whether the actual stock of educa-
tional capital exceeds or falls short of the optimal stock. The cost-benefit
criterion cannot give any indication of the optimal path outside the steady-
state optimum. The distinction between the stock of educational capital and
the flow of additions to this stock is crucial here. The cost-benefit criterion
does not say anything about the relation between the actual flow and the
optimal flow at a given point in time. It does not followfor instance, that the
actual flow of new educational capital should be increased permanently if the
actual stock of educational capital falls short of the optimal stock.
If we now return to the case where the stock of educational capital enters
the socialwelfare function, the expression corresponding to (22)willbe:
IL= - I:('B+::)g'e-<p+Q)tdt• (25)
Not surprisingly, (25) shows that ceteris paribus benefits from education,
and accordingly, the optimal investment in education, would now be higher
due to the positive term uBluz• (25) is a formalization of the informal "rule"
often encountered in the economicsof education literature that a term which
represents the "consumption benefits" from higher knowledge should be
"added to the monetary returns". Obviously,a priori knowledgeof the marginal
rate of substitution of goods for educational capital for all values of X and E
would be required in order to make such a procedure operational.
VI. Conclusions
a) In the casewhere the sole raison d'ltre of the educational sector is its ultimate
contribution to the production of goods in society, there is a unique and con-
stant stock of educational capital that is optimal. This steady-state level of
knowledge can only be reached assymptotically.
b) This feature of the solution is changed when the stock of knowledgein
itself enters the social welfare function. Under this assumption, there is in
Swed. J. oj Economic» 1975
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general no unique steady-state stock of educational capital that is optimal.
In the case of multiple equilibria, the optimal stockof educational capital
will in general depend on the initial stock. An optimal policy, however, will
still be consistent in the sense that once an optimal policy has been found at
the beginning of the planning period, it will not be revised later on in the
planning period.
c} It has been shown that, properly understood, the cost-benefit criterion
usually proposed in the literature on the "economics of education" is consistent
with the optimality condition in our model. Itmust be stressed, however, that
this criterion deals only with the optimalstock of educational capital in relation
to the actual stock-it does not say anything about the optimal allocation of
labor to the educational sector when the actual stock of educational capital
diverges from the optimal one.
Appendix
To establish the saddle point property of (pco, ECO), make a linear expansion
of (lO) and (H) around (pco, ECO):
s= (I-' +e) (p -pCO) - (UzfEE+UEE) (E - ECO)
E -:::!g'L,,(p-pCO) -I-'(E - ECO).
The behavior of the system around (pco, ECO) is determined by the charac-
teristic roots of the matrix
i.e. the roots of the equation
viz.
Ås the expression under the square root sign is positive and greater than e.
both roots are real but have opposite signs. Consequently, (pco, ECO) is a saddle
point.
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ECONOMIC GROWTH AND THE ALLOCATION OF LABOUR BETWEEN EDUCATION
AND GOODS PRODUCTION: POSITIVE AND NORMATIVE ASPECTS.
By Jostein Aarrestad
l. Introduction.
The total resources ofa country may conventionally be grouped
as follows:
(a) Physical Capital
(b) Natural Resources
(c) Population
(d) Educational Capital
All these resources may be increased or reduced over time, con-
sciously or unconsciously. While there is a vast literature
relating to the optimal development of (a) over time and a
growing literature regarding (b) and (c), very little has so
far been published on the optimal management of a society's
educational capitalover time. Traditionally, economists have
regarded the production factor "labour" as homogenous. The
quality of labour has been assumed constant over time. However,
by altering the allocation of resources to e.g. the educational
sector, the quality of labour may be consciously changed. Socie-
ty is then faced with a dynamic optimization problem since to
the extent resources are allocated to the educational sector
~, in order to make labour more productive later, these resour-
ces cannot be used for producing goods and (other) services
now.
Special aspects of this problem have been treated by Razin [5]1
and [6] and Dobell and Ho [l]. A more general analysis has been
given by Uzawa [8] and,recently, by Manning [4]. This paper, which
is a generalization of [10], also attempts a general approach to
the problem. A problem in Uzawa's paper is that he is not explicit-
ly concerned with the optimal management of the stock of educat-
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ional capitalover time, but with the rate of improvement 1n
labour efficiency, which in his formulation can never be nega-
tive. In our context this would mean that the stock of educat-
ional capital, i.e. the stock of knowledge in society, can never
be reduced, even if there is no activity in the educational
sector. This does not seem entirely realistic, and we will analyze
a model where this is avoided. The model can also be used to give
a positive analysis of the interdependence between the educati-
onal sector and the rest of the economy during a process of
economic growth. So far, according to Wan [9], p. 231, "there has
been no"positive" growth model incorporating the features of
education". The solution in the positive model can then be con-
fronted with the optimal solution. Other new features in this model
are: (i) The effect on the optimal allocation of labour over time
from different rates of technological progress in the educational
sector and the rest of the economy is analyzed, and (ii) instead
of being used rather ad hoc as in the "economics of education"
literature, investment criteria for the allocation of labour to
the educational sector can now be derived from an explicit dynamic
optimization model.
2. The Model.
Since the ma1n problem is to find optimal paths for the allocation
of labour over time, a dynamic model is needed. The model consists
of two sectors - an educational sector producing "knowledge"
which we shall call "educational capital" and a goods-producing
sector. The main simplifications are that we disregard physical
capital, so that labour and educational capital are the only spe-
cified factors of production. The model is therefore more relevant
to an economy rich in physical capital and where labour is a
"bottle-neck", as e.g. Norway. The production period in the edu-
cational sector is overlooked. Labour is here to be understood as
completely uneducated labour, so we have made the abstraction of
completely separating the productivity of educational capital from
the productivity of "raw" labour in the production process. The
amount of "raw" labour employed in the educational sector is de-
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noted by L2 and the output in this sector is denoted J(t). At
any point in time, t, output in the educational sector is given
by
(1) J(t) = G(L2(t»; GI > 0, Gli :::O.
When Gli = 0, GI will be denoted by a. J(t) is net 1n the sense
that any output in the educational sector that is subsequently
used as input (as when students become teachers after graduation)
is not included in J(t)~)The output in the goods-producing sector
is produced according to the following production function:
(2) X(t) = F(Ll(t), E(t».
Here X(t) is total production of goods at time t, LI (t) is the
amount of "raw" labour allocated to goods production, and E(t)
is the level of knowledge 1n society, a stock called the stock
of educational capital. F is assumed to be strictly concave wihh
positive and diminishing marginal productivities. Also
F(LI (t), O) = F(O, E(t» = O. In other words (2) says that the
level of goods production in society depends on the level of
knowledge, which we have called educational capital, since it
is produced in the educational sector, and on the amount of
labour allocated to the gocds-producing sector. Production
functions expressing the same idea can be found in [2]. (See
e.g. page 14 and model 7.1 page 36.) We shall not here dwell
upon the problems of measuring the educational capital in
society. In principle they are similar to the problems of
measuring the stock of physical capital. Several attempts to
measure the stock of educational capital in different countries
have been made, see e.g.those mentioned in [7], in chapter 20,
p. 523 and the discussion on page 742. A detailed estimate of
the educational capital in Norway in 1950 and 1960 is presented
in [3]. There seems to be a better empirical basis for (2) than
for the production functions used by Uzawa in [8]. The stock of
educational capital is built up through the gro~s addition to
the existing stock J(t), given by (1). On the other hand, it
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depreciates since educated people die, knowledge gets obsolete and
people forget what they once learned. E(t) is assumed to depre-
ciate at a constant rate ~. The equation of motion for the state
variable of the problem, E(t), is therefore:
(3) E(t) = J(t) - ~E(t),
where E(t) d~~t) is the net increase in E(t) at point in time
t. We assume that there is initia11ya stock of educational capi-
tal, EO' so that
(4) E(O) = E 2)O·
Finally, there is a fixed proportion between the population and
labour force L(t).L grows at the exponential rate n, so that
(5 ) L(t)
and we have full employment, i.e.
(6 )
Assume now tHat F is homogenous of degree one in its two arguments,
so that
(7) E= F(I ,1)
l
where
E is the aggregate educational capital ratio, andu = L
11
L1 is the part of the available labour force=-L
allocated to goods production.
Similarly, 12 is the part of the total labour force allocated to
the educational sector, so that
30
(7) says that the average labour productivity in the goods-
producing sector, i.e. total production of goods per man-year
worked, is an increasing function of the level of knowledge
per worker - which seems very reasonable. From (7) we now have
(9)
Since ~~ = f'(~), we have from the properties of (2) that
1
(lOa)
Also
(10b)
which by the assumptions on (2) is positive. For reasons to
become clear later on, we also assume that
(11 ) f' (O) > II +nav
where a and v will be defined later. The development of the
aggregate educational capital/labour ratio u over time is given
by
(12 ) u(t) = h(t) - AU(t)
where
h = J 3)
L
L
= n and A = II + n.
L
Assume proportionality between output and input in the educat-
tional sector, -so that J = aL2 or, dividing by L and using (8),
(13 ) h = a ( 1- 1 1) ,
31
where a is a constant factor of proportionality. (9), (12)
arid (13) are three relations between four time functions,
x(t), u(t), het) and 11(t), hence the model is not yet deter-
mined. It can be "closed" either
(i) by a description of how 11 is actually determined in
an economy (~ descriptive mode1),or
(ii)by choosing 11 Ct ) such that the development over time
of the economy from a given initial situation is
optimized (an optimization mo~e1). Let us treat the
two possibilities in turn.
3. Descriptive Theories.
a) It is a well-known fact that demand for education and the
level of income in a society tend to vary in the same direction.
At the individual level, the reason may be that education gets
more profitable as income per capita in society increases
or education is a normal consumption good. Paralell to the
treatment of total savings in relation to total income in the
andl
neoclassical model of economic growth, the simplest way to forma-
lize this relation is to assume a fixed relation between the part
of the population that, at any time, is undertaking education and
production per capita, so that
(14)
where v is a constant. (8), (9), (12), (13) and (14) is now a
determined model in x, u, h , 11 and 12, To study the development
over time of this system from a given initial situation, we
substitute (14) in (13) and (13) in (12) which yields
or, dividing by 11:
(15)
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To analyze (15), define z = ~.11
Instead of (15) we then have
(1Sb)
11z + -- Z = avf(z) - Az.11
From (14)
v11f'(z)z
1+vf(z) .
Using this expression in (lSb) we obtain
(1Sc) • = 1+vf(z)[avf(z) - AZ]z 1+vø(z)
where
ø(z) ax= = f(z)-f'(z)z > 0,aLl
which means that
1+vf(z)
1~vø(z) > ° for all z.
For this reason and because of (lOa) and (11), there exists
a unique and globally stable steady-state educational capital
intensity z* = (lu)*, such that
1
(16) avf(z*) = AZ*.
This solution is illustrated in figures 1 and 2 below.
enf(z),
AZ
z(t)
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AZ
z* z(t)
Fieure l
Figure 2
From the definition of z:
.u = 11 ( 1 tv If> (z ) ) Z1 + vf(z)
which means that
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l (1+vØ(z»
z O <=> . O, since * O= u = vf(z)1 +
(17 ) and
sign Z sign . since 1.1(1+vØ(z» > O •= u, 1 + vf(z)
(17) shows that the steady-state level of z is also a
steady-state level of u, with the same stability properties
as the steady-state level of z. This means thatI is constant
or that the total educational capital in society grows at the
same rate as the exogenously given growth rate of population.
Also, since in this steady state both u and 1u are constant,
11 must be constant as well, i.e. a constant traction of the
population will be allocated to the educational sector. From
(9) it then follows that Iwill be constant which means that
total goods production in society grows at the same rate as the
population.
b) Another possible assumption as regards the allocation of
labour to the educational sector would simply be that, at any
point in time, a constant fraction of the population is in the
educational sector. Such a relation might e.g. be the result
of a conscious educational policy. Denoting the constant 12 by12, we would then from (12) have that u = al2 - Au which has the
solution
(18)
where uo is the initial educational capital intensity.
a -Provided uo < X 12, u(t) in (18) will rise asymptoticallya -towards a steady-state level given by u = X 12.
Therefore, under the above two behaviour assumptions, which do
not seem unreasonable, the economy would move towards a stable
steady state with a constant level of educational capital per
worker. The level of this steady-state educational capital
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-intensity depends on a, ~, nand 12 (or v under assumption
a». When 12 = 1 we will asymptotically reach the highest
possible sustainable u, denoted by ~, where ~ is given by
'" au = J' A natural question now is: What is the "best" steady-
state level of educational capital per worker? For given a
and A, the problem is then to find the "best" value of 12
(or 11),
4. Normative Analysis.
a) A "golden rule" - type of analysis.
The golden rule in standard growth theory 1S that steady-
state capital intensity (and associated savings ratio) that
maximizes consumption per capita in steady state. In this
model, where consumption does not enter explicitly, we would
naturally among the possible steady states choose that which
maximizes production per capita x, given by (9). Using 11
as a control variable in case b) above, given steady-state
a -u = r(1-l1)' we get the following first-order condition for a
maximum of x in a steady state:
(19 )
To interpret (19), multiply by 11, In addition we have that
ax
= aE
dEand dL2
a
= ~ (in steady state). We can now rewrite (19) as
which says simply that the part of the labour force in the
educational sector should be expanded until, in a stedy state,
the average product per worker k is equal to the indirect margi-
nal product of labour, that is the marginal product of educa-
tional capital times the effect on the educational capital
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of a marginal lncrease in the part of the labour force that is
in the educational sector. That (19) is a maximum condition
is clear since
(20)
The optimal 11 in a steady state given by (19) is a function
of the fraction r' To simplify notation, denote this fraction
by Z. The effect on the optimal 11 in a steady state from a
change in Z is then glven by
(21)
1 f' + Z(l -111
1)f"
Somewhat surprisingly, perhaps, the direction of this effect
is in general not determined. We see, however, that as 11
approaches 1, (21) will be negative. This means that when the
part of the labour force allocated to the educational sector
initially is "low", an increase ln CL, due to e.g. more efficient
teaching methods would increase the part of the labour force
allocated to the educational sector, while an increase in n -
the growth rate of the population, or in ~ - the rate of depre-
ciation of the educational capital, brought about by e.g. a rise
in the death rate, would reduce the part of the population
allocated to the educational sector. On the other hand, if 11
approaches zero, that is, the part of the labour force in the
educational sector is "high".~ then the opposite conclusion would
hold. It must be remembered that a golden rule - type of analysis
leads to normative results of rather doubtful relevance, since
the initial situation and the development over time towards a
possible stationary state is disregarded. The problem is reduced
to a choice between alternative bypothetica1 steady states with
alternative hypothetical constant 11 'so To take the initial
situation into account and find the possible optimal paths over
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time of 11 (t) from a given starting point, a dynamic analysis
is needed.
b) Optimization over time.
To find the optimal path of 11 over time, assume that society
wantsto maximize the present value of production per capita.
Suppose that the planning horizon is infinity. The objective
is then to maximize
(22)
00 -pt!x(t)e dt,
O
where p is the social rate of time preference, assumed positive
and constant. This integral will converge provided the rate of
growth in x is less than p.Substituting for x from (9) and
from (13) in (12) we get the following optimal control problem
with 11 (t ) as a control variable:
max /1011f(lu)e-Ptdt
O 1
s.t.
. 0.(1-11) AU(23) u = -
O 11
< 1< -
u(O) = u (given)o
lim u(t) is free
t-klO
(Since production would be zero if 1j = O, we restrict 11
to be positive). To solve problem (23), form the (present value)
Hamiltonian function
(24)
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Necessary conditions for a solution to (23) are that there
exists a continuous function p(t) such that
(25) p(t) = + f " (~) +(P+A)p(t)11
(26) u(t) = a(1-l1(t» - AU(t)
(27) aH f(~) f ' (~)~ > if 1.a11
= - - ap = O and = O 11 «11 11 11
p(t) can be interpreted as the "shadow-price" of u, i.e. p It )
expresses the increase in the optimal value of the objective
function obtained from adding "one extra unit" of educational
capital per capita to the stock of educational capital per
capita at point in time t. (25) shows the optimal path of this
shadow price. (26) is merelya repetition of (12). (27) is the
optimality condition for 11 at any t, saying that, for an
interior solution, the marginal product of labour in goods
production - d~X - should equal the marginal product of labour
1
allocated to the educational sector - a - times the shadow
price of u, that is p. If (27) hol&with strict inequality we
have a boundary solution and 11 = ,1. Since d~X and a are both
positive, p(t) must always be positive when tte solution is
interior. (27) shows that we may have two types of solutions,
depending on whether 11(t) is interior or not. Let us denote
the region where 11 is interior by N (for nonspecialization)
and the other by S (for specialization) and analyze them in turn,
beginning with N.
(i) The N-region.
(27) now determines an optimal 11, which, for a given a, depends
on u and p. That is
(28)
The essential feature of (28) is that
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g1ven as a function of p and u from
two autonomous differential equations
in u and p. This permits a two-dimensional graphic analysis
of the system from which the optimal trajectory of 11(t) will
emerge. The graph of pet) = O in the (p,u) phase-plane is a
horisontal line since
a11 11
(29) au = u
and
a11 (l13(30) 1ap = u2fll
Since the optimal 11 is
(28), (25) and (26) are
(31) *' I p=O =0.
For the slope of the graph of u et) = O we obtain
(32 ) ~du =u = O
which is positive. Before we discuss the solution graphically,
consider region S.
(ii) The S-region.
To study the boundary of the N-region, denote the set of
(p,u) values where 11 = 1 is an interior solution to (27) by B,
so that
B = {{p,u)lf{u) - f'{u)u = op},
Along B we then have that
dp = _ ~{f"{u)u} > Odu (l
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so that the boundary of the N-region has a positive slope.
Further, in region S we have
li = -AU < O
There is therefore no non-trivial stationary point for u in S.
p = O when
p = p1>..{f'(u)}
so that
(33) ~ I = _1_{f"(u)} < O.du p=O P+A
In figure 3, the above analysis of regions Nand S is illu-
strated in a phase-diagram i the (p,u) - plane. The S-region
is shaded, and the movements of u(t) and p(t) in the different
regions of the phase-plane are indicated by arrows.
00
p
11=0 inpet)
L N
p=O an N
inS
r
.
u= O in S r----
Figure 3.
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Some additional information on the phase-diagram:
i) B must start out from (0,0) since from the definitio~ of B
p = O => u = O and u O =>p = O.
ii) A point on B will, for a given p, always be to the right
of a point on u=o. This follows from (29).
iii) The curve u=O must also start out from (0,0), since from
(26) and (27) p=O => u=O and u=o => p=o.
iv) '" ;!.E_ infinity. This isAs u approaches u,
dulu=o
approaches
since dp is always positive and for > . is al-so
dulu=o
u u, u
ways negative.
The equilibrium of the system LS represented by the intersection
of ~(t)=O and u(t)=O. Thus it can be stated that there must exist
a unique optimal stationary state for p and u - (poo, uoo) - such
that
(*) 00u a.l (00 uoo)= I 2 P ,
and
(**) 00p
00
_1_f, (u )p+l l1(poo, uoo)
This point is shown in the phase-diagram. Since p and u are
stationary Ln this point, Ii (i=1,2) will also be constant.
The equilibrium of the system is therefore a state of propor-
tional growth, where the absolute value of all variables grow
at the rate n over time. This state is reached only asympto-
tically. To interprete the equilibrium values of u and p, we
see that (**) multiplied by a. is the present value of a marginal
allocation of labour to the educational sector. In the statio-
nary state this value must, according to (27), be equal to the
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(instantaneous) marginal value of allocating labour to the
goods-producing sector. It is easily realized that if we
start from some arbitrary point in the phase-plane we do not
generally approach the equilibrium, and it is straight forward
00 00 •to show that (p ,u ) i.s a saddlep'oint.
c) The Optimal Policy.
Since (poo, uoo) is a saddlepoint, there is one and only one
path in the (p,u)-space converging to the equilibrium, so that
given an initial u there corresponds a unique p , which foro o
• • 00all u ~n N ~s p =p , such that a path starting from the pointo o
(p ,u ) will converge to the equilibrium (poo, uoo). Along this
o oS)
path, the optimal 11 is given as a function of u alone and
the optimal 11 can in principle be computed.
It remains to discuss possible optimal policies. Consider first
initial points in region N. 00If u(O) happens to be equal to u ,
then 11(0) can be chosen equal
of 11' and the optimal policy
If u(O) < uoo, find that 11(0)
to the optimal constant level
is to keep u and 11 constant.
00which satisfies (28) with p
inserted and reassign 11 (t) continuously to satisfy (28). Since,
by assumption, we are now on the optimal path, u(t) must increase,
00 •and from (26) we see.that u(t) approaches u asymptot~cally.
Since pet) is
through (28),
constant and 11 is an increasing function of u
l1(t) will increase as u(t) increases. This means
$lOthat when u(O) < u the initial 11 must be set below the
stationary value of 11' The part of the labour force that is
allocated to the educational sector will therefore decrease
as u increases3 and the lower the initial u iS3 the higher will
the initial l2 be. An economic explanation for this pattern can
be found in t&e fatt that the opportuni~y cost, ii term~ of
goods-production forgone~of allocating labour to the educational
sector is lower as long as u is "low~. This is because Ll anda21<
E are complement~ry (aL-aE > O) ~n gOOds production, since F
1
is homo~enous of degree one. Since u is reached only asymptoti-
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a2l 1cally and --2-
aualso be reached
< ° from (29), the optimal constant 11 will
only asymptotically. Opposite conclusions will
hold for the case when the initial educational capital intensi-
00ty is higher than u . In that case 12 would increase over time
from its initial level which would be less than 12. Again, the
stationary values for both u and 11 would be reached only
00asymptotically. Optimal paths for l2(t), assuming u(O) < u , from
two initial situations are illustrated in figure 4.
There is a striking contrast betweenthe optimal pattern of
labour allocation over time shown in this figure and the time-
form of l2(t) observed in actual life. In Norway, the part of
the population allocated to the educational sector on full-time
basis has been rising steadily over time, from e.g. 0,16 in 1955/
56 to 0,21 in 1972/73 and the trend is the same in other countries.
There is a very good correspondence between the actual pattern
of labour allocation over time and the time form of l1(t) implied
by the first positive model presented in the earlier part of
*this paper. For z < z .this model implies an increasing part of
the population in the educational sector over time. For reasons
outside this model such a development need not be inoptimal.
Education may e.g. be undertaken for consumption purposes. At
the end of this paper it will also be shown that the optimal time
form of l-1(t) is reversed in periods with rapid technological
progress in the goods-producing sector relative to the educational
sector. Except for such periods, however, the actual development
of l2(t) observed in most countries is not consistent with the
aim of maximizing some present value of production per capita.
Without going into the matter in detail here, an optimal time
form of l2(t) could perhaps be obtained in the positive model by
using taxes and/or subsidies to make the "educational prospensity"
v a decreasing function of production per capita.
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"low" u(O)
"high" u(O)
Figure 4. t
coAn extreme variant of the case where u(O) > u would be an
initial point in region S, that is (for) initial u's to the
right of ~ in figure 3. In S, the initial educational capital
intensity is so high that the whole labour force would be
allocated to
policy is to
S leading to
goods production. Given an u in S, the optimal
o
assign a p on the unique optimal trajectory ino
(pco,~). From the directions of movement of p
and u in S, indicated by the arrows, it follows that along the
optimal trajectory u must be decreasing and p increasing until
co -(p ,u) is reached. As that point in time, the system switches
into region N and follows the optimal policy outlined above
cofor the case uo > u . That the "candidate" optimal policies
discussed above are really optimal, is clear from the following:
a) The Hamiltonian function (24) is concave in u Ct ) and 11 (t)
simu1tanous1y, for given pet) and t.
b)
lim -pt cot~ ~ p(t)(u(t)-u) = o.
This is so since pet) is constant and as t+co u(t) approaches
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u~. Since the path satisfying (25) and (27) also satisfies a)
and b) above, it is indeed optimal.
Before we make a more thorough economic interpretation of the
optimality conditions, it may be of some interest to study how
the optimal steady state u and 11 depend on the parameters
ce ee eeof the problem. By (28), 11 depends on u and p , and by (25)
ec eeand (26), u and p depend on the values of a, n,~ and p.
Differentiating in (25) and (26) we get the following effects
on the optimal steady-state u (where the derivatives are
evaluated at pet) = u(t) = O):
(34 )
ee 11dU 1 Al }au = {-(1-l )[a- + p +D 1 u
ee
1 11 a
2l3au A) 1 p}ax- = {u(a- + p + - u2f"D u
213~ a 1dU 1 { p}ap =-- u2f"D
11 11 +A)D = -(a- + p + A)(a- < O.u u
(35)
(36 )
where
From these expressions we see that an increase in A (in n
~ .. ~and/or ~)reduces u ; that an 1ncrease 1n p also reduces u
and that an increase in a increases u~. These results will be
explained when we have found similar expressions for the
eepartials of p
00
(37) ~ = Oaa
00 00 11(38) ~ ~ 1 A)p}= = { c«-s-. + < O
dP dA D u
From (34) and since =
00 00
d11 dU
00
dP da
00
du da
> O,it is clear that
in the steady state, the higher a is, i.e. the more "efficient"
the educational sector is, .the greater is the part of the labour
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force engaged in goods production and the greater is the
educational level per worker. For the effect of a change in
00p on 11 we obtain after some manipulation
31 et11A.p
D { 2 > o.
u f"
(39 )
This means that an increase 1n the social rate of time prefer-
ence would reduce the stationary-state part of the labour force
employed in the educational sector, and from (36) it would also
reduce the optimal "education intensity" in steady state.
Finally,
(40)
A)
which is in generala1
1zero, however, ap-
lute values of flI,
indeterminate in sign. If f" approaches
approaches infinity so that for small abso-
(40) is positive, and the allocation of
labour to the educational sector should be reduced.
To summarize, the lower the rate of growth of the population
in a country is, the higher is the optimal level of education
among its citizens. Also if we associate the rate of depreci-
ation of human capital ~ with the death rate, we see that the
higher the death rate is, the lower is the optimal level of
knowledge in the population. Since the effect of A on 11 in
(40) is not clear, it is possible to imagine two countries of
which one has a higher death rate and rate of population growth
than the other and where this country optimally allocates a
larger part of its labour force to education only to obtain a
lower level of knowledge among its population. This shows the
relev~nce of demographic factors for optimal educational policies.
It shows also a vicious circle, since as long as industrially
underdeveloped countries have a higher A than developed ones,
it is, ceteris paribus, optimal for them to have a lower level
of knowledge in their work force then developed countries.
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(36) and (39) show, not surprisingly, that the optimal edu-
cational intensity and the part of the labour force allocated
to the educational sector are increased (reduced) if society
choos~ to evaluate present, as opposed to future, goods produc-
tion, lower (higher). Finally, increased efficiency in the
educational sector effective through a higher a, leads opti-
mally to a higher level of education per capita, and to a
smaller part of the" population in the educational sector at
.6)any tl.me.
5. Interpretation.
Let US examine the necessary conditions for optimality more
closely than was done in connection with (25), (26) and (27).
Combining (25) and (27), we obtain in N
(41)
or
(42) ll+n+p·
The MRS of L1 for E depends on the relative quantities of E and
L1 only. In the (E,L1)-p1ane depicted in figure 5, (42) is
therefore a ray through the origin, connecting all points on
the isoquants with slope +a+, labelled by MGR (for "Modified
II n P
Golden Rule") .
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\slope
a ~\
X
E
MGR
\ ox
\ .r=: a<, .\+p
Li
Figure 5
This ray shows the optimal expansion over time for E and Li'
in the stationary state (which is only reached asymptotically).
The other ray, labelled GR, 1S the expansion in Golden Rule
(when P=O). Figure 5 shows that there will be too much educat-
ional capital in Golden Rule and that the difference between
the GR and MGR levels of educational capital will increase
through time. The reason is, of course, that the "waiting
costs", expressed by p, of the "roundaboutness" of production
in this model is overlooked in GR. Su b a tLt u t Ln g a = dJ a ndLZ
(4Z) b· ax (l ax) dJ . ax _ f' u .we o ta1n aL = p+.\ ai dL . S1nce ai - (~)1S constant
. 1. Z . 11n steady state, the express10n above can be wr1tten as
CXI
(43) ax (O) = f ~ . dJ -(P+ll+n)tdaLl O aE dLZ
e t.
The LHS of (43) is the instantaneous loss of expanding the
number of students (and thereby reducing the number of workers)
with "one unit". The RHS gives the everlasting benefits (in
steady state) of expanding the number of students with one
unit. The investment criterion in steady state for allocating
labour to the educational sector should therefore be that the
instantaneous marginal cost of expanding the number of students
equals the present value (if the everlasting marginal benefit.
The effect of pbpulation growth and depreciation of human capi-
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tal is taken care of in the discount factor, which for this
reason is greater than the social rate of time preference.
The cost/benefit criterion cannot tell anything about the
optimal path outside the steady-state optimum. It does not
follow for instance, that the actual flow of new educational
capital should be increased if the actual stock of educational
capital falls short of the optimal stock. Outside the steady
state, the exact path for the allocation of labour to the
educational sector is determined by the optimal trajectory
in figure 3, represented by the horizontal line through
00p(t) = p' • Along this optimal trajectory the optimal l2(t) is
given as a function of u, and some of the properties of the
optimal time-form of l1(t) have been d[scussed earlier, and
illustrated in figure 4.
6. Modifications and extensions.
A number of extensions and modifications of the basic model
are possible. We shall consider two.
6.1. Variable labour-force participation ratio.
Consider first the case where the labour-force participation
ratio is a variable. Let
p(t) be the size of the population at t, and
L(t) the labour force at t.
Per capita variables be redefined: Emust now u = p'
h J
aL2 a12 where 12
L2 Defining 11 the= = = = -p-- . 1nP p
same way, we have
(44) L= p.
The crucial assumption we shall make now 1S that the labour-
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force participation ratio depends positive1yon the level
of education in society, so that
(45) L(t) = y(u)P(t)
which together with (44) means that
(46) 11 + 12 = y(u).
As before * = n, so that u = a12 - Au,where A = ~ + n.
uAlso x = 11f(1 ).1
Concerning the labour-force participation ratio, it seems
reasonable to think that it has the form shown below in
figure 6.
y(u)=~
y
uo u '"u u
Figure 6
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In words: From a given initial level of labour-force
participation in the population, determined by the initial
level of education, labour-force participation tends to in-
crease monotonously with u, but at a decreasing rate, until,
at some educational level in the population, U, less than
the largest sustainable level ~, the labour-force partici-
pation ratio reaches a maximum. The main justification for
this relation is to be found in the fact that female labour-
force participation increases with the level of education. The
value of y will depend on factors exogenous to this model,
especially the age distribution of the population. W'hen the
effect of education on labour-force participation is recognised,
it can be shown that the solution has the following properties:
~
a) If u = O and p = O intersect for u > u the equilibrium
values of p and u are the same as in the basic model, and the
constant optimal value of l~ is the same. The optimal path
A
towards the equilibrium point for u < u will, however, be
different when the effect of u on labour participation is re-
cognized. This is so since now the optimal trajectory for any
given u < u lies above the optimal trajectory in figure 3.
This means that the optimal 12(t) is higher now for all u < u.
Therefore: Until the level of education is reached where the
labour-force participation ratio is maximized, a greater part
of the labour force should now at any time be allocated to the
educational sector compared to the case where the labour-force
participation ratio is regarded as exogenous.
b) The other possibility is that u = O and p = O intersect
A
at u < u, so that the optimal equilibrium values of p and u,
which need not be unique in this case, are both above the cor-
responding values in the basic model. It means that if the
optimal level of knowledge is reached before the labour-force
participation has reached its maximum, both the optimal level
of knowledge and the optimal constant part of the labour force
allocated to the educational sector is higher than in the basic
model. The paths towards these levels have the same properties
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compared to the basic model as those discussed above when
A
u < u.
For the equilibrium level of p we now obtain
(47) p = _1_{f' (~ ) + wy' (u) ]
p+A 11
where w is the shadow price of labour. The present value of
a marginal allocation of labour
ap - now consists of two parts.
to the educational sector -
The first: a, f'(~l ) is the
p +/\ 1
present value of the marginal product of educational capital
in equilibrium multiplied by the marginal product of labour
in producing educational capital - a. The second:
P~A wy'(u) is the present value of the gain of available
labour due to a marginal increase of educational capital
in equilibrium, multiplied by a.
6.2. Technical Change.
Let now
X(t)
and
where E. is the rate of exogenous technical change in sector i
1.
(i = 1,2). In intensive terms:
(48) x(t)
and
(49)
Using (48) and (49) instead of (9) and (13) in (23) we
obtain
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(50) . a(1-11)e
c2t - AUu
. u c1t (p+.\)p.p = -f'(- )e +11'(51)
(50) and (51) now depend explicitly on time, which means
that the system is not autonomous any more, so that in
general there will not be any stationary points in the
(p,u)-p1ane. Still, some information on the optimal develop-
ment of the system when technical change is present can be
obtained from a phase-plane where time is regarded as a
variable. Consider first the case where there is technolo-
gical progress in goods production only, i.e., Cl > O, whereas
c2 = O. The scenario is set out in figure 7 below.
u=O
p(3)=0
p(2)=0
Il (1) =0
p(O)=O
u u
Figure 7
For t=O the u=O and p=O curves are well known. As t increases,
the u=O curve is not affected, since c2=0. For a given u,
however, the first term on the RHS of (51) shows increasingly
higher negative values as time elapses. To satisfy the equation,
p must therefore increase over time and the p=O-curve will
therefore shift upwards over time as indicated in the figure by
the dotted curves. Over time, the system would therefore
follow the arrow in the figure,
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with p and u steadily increasing and u approaching u.
Without technological progress in the educational sector,
a steady increase in u is only possible if the part of the
population allocated to education is increasing over time, so
a situation with no technical progress in the educational
sector, but with positive exogenous technical change in goods-
production leads optimally to an over-increasing part of the
population being employed in the educational sector. The
scenario of the opposite case, with E2 > O and El = O is set
out in figure 8.
u(O)=O u(l)=O u(2)=0
p
p=O
u
Figure 8
The curve p = O is now independent of time, while for a g~ven
u, p must decrease over time to satisfy (50). Over time, p will
therefore be constant while u will be for ever increasing.
This means that the part of the labour force employed in goods
production will be steadily increasing. With 11 and u increasing,
x(t) will also be ever-increasing. A combination of the two
cases, so that both~ and E2 are positive, would obviously also
lead to an ever-lasting increase in both p and u. The optimal
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path of 11(t) cannot generally be determined 1n this case.
As to the relevance of the above results, it seems that a
typical feature in the reLa tion between the educational
sector and the goods-producing sector in a modern society 1S
that technical progress in the educational sector is rather
slow compared to the goods-producing sector. In periods with
rapid technological progress in the goods-producing sector,
effects of the type discussed in the extreme case where El > O
and E2 = O may therefore be relevant. In such periods the con-
clusion in the basic model that the optimal 12(t) should
decrease over time must be reversed. Such a development for
the whole future is hardly optimal since p(t) is steadily in-
creasing. The opposite case, that Et= O and E2 > O seems less
relevant.
7. Summary.
Two positive models, based on reasonable behavioural assumptions
of labour allocation over time, are analyzed. Both of them
yield a unique, stable steady state where "knowledge per capita"
and the part of the labour force going into the educational
sector are constant over time. A golden rule for labour allo-
cation to the educational sector is considered. The allocation
of labour to the educational sector is then optimized over time.
A unique steady state optimum exists, which is reached only
asymptotically along the optimal path. The valuesof the vari-
ables in steady state are independent of the initial situation
and depends on the rate of social time preference, the efficiency
of the educational sector, the rate of depreciation of knowledge
and the rate of increase in population. Along the optimal path
the part of labour allocated to the educational sector should
be falling towards its stationary level if the initial level of
knowledge in society is less than the optimal level. Further, a
lower initial level of knowledge will lead to a higher initial
part of labour allocated to education. The allocation pattern along
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the optimal path may be reversed in periods with rapid
tecnological progress in goods production. Finally, criteria
for investment in education which have been used rather ad
hoc in the "economics of education" literature, may now be
derived from an explicit dynamic model.
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Appendix.
Denote the stock of educational capital used in the
educational sector by E2 and gross investment by J2.
Define H as total gross production of educational capital.
(Al) H = J + J2,
where J is defined in the text. Assume that H is produced
by a constant returns to scale production function F2 with
the usual properties
Efficient factor-combination implies a fixed relation be-
tween L2 and E2 for all H, so that, say E2 = kL2, whi6h means
that along the efficiency locus in the factor-plane H can be
*= F2(L2,kL2). Fromexpressed as a function of L2 alone: H
*(A.l) we now have J = F2(L2,kL2)-J2.
If we introduce depreciation also 1n this sector, we have that
or
so that
or
where
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(A.4) is approximated by (1) in the text which therefore holds
when the product kL2 is "sufficiently small".
As an e~amp1e regard L2 as pupils and E2 as teachers and
specify H as
H = min
We now obtain k = b. b is the teacher/pupil ratio, say 1/20.
Instead of (A.4) we now get
Historically L2 has been "small" compared to L2. In
periods with drastic changes in L2, however, (1) may not be
good approximation to (A.4)
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Notes.
* I am indebted to S. Strøm at the University of Oslo and
my colleague K.P. Hagen for extremely valuable comments.
This work was begun in 1973 when I was a visiting research
associate at the Economics Department, University of Cali-
fornia, Berkeley. Financial assistance from the Norway-
America Association is gratefully acknowledged.
l) The deriv.ation of the G-function, which is a first-order
approximation, is discussed in the appendix.
2) It might be objected that the treatment of educational
capital in (2), (3) and (4) is formally identical to the
treatment of physical capital in models of economic growth.
However, as long as a capital concept is used, this can
(and should) not be avoided. The point is that this model
- in contrast to mo.d.e.Ls of optimal savings-focuses on the
optimal allocation of labour to education, and the model
is constructed so as to make this analysis as explicit as
possible.
3) To avoid confusion with dotted variables, we have used h
instead of j, which would otherwise have been the natural
symbol to use here.
4) Because 11 enters (15), this differentialequation is not
formally identical to the so-called "fundamental differen-
tial equation of economic growth".
5) This path is the candidate optimal path-"candidate" S1-nce
we have not yet considered sufficiency.
6) This means that if e.g. a is decreased at tI, 11 would
make a negative Jump at t'. After tI, 11 would again
increase towards the new and lower optimal stationary level.
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OM OPTIMAL UTVIKLING AV EIN KUNNSKAPSBASERT
INDUSTRISEKTOR
Av JOSTEIN AARRESTAD*
1. Innleiing.
Tradisjonelt har økonomane betrakta produksjonsfaktoren «arbeids-
kraft» som homogen. Arbeidskraftas kvalitet har vore føresett konstant.
Men ved ymse tiltak, spesielt ved å byggja ut utdanningsnivået i
eit samfunn, kan ein medvete påverka kvaliteten av arbeidskrafta.
Ein annan måte å seia dette på, er at ein byggjer ut utdanningskapi-
talen i samfunnet. Problemet som då melder seg, er kor mye av sam-
funnets ressursar det er optimalt å satsa for å byggja ut og vedlikehalda
utdanningskapitalen i samfunnet. Det oppstår her eit optimaliserings-
problem av dynamisk art, fordi i den grad ressursar nå blir allokert
til utdanningssektoren for å auka utdanningskapitalen med sikte på å
kunne produsera meir i framtida, vil desse ressursane ikkje kunne
brukast til produksjon nå.
Inn under dette optimaliseringsproblemet fell ein velkjend påstand
frå norsk industripolitisk debatt etter krigen: «Vi må satsa på intel-
ligensindustri». Nemninga «kunnskapsbasert industri» er også brukt
i den seinare tid. Ein mulig måte å presisera og diskutera påstanden
på, er den følgjande analyse av ein enkel makroøkonomisk modell for
optimal utvikling av ein kunnskapsbasert industrisektor i eit samfunn."
Trass i den vekt utdanningsnivået i eit samfunn blir tillagt som
forklaringsvariabel for den økonomiske utviklinga, og trass i den store
mengd ressurs ar som til ei kvar tid går inn iutdanningssektoren i eit
samfunn, eksisterer det i litteraturen få arbeid som diskuterer den
optimale ressursbruk i utdanningssektoren frå eit dynamisk synspunkt.
Dette i motsetnad til den omfattande litteraturen om optimal akku-
mulering av realkapital. Ulike, men relaterte problem er tatt opp av
*Eg·"vil takka dosent Steinar Strøm, Universitetet i Oslo, for ei rekke nyttige
merknader ti} ein tidlegare versjon av denne artikkelen.
l Alternativt kan modellen tolkast som ein modell for optimal utvikling av ein
«moderne» sektor, i motsetnad til den «tradisjonelle» sektor, i eit u-land.
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Uzawa [8], Razin [6], Dobell og Ho [l] og nyleg av Manning [5].
Vi skal i denne artikkelen sjå på ei generalisering av modellen fram-
stilt i [9], sidan, mellom anna,
a) folkemengda nå ikkje er konstant, og
b) økonomien nå er delt i tre sektorar, noe som gjer at det kan vera
fleire regime i den optimale politikk.
Hovudproblema i denne artikkelen er å finna optimale banar for
allokeringa av arbeidskrafta over tid mellom dei tre sektorane i øko-
nomien. For å kunne svara på slike spørsmål trengst det ein dynamisk
modell. Vi oppnår enklast mulig matematiske uttrykk ved ei konti-
nuerlig formulering av modellen.
2. Modellen.
Modellen består som sagt av tre sektorar - ein utdanningssektor
som produserer kunnskap, som vi vil kalla utdanningskapital, og to
sektorar for vareproduksjon. Den første vareproduksjonssektoren bru-
kar utdanningskapital i produksjonen, la oss kalla den sektoren intel-
ligensindustrien. Den andre vareproduksjonssektoren brukar ikkje
utdanningskapital i produksjonen. Ei slik forenkling er ei tilnærming
til det faktiske forhold at utdanningskapitalen per arbeidar varierer
ganske mye mellom dei forskjellige næringane, og også mellom dei
forskjellige industrigreinene, sjå t.d. [2].
Hovudforenklinga er elles at realkapitalen ikkje er spesifisert i
modellen, slik at arbeid og utdanningskapital er dei einaste produk-
sjonsfaktorane. Modellen vil derfor vera mest relevant for ein økonomi
rik på realkapital, der arbeidskrafta er ein «flaskehals» (som Norge?).
Produksjonsperioden i utdanningssektoren er også oversett. «Arbeid»
må forstås som fullstendig uutdanna arbeidskraft, fordi vi har gjort
den abstraksjon å skilja utdanningskapitalens produktivitet fullstendig
frå det «rå» arbeidets produktivitet i produksjonsprosessen.! Vi går
da over til å spesifisera modellen. •
Mengda «rå» arbeidskraft sysselsett i utdanningssektoren kall ar vi
L3 og produksjonen i denne sektoren kallar vi J. For å forenkla går vi
1Meir fruktbart i problemstillinga om intelligensindustri er det å tolka «rå»
arbeidskraft som arbeidarar med bare elementær, obligatorisk utdanning.
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ut frå at det er eit fast forhold mellom produksjon og innsett mengd
arbeidskraft i denne sektoren, slik at på eit kvart tidspunkt t er
(l) J(t) = aLa(t),
der a er ein konstant.
J er netto i den forstand at eit kvart produkt frå utdanningssektoren
som sidan blir sett inn igjen i utdanningssektoren, som t.d. når ein
student blir lærar etter eksamen, ikkje er inkludert i J.
I «intelligensindustrien» er produktfunksjonen
der
Xl(t) - totalproduksjon i denne sektoren
Ll(t) - den mengd arbeidskraft som er sysselsett i intelligensindu-
strien
E(t) = den totale utdanningskapital i samfunnet:
F antar vi er konkav med positive og avtakande grenseproduktivi-
tetar. E og L er komplementære, dvs. o2FfoEaLl > O.
Vidare er
F(O, E) = F(Ll, O) = O
FE(O, E) = O.l
(2) seier altså at produksjonen i intelligensindustrien avheng av
kunnskapsmengda i samfunnet og den mengd arbeidskraft som er i
denne sektoren. Produktfunksjonar som uttrykker same ide, kan ein
finna i [3], t.d. modell ~.1. på side 36. Vi skal ikkje her diskutera
problema med å måla utdanningskapitalen. Fleire freistnader på å
gjera det i ulike land er gjort, sjå t.d. [7], kapittel 20 og diskusjonen
s. 742. I [4], har E. Hoffmann berekna utdanningskapitalen i Norge
i 1950 og 1960.
Behaldninga av utdanningskapital får til ei kvar tid ein brutto
tilvekst J. På den andre sida har vi også ei form for kapitals lit her,
sid an utdanna folk døyr, visse typar kunnskap blir økonomisk mindre
verdifulle på grunn av den tekniske utvikling, og dessutan gløymer
(2a)
l Her er FE = aFlaE.
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folk til stadighet det dei eingong lærde. Om kapitalslitet antar vi
enkelt at det utgjer ein konstant del fl av behaldninga til ei kvar tid,
slik at
(3) i(t) = J(t) - pE(t).
Initialt antar vi ei gitt behaldning av utdanningskapitallik ED.
I vareproduksjonssektor 2 tenkjer vi oss at produksjonen skjer ute-
lukkande ved hjelp av arbeidskraft. For å få mest mulig enkle uttrykk
går vi ut frå at det også i denne sektoren er eit fast forhold mellom
produksjonen og den innsette mengd arbeidskraft, slik at
(4)
der
X2 er produsert mengd i denne sektoren,
L2 er den mengd arbeidskraft som er sysselsett her og
f3 er ein positiv konstant.
Vidare går vi ut frå at det er eit fast forhold mellom folkemengda
og totaltilgangen på arbeidskraft, L(t), og at L(t) veks med ein eksogen
og konstant tilvekstrate n, slik at
(S) L(t) = Loent; Lo er gitt.
Den samla sysselsetting i dei tre sektorane kan ikkje overstiga total-
tilgangen av arbeidskraft, dvs.
(6)
Anta nå at F er homogen av grad 1 i L1 og E slik at
(7)
der u = ElL er den aggregerte utdanningsintensiteten, dvs. utdan-
ningskapitalen per arbeidar i økonomien, og II = L11L er den delen
av totaltilgangen på arbeidskraft som er allokert til intelligensindu-
strien.
(7) seier at den gjennomsnittlege arbeidsproduktivitet i intelligens-
industrien, dvs. totalproduksjonen per årsverk, er ein stigande funksjon
av kunnskapsnivået per arbeidar - noe som ikkje verkar urimeleg.
X11L1 er den totale produksjon per arbeid ar i sektor 1. Vi er meir
4
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interessert i totalproduksjonen i sektor lper arbeidar totalt i økono-
mien, Xl = XIIL. Frå (7) får vi då
(8)
Sidan
aXI/CJE =1'(ulll)
har vi frå eigenskapane ved (2) at
(9) l'> O og J" < o.
Dessutan er
(10)
Utviklinga av den aggregerte utdanningsintensiteten u over tid er
gitt ved
!_(u(t)) = Il = !_(~)= J(t) - flEet) _ L(t) u(t)
dt dt L L(t) L(t)'
slik at
(11) Il (t) = het) - AU(t),
der
h = JIV,
LIL = n
og
A = fl + n.
Divisjon med L i (1) gir
(12) het) = als
der Is = LslL dvs. den delen av totaltilgangen på arbeidskraft som er
allokert til utdanningssektoren.
Dividerer vi så med L i (4) får vi
(13)
1For å unngå forvirring m.o.t. variablar med prikk over skal vi bruka h i staden
for j, som elles ville yore mest naturleg.
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der
Xa = X2/L dvs. gjennomsnittsproduksjonen av vare 2 per arbeid ar
totalt i økonomien, og
12= L2/L er den delen av totaltilgangen på arbeidskraft som blir
allokert til sektor 2. Til sist vil (6) på intensiv form bli
(14) 11 + 12 + 13 < 1.
(8), (11), (12), (13) og (14) er fem relasjonar i sju funksjonar, xl(t),
x2(t), u(t), het), ll(t), 12(t) og 13(t). Modellen som den står har altså
nå to fridomsgrader .
Men ved å velja t.d. II(t) og l2(t) slik at utviklinga av økonomien
frå ein gitt initialsituasjon blir optimalisert, vil modellen bli determi-
nert. Implisitt i eit slikt optimalt forløp av økonomien vil det då vera
eit svar på om, og under kva slags forhold, det lønner seg å «satsa»
på intelligensindustri. Oppgava er altså å finna den optimale allo-
kering av arbeidskrafta mellom dei tre sektorane, gitt (8), (11), (12),
(13), (14), Eo og Lo.
Samfunnets velferd, W, vil til ei kvar tid avhenga av dei produserte
mengdene per capita av dei to varene, dvs.
W = W(xl, x2).
Vi skal anta Wadditiv, slik at
(15)
der
U' > 0, U" < 0,
V' > 0, V" < °
og der
lim V' (x2) = 00
x.~o
Vidare skal vi anta at samfunnet har ein uendelig lang planleggings-
horisont, at det ikkje er noen restriksjonar på verdien for u på noe
tidspunkt og at den sosiale diskonteringsraten er ein konstant p > O.
1Det er altså bare nytten til eit representativt individ som tel i W-funksjonen.
Alternativt kunne folkemengda trekkjast inn ved at t.d. W = L(t)[U(x1) + V(x.)].
Argumenta for dette er etter mi meining ikkje overtydande.
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3. Anaryse av modellen.
For å letta oversikta samlar vi relasjonane ovanfor. Vi får då det
følgjande problem i optimal kontrollteori :
(16)
CJ)
Maks J [U(xl) + V(x2)]e-ptdt
Xl = lJ(u/ll)
x2 = (Jl2
ti = h -AU
h = ala
Il + 12 + la < 1
O < li < 1; i= 1,3
0<12 < 1
u(O) .= Uo (gitt)
lim u(t) er fri
1__CJ)
når
På grunn av føresetnaden om V(x2) vil det alltid vera produksjon i
sektor 2. A priori treng det derimot ikkje vera optimalt å ha produk-
sjon i intelligensindustrien og/eller utdanningssektoren.
Vi vil derfor ha fire mulige regime i den optimale løysinga, skje-
matisk oppstilt i tabell l:
Tabell 1.
Regime 11 l. la
A >0 >0 >0
B >0 >0 O
C O >0 >0
D O 1 O
La oss først studera den optimale utvikling i økonomien under
regime A, dvs. når ei indre løysing er optimal.
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3.1 Indre løysing
Det vil nå vera optimalt å allokera arbeidskraft til alle tre sektorane.
Ved å danna Lagrange-funksjonen L, der
L = e-pf{U(IJ(u/ll)) + V(fJI2) + peals - AU)
+ w(I =l, -12 -la)},
finn vi dei følgjande nødvendige vilkår for å løysa (16):
Det eksisterer ein kontinuerlig p(t), slik at
(17)
(18)
p = - U'[f'(u/ll)] + (p + A)P, og
U'[J - (u/lI)f'] = V'fl = ap = w.
Endelig må (Il) sjølsagt halda. (Banar som tilfredsstiller (17), (18)
og (Il) og tilsvarande vilkår for andre regime er kandidatar til den
optimale politikk, korvidt dei verkeleg er optimale, skal vi koma til-
bake til). w er her arbcidskraftas skuggepris, mens p er den adjungerte
variabelen til rørslelikninga.
(18) seier at for å ha eit optimum, må til ei kvar tid grensenytten
av produksjonen multiplisert med arbeidets grenseprodukt i begge
vareproduksjonssektorane vera lik, og lik skuggeprisen på arbeidskraft.
Denne felles storleiken må igjen vera lik ap, dvs. skuggeprisen på
utdanningskapital multiplisert med a - arbeidskraftas grensepro-
duktivitet i å produsera utdanningskapital. Meir fullstendig: pCt) kan
noe upresist tolkast som auken i den optimale verdi av kriteriefunk-
sjonen av å leggja til «ei eining ekstra» av utdanningskapital til
behaidinga av utdanningskapital på tidspunkt t. Det framgår av (18)
at p og w begge må vera positive. Full sysselsetting er derIor alltid
optimalt, og (14) må alltid halda med likskapsteikn. Langs den
optimale bane for p må (17) vera tilfredsstilt.
Ved ei indre løysing er w, Il' 12 og dermed la implisitt gitt som
funksjonar av U og p frå (18). Definer
(19)
Fordi lt/Cu/ll) er konkav i Il og U, og fordi U er ein stigande og
konkav funksjon av Xl' er q konkav.
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(20)
Implisitt derivasjon i (18) gir, ved bruk av (19), at!
1
all/ou = - q'u/qll; all/ap = a/qll'
al2/au = O; ol2/op = a/V"IP,
aw/ou = O; ow/oP = a.
Med w og l, (i = 1, 2, 3) som funksjonar av p og u, er (11) og (17)
to autonome differensiallikningar i u og p. Vi kan då foreta ein to-
dimensjonal grafisk analyse av dette systemet. Ved å setja inn frå (20)
finn vi frå (11) at langs kurva for li = O er
dp A + a(oll/au)--
du a(all/ap + oI2/oP)
og frå (17) 'at langs p = O er
(22) dp _ q'u(alt/ou) + quu
du - p + A - q'u(fJI1/ap)
(21)
Ved å setja inn for (all/aU) kan (22) skrivast som
dp = (l/qll)[ - (q'u)2 + qllquu]
du - q'u(oll/ap) + (p + A)
Sidan q er konkav, er teljaren i (22) negativ, men bortsett frå det,
strekk ikkje konkaviteten til for å bestemma forteiknet på (21) eller
(22). Det problematiske leddet er q,u som vi må anta positivt, noe det
vil vera hvis t.d. krumninga på U-funksjonen er «tilstrekkeleg liten».
I så fall er nemnaren i (22) positiv, slik at (22) er negativ, mens (21)
er positiv.
Den høgaste utdanningskapitalen som kan oppretthaldast, U,
følgjer av ,
t al = AU,
dvs.
U = a/A.
I (p,u)-planet framstilt i figur l, må kurva for li = O starta frå (0,0).
Dette fordi (11) os: (20) betyr at u = O => P = O for at li = O. Om-
1Her er q,.. = a1q/alau osh.
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olu=
I
L II
I
._l I
I
pCO I
I I
11 p=O
I
UCO ii u
Figur 1.
vendt vil p = O => u = O. Når u nærrnar seg fi, må ri = O bli «lodd-
rett». Dette fordi kurva alltid er stigande for u < 17" mens for u> u
er ri alltid negativ.
Forma på il = O i (11) er derfor som vist i figur 1, der også u er
avsett.
Kurva for p = O er fallande mot høgre i diagrammet, og p er
alltid positiv.
Jamvel om den eksakte form på kurvene for ri = O og p = O er
vanskeleg å firma, veit vi nå nok til å fastslå at det må eksistere eit og
bare eit stasjonærnivdfor p og u - (pa>, u" - slik at
(23)
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og
(24)
Dette er vist i figur l.
Sidan p og u er stasjonære i dette punktet, vil også l" (i = 1,2, 3)
vera konstante over tid når p og u er lik sine stasjonærverdiar. (24)
multiplisert med a er den neddiskonterte verdien av ei marginal
allokering av arbeidskraft til utdanningssektoren. I stasjonærtilstanden
skal denne i følge (18) vera lik den marginale verdi av å allokera
arbeidskraft til dci to andre sektorane.
Pilene viser dei dynamiske kreftene som verkar på systemet i dei
forskjellige regionane i fase-planet. Det er visuelt intuitivt, og kan
lett visast at (pa>, u" er eit sadelpunkt. Det vil seia at det er ein og
bare ein bane i (P, u)-planet som fører til (pa>,u" slik at til ein kvar
initial Uo korresponderer det ein eintydig Po, slik at ein bane som
startar i (Po, uo), konvergerer mot (pa>,ua». Denne banen er innteikna
i figuren. Vi skal seinare visa at denne banen verkeleg er optimal.
Løysinga av optimumsproblemet når vi har ei indre løysing, er
altså å Iinna den initiale Po og så følgja den optimale banen mot
(pa>, ua». Kva karakteriserer så denne optimale banen? Frå figuren
ser vi at for Uo < u" er pet) fall ande over tid, mens u(t) er veksande.
Kunnskapsmengda i samfunnet vil altså vera monotont stigande mot
u", som bare vil nåast assymptotisk.
Kva så med den optimale allokering av arbeidskraft over tid til dei
tre sektorane langs den optimale banen? Frå (18) har vi at
(25)
Hvis Uo < u", er p < O og ri > O. Av (25) ser vi då at langs den
optimale banen er 11 (t) stigende, dvs. den delen av totaltilgangen på arbeidskraft
som er allokert til intelligensindustrien, skal stiga over tid. Tilsvarande for la
får vi at
12= (oI2/ap)p
slik at for Uo < u" skal også allokeringa av arbeidskraft til vareproduksjons-
sektor 2 stiga over tid langs den optimale banen.
Det følgjer då at 13(t) dvs. den delen av totalt ilgangen på arbeidskraft som
optimalt blir allokert til utdanningssektoren, må oerafallande over tid. Vidare
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t
Figur 2.
ser vi frå figur 1 at di lågare Uo er, di høgare vil Po vera, og di høgare
vil den initialt optimale 13 vera (med tilsvarande lågare utgangspunkt
for 11 og 12). Den optimale bane for 13 frå to ulike initialsituasjonar for u
er illustrert i figur 2.
Motsette konklusjonar vil halda hvis Uo > u", Då vil 13 tilta over
tid, mens 11, 12 og u vil falla over tid langs den optimale banen. Endeleg,
hvis tilfeldigvis Uo = u"', kan 1,(0) vcljast lik sine optimale konstante
verdi ar, og den optimale politikk er å halda l, konstant. I teorien
kan det også tenkjast at Uo er så høg at det er optimalt åsetja 13(0) = O.
Dette skal vi kommentera seinare saman med alternativet at den
optimale ll(t) = O for noen t. Foreløpig held vi oss til ein situasjon
der ei indre løysing for l, er optimal, noe som truleg også er mest
relevant.
Resultata ovanfor gjeld for gitte, konstante verdiar av parametrane
i modellen. Det kan då vera av ei viss interesse å studera korleis det
optimale nivå for p, u, Il) Xl og X2 til ei kvar tid avheng av parametrane
i problemet, a, ;. og p. Ved å derivera implisitt i (17) og (11) med l, =
1,(P, u) får vi dei følgjande verknader på dei optimale stasjonære
verdiane av u og p :
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Den optimale stasjonære utdanningskapitalen per arbeidar vil gå
ned når samfunnets tidspreferanserate aukar, dvs. når samfunnet vel
å leggja meir vekt på produksjon idag, i motsetnad til i morgon.
Vidare ser vi at eit positivt skift i utdanningssektorens produktivitet,
a, på grunn av til dømes effektive læremidlar og læremetodar, fører
til ein høgare optimal utdanningskapital. Ein raskare vekst i befolk-
ninga og/eller depresisering av utdanningskapitalen ved t.d. at eksi-
sterande kunnskap blir raskare økonomisk verdilaus, vil ha den mot-
sette verknad. Utdanningskapitalens skuggepris går ned når tidsprefe-
ranseraten aukar, og den går også ned når utdanningssektorens
effektivitet aukar, Verknaden på skuggeprisen av ei endring i A er
uklar.
Korleis blir så allokeri"ga av arbeidskraft mellom dei tre sektorane
påverka av skift i parametrane ? Frå (22) avheng l/X> av pr¥> og u"
som igjen er Iunksjonar av p, A og a. Ved å setja inn i
ser vi at når effektiviteten i utdanningssektoren, a, går opp, vil [lOg
12 begge gå opp, dvs. allokeringa av arbeidskraft til utdannings-
sektoren går ned, mens allokeringa av arbeidskraft til begge dei vare-
produserande sektorane går opp.' Tilsvarande hvis p aukar, går den
optimale mengda av arbeidskraft i sektor 2 opp, mens den går ned i
utdanningssektoren. Det er uklart kva som vil skje med allokeringa av
arbeidskraft til intelligensindustrien. Når ~ går opp, vil produksjonen
av begge varer auka. Når p går opp (ned), vil produksjonen i sektor
2 auka (avta). Dermed må produksjonen i intelligensindustrien avta
(auka). Frå formlane er det uklart kva som vil skje når A aukar.
Den totale produksjonskapasitet i økonomien vil då falla. Eit rimelig
resultat er at «tapet» blir spreidd på sektor 1 og 2 slik at la avtar, W
stig og Il avtar. la tiltar derfor, men mindre enn det som trengst for å
kompensera for auken i fl, sidan den optimale u fell. Dette altså ved
ei indre løysing for alle tre sektorane.
Til nå har det ikkje vore spørsmål om det skal satsast på intelligens-
industri, men kor mye det bør satsast. Svaret på dette avheng altså
mellom anna av verdi ane på n, fl, p og a. Spesielt kan ein merka seg
l Dette er å forstå slik at hvis t.d. a går ned, villi gjera eit negativt sprang for
så, etter det, igjen å stiga mot det nye, lågare, stasjonærnivået.
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relevansen av demografiske forhold. Befolkningstilvekstens rolle har
vi alt nemnt. Vidare vil det vel vera rimeleg å assosiera utdannings-
kapitalens depresieringsrate med dødsraten i befolkninga, slik at di
høgare denne er, di lågare er det optimale kunnskapsnivå i samfunnet.
Eit tiltak som reduksjon i pensjonsalderen vil, ved sida av å redusera
den yrkesaktive del av befolkninga, også gi Il, eit positivt skift og der-
med redusera det optimale kunnskapsnivå i befolkninga og påverka
den optimale fordelinga av arbeidskrafta mellom dei tre sektorane.
Vedrørande forholdet «i-lande/eu-land» viser dette ein vond sirkel.
Så lenge «u-land» har ein høgare ;, enn «i-land» vil det, alt anna
like, vera optimalt for dei å ha eit lågare kunnskapsnivå per arbcidar
enn. i «i-land», samtidig som det kan tenkjast å vera optimalt for
dei å allokera ein større del av arbeidskraftstilgangen til utdannings-
sektoren.
Kva så med den optimale utvikling i økonomien hvis llogleIler la
er lik null for noen t?
3.2 Andre regime
I tillegg til A kan vi som nemnt i samband med tabell l, ha dei
følgjande 3 regime:
B: Is = O er optimalt hvis ap < w = V'p = U'(f - (u/l1)f'], slik
at arbeidskraftas grenseprodukt i å produsera utdanningskapital
multiplisert med utdanningskapitalens skuggepris er mindre enn
skuggeprisen på arbeidskrafta brukt i dei to andre sektorane.
«Grenselinja» b mellom A og B, innteikna i figur 3, dvs. der
Is = O er ei indre løysing, vil i figur l liggja til høgre for kurva
il. = O. Dette fordi
als/au < o frå (20), slik at
IseA > lseb ~ ueA < ueb for gitt p.
Dessutan må u eb < u.
På grunn av at ala/au < O og als/ap > O frå (20) må b vera
stigande i (p,u)-planet.
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I B vil u heile tida vera fallande fordi it = - A.U og p stigande
fordi ddP./. er negativ i B. Det vil seia at 11 minkar over tid, mens
u p=o
12 aukar langs pen optimale ballen.
p: 11 = Ohvis U,[f c- (ulll)!'] < zp = ap = V'P, dvs. når det margi-
nale bidrag til samfunnets velferd av å sysselsetja folk i intelligens-
industrien er mindre enn arbeidskraftas skuggepris.
Grenselinja c mellom A og C, også innteikna i figur 3, dvs. der
Il = O er ei indre løysing, vil i figur l liggja til venstre for kurva
il = O. Dette fordi ((Hl/aU) > O frå (20) slik at
IleA> llec -ee- ueA > s sc for gittp.
Frå (20) har vi at (all/au) > O og (all/ap) < O slik at c også må
vera stigande i (P,u)-planet.
På grunn av (2a) får vi i staden for (17) at
(26) p = (A. + p)P iC,
dvs.
(27)
slik at p vil vera eksponensielt stigande i C.
Fordi
V' P = aPoe().+Pjl
må 12 stadig falla i C. la må derfor stadig stiga, sidan Il = O.
Med la stadig stigande må u (før eller seinare ) auka i C. For p = O
er vi opplagt ikkje i C fordi ap då er mindre enn w.
I figur 3 er regionane B og C og «grenselinjene» b og c teikna inn
saman med A. På same måte som for it = O kan det visast at
b og c må starta frå (Q,O).
t
D: Il og la = Osamtidig hvis og bare hvis både
ap < w = V' P og
U,[f - (u/li)!'] < w = V' p.
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I så fall er det produksjon bare i sektor 2.
I D har vi også på grunn av (2a) at
(26) fl = (A + p)p.
I D er (26) tilfredsstilt for p = O for alle t.
Alternativt kunne ein tenkja seg at p =1= O og stigande som i C.
Jamvel om det er vanskeleg å visa at dette ikkje kan vera tilfelle
når vi har ein uendelig planleggingshorisont, er det klart at dette
alternativet ikkje kan forekom a i tilfellet med ein endelig plan-
leggingshorisont, T < 00. Då er transversalitetsvilkåret, når vi har
fritt endepunkt, at
som bare er oppfylt når
(28) P(T) = O.
I så fall er det klart at den einaste pet) som tilfredsstiller både (26)
og (28) er pet) = O for alle t. Sidan pet) = O for alle T < 00, er
det rimelig å gå ut frå at det også vil gjelda når T går mot uendelig.
u vil vera fallande i D.
Når vi tar med alle regimene A, B, C og D, vil det å fastleggja den
optimale politikk også inkludera problemet å Iinna dei overgangane
mellom A, B, C og D som kan vera optimale over tid, dvs. å Iinna
den optimale rekkefølgje mellom dei 4 regimene. Dette betyr å finna
ut kva slags overgangar (<<switches») som er mulige ut frå optimums-
vilkåra. Dernest vil [" x" P og u ha eit optimalt forløp innafor kvart
regime, som t.d. allerede utførleg diskutert under A. Kva andre
regime kan så eventuelt A gå over i? Sidan [,(POO, UOO) > O for alle i,
kan ikkje A gå over i noe anna regime langs den optimale banen.
Dette fordi u alltid går mot UOO i A.
Ser vi på B, må denne politikken åpenbart slå over i A langs den
optimale bane fordi i B er u Iallande, og p stigande over tid slik at det
vil vera eit tidspunkt t' der den optimale [a(t) går over frå å vera null
til å bli positiv og vi er i A. B kan ikkje slå over i C fordi B betyr
p < (l/a) U'[f - (ul[l)j'], mens C betyr p > (Ila) U,[f - (ull1)J'].
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For at B skulle slå over i C måtte altså p gjera eit sprang, men det
er umulig ifølge maksimumsprinsippet. B kan også slå over i D.
Politikk C må slå over i A. Dette for det første fordi det er
meiningslaust å oppretthalda aktivitet i utdanningssektoren utan at
det nokon gong blir produksjon i «intelligensindustrien». For det
andre kan ikkje C slå over i B av same grunn som Bikkje kunne
slå over i C. C kan heller ikkje slå over i .D fordi p då måtte gjera eit
sprang.
Vedrørande D kan denne politikken ikkje slå over i noen annan
politikk. I D er P = O og w konstant og lik V' ({J) {J. Med P konstant
må ap < w initialt halda permanent og «switch» til andre regime
er derfor ikkje mulig.
Vi står då igjen med dei følgjande mulige sekvensar for den opti-
male politikk:
A
B-A
C-A
D
B -+ D
B og C er regime som ikkje kan oppretthaldast langs den optimale
banen, mens A og D er dei regima som før eller seinare blir etablert.
Når A eller D er etablert, vil dette regimet oppretthaldast for alltid,
så lenge data i problemet er uendra. Den optimale politikk hvis
økonomien initialt er i A, er alt utførIeg diskutert.
Ved hjelp av figur 3 basert på eigenskapane ved regimene B og C
- og «grenselinjene» mellom desse regionane og A - skal vi nå
gjera greie for den optimale politikk hvis økonomien initialt er i B
eller C.l
Optimal politikk er nå: Hvis Uo < Ul: Vel Po slik at (Po, uo) ligg på
den eintydige banen i (p, u)-planet som fører til (Pl' Ul)' Når dette
punktet er nådd, gå så fram som gjort greie for tidlegare under A
når Uo < U'" • Hvis Uo > u2: Vel Po slik at (Po, uo) ligg på den eintydige
banen som fører til (P2' u2). Når dette punktet er nådd, er den optimale
politikk gjort greie for under A med Uo > U"'.
Anta at t.d. økonomien initialt er i B, dvs. 13= O. U er fallande og
1Regime D i fasediagrammet vil vera samanfallande med u-aksen.
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Figur 3.
P er stigande. Den mengd arbeidskraft som optimalt skal allokerast
til «intelligensindustrien», er avtakande mens mengda av arbeidskraft
til sektor 2 aukar inntil P = P2 og U = U2 slik at økonomien slår over i
regime A med u > ua>, der 13 > O nå tiltar mot l3 a>, mens Il og 12
avtar mot Il a> og 12a>. Det kan synast noe kunstig at økonomien initialt
skulle ha «for mye» utdanningskapital, men det kan også tenkjast at
ei endring i data, t.d. eit positivt skift i p, samfunnets tidspreferanse-
rate, kan føre til at den aktuelle utdanningskapitalen i samfunnet vil
vera for høg, slik at det er optimalt for samfunnet å slå over frå A til
B med ei etterfølgjande tilpassing som ovanfor skissert.
Anta så at økonomien initialt er i C, den optimale Il = O, 12 fell
og la stig langs den optimale banen. C vil gå over i A når P = Plog
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u = Ul med 11 > O og stigande, 1'1. nå stigande og 13 nå fallande mot
stasjonærnivået, Om vi går utafor modellen, kan vi sjå på dette
forløpet som ein tilnærma beskrivelse av den aktuelle politikken vis a
vis oljesektoren. Det oppstod her «spontant» ein ny produksjonssektor
med behov for større kunnskapsmengde enn det som var til disposisjon
innanlands i utgangspunktet. Dei innanlandske arbeidskraftressursane
har så for størstedelen blitt satsa på å bygga opp den nødvendige
kunnskapsmengda før norsk ekspertise i særleg grad skal gå inn i og i
det vesentlege overta drifta i oljesektoren.
At den optimale politikken som fører til enten A eller D verkeleg
er optimal, er klart frå det følgjande :
i) Lagrangefunksjonen er konkav i u og l" (i = 1, 2, 3),
(29) for gitt pet) og t.
ii) ~ rPtp(t)(u(t) - uCX»= O
I-+co
Dette fordi i A går pet) 'mot pcx> når t -+ 00, mens u(t) går mot uCX>.
I D er pet) = O og ii) er dermed også oppfylt i D.
4. Avslutningsmerknader
4.10ppsummering.
Dei viktigaste dynamiske resultata fra modellen er
1: Hvis det frå eit visst tidspunkt og for «all framtid» er lønnsamt å
«satsa på ingelligensindustri», vil det vera ei eintydig, stasjonær
allokering av arbeidskraft mellom dei tre sektorane: Utdannings-
sektoren, «intelligensindustrien» og annan vareproduksjon som er
optimal. Frå ein gitt initialsituasjon blir denne allokeringa bare
nådd assymptotisk, og den er uavhengig av initialsituasjonen, Den
optimale bane mot denne stasjonære, optimale allokeringa, hvis
det initiale kunnskapsnivå er mindre enn det optimale, er karak-
terisert ved at den delen av den tilgjengelige arbeidskrafta som blir
allokert til utdanningssektoren skal avta over tid, mens den for
både intelligensindustrien og annan vareproduksjon skal tilta over
tid. Vidare, di lågare kunnskapsnivået initialt er, di høgare skal
den initiale allokering av arbeidskraft til utdanningssektoren vera,
og di lågare blir allokeringa til begge dei to andre sektorane.
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Den optimale stasjonære allokeringa, og dermed den optimale
allokering av arbeidskraft til ei kvar tid langs den optimale bane,
er bestemt av mellom anna samfunnets tidspreferanserate, utdan-
ningssektorens effektivitet, tilveksttakta i folkemengda og kor fort
kunnskapen depresierast.
2: Det kan også vera optimalt ikkje å satsa på intelligensindustrien
initialt, mens ein i den første perioden bare driv «tradisjonell»
produksjon og oppbygging av «kunnskapskapitalen». Når denne
så har nådd eit visst nivå, er tida komen for å begynna å allokera
arbeidskraft til intelligensindustrien også. I den første perioden har
den optimale allokering av arbeidskraft over tid det følgjande
mønster: Den delen av arbeidskrafta som går til utdanningssekto-
ren aukar over tid langs den optimale banen, mens den delen som
går til tradisjonell industri skal avta.
3: Endelig er det tenkelig at det ikkje er optimalt på noe tidspunkt å
ha aktivitet i intelligensindustrien. Det er då i denne modellen
heller ingen grunn til å oppretthalda noen utdanningssektor. Ein
slik situasjon i økonomien, der det ikkje er lønnsamt å satsa på
intelligensindustri - eller utdanning av arbeidskrafta - vil, for
gitte data, vera eit permanent trekk ved økonomien, og denne
situasjonen må også gjelda initialt.
4: Det kan tenkjast å vera optimalt å ha ein intelligensindustri
initialt jamvel om det ikkje vil vera optimalt for alltid. Det ville
då ikkje vera noen aktivitet i utdanningssektoren, og aktiviteten
i «intelligensindustrien» skulle nedtrappast inntil denne sektoren
blir nedlagt.
4.2 Mod i fik a s jon a r o gut v i din gar a v mod e Il e n
Det er lett å peika på trekk ved modellen ovanfor som gjer den
«urealistisk». Mellom anna medfører det ingen tilpasningskostnader
t.d. å leggja ned utdanningssektoren for cin periode, mens dette faktisk
ville vera Iorbunde med store problem. A modifisera modellen på dette
punktet er truleg ikkje enkelt.
5
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Derimot er det mulig å utvida modellen til å
i) modifisera føresetnaden om at bruttoproduksjonen i utdannings-
sektoren er proporsjonal med arbeidskraftsinnsatsen i denne
sektoren,
ii) ha med (ulik) eksogen teknisk framgang i dei tre sektorane, og
iii) trekkja inn utlandet, slik at eksport og import av begge varene er
mulig, kanskje også eksport og import av arbeidskraft og utdan-
ningskapital (<<brain drain»),
Modellen ovanfor er dessutan basert på at alle avgjerder blir tatt
sentralt. Det vil også vera av interesse å diskutera korvidt den optimale
utvikling i ein økonomi av denne typen kan realiserast ved hjelp av
desentralisering av avgjerdene til den enkelte utdanningssøkar. La oss
til slutt sjå litt nær are på punkt ii) ovanfor: Eksogen teknisk framgang
i utdanningssektoren vil vera det same som at a stadig skifter oppover
over tid. Frå før veit vi at dette ville bety at u stadig aukar, mens p
fell over tid, dvs. 11 og 12 vil heile tida stiga langs den optimale bane,
mens 13 vil vera fallande.
Verknaden av eksogen teknisk framgang i intelligensindustrien kan
studerast på liknande vis, ved å la første ledd i (17) få eit positivt skift,
som vi så kan anta skjer kontinuerlig over tid.
Ved same framgangsmåte som for ei endring i a finn vi at u og p
nå begge vil stiga over tid, men sidan det ikkje er noe teknisk framsteg
i utdanningssektoren vil u gå mot il, mens p ikkje har noen øvre
grense. Dette betyr at den delen av arbeidskrafta som blir allokert til
utdanningssektoren, nå må stiga over tid langs den optimale banen -
dette i motsetnad til resultatet i den opphavelige modellen. 12må avta.
Ein kombinasjon der vi har teknisk framsteg i begge sektorane ville
åpenbart leia til ei stadig stigning i både u og p langs den optimale
banen, mens det er uråd å seia noe generelt om lj(t) skal avta eller
tilta langs den optimale banen.
Det er vel grunn til å tru at den tekniske framgangen i utdannings-
sektoren er heller liten samanlikna med vareproduksjonssektorane. I
periodar med stor skilnad i teknisk framgang mellom dei to sektor ane
kan verknader av typen «teknisk framgang bare i intelligensindustrien»
derfor vera relevant. I slike perioder kan derfor konklusjonen frå den opp-
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hauelege modellen om at Il og 12 skal stiga over tid, mens la skal falla langs den
optimale banen, bli reversert.
Ei slik utvikling for all framtid kan neppe vera optimal sidan pet)
er stadig stigande, noe som betyr at cit 'vilkår tilsvarande ii) i (29)
ikkje treng vera oppfylt.
Norges Handelshøyskole,
Bergen.
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ON THE OPTIMAL DEVELOPMENT OF KNOWLEDGE-BASED
INDUSTRIES AND THE EDUCATIONAL SECTOR
IN A SMALL OPEN ECONOMY·
By JOSTEIN AARRESTAD1
I. INTRODUCTION
Traditionally, economists have regarded the quality of labor as constant over
time. However, by altering the allocation of resources to, e. g., the educational
sector, the productivity of labor may be consciously changed. Society is then
faced with a dynamic optimization problem since, to the extent resources are
allocated to the educational sector now, in order to make labor more productive
later, these resources cannot be used for producing goods and (other) services
now.
Considerable resources today are allocated to the educational sector in most
countries. Even so, little theoretical attention has been given to the problem of
optimal allocation of resources to the educational sector from a dynamic point of
view. This is in contrast to the vast literature on optimal accumulation of physi-
cal capital. Exceptions are Uzawa [1965], Razin [1972], DobeII and Ho [1967]
and, recently, Manning [1975, 1976]. This paper is a generalization of Aarrestad
[1975], where the problem was to find the optimal allocation of labor to the
educational sector in a centrally planned closed economy where all production
was aggregated into one sector. The following model is more disaggregated
since in addition to the educational sector, the production of goods and services
now takes place in two sectors with different "knowledge-intensity," which
means that there may be more regimes in the optimal policy. The present model
is also more general since it allows for export and import of the two types of goods.
It is hoped that the theory may throw some light on how to find the optimal
levelover time of general education and technical "know-how" in a (homo-
geneous) work-force. The model may be given two "real-world" interpreta-
tions:
i) to study the optimal development of a "knowledge-based" industrial sector
and the educational sector in a developed economy, or
ii) to study the optimal development of the "modern" vs. the "traditional"
sector and the educational sector in a less developed economy.
The main problem in this paper is to find optimal paths for the allocation of
labor over time to the three sectors of the economy. To answer such questions
• Manuscript received July 6, 1976; revised April 22, 1977.
I Dr. John S. Lane at the London School of Economics and an anonymous referee of this Re-
view have read earlier versions of this paper and given very helpful comments. Financial
assistance from The Bank of Norway's Fund for Economic Research is gratefully acknowledged.
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a dynamic model is needed.
2. THE MODEL
The model consists of three sectors - two sectors for the production of goods,
and one educational sector producing general knowledge and technical "know-
how". The accumulated level of general knowledge and technical "know-how"
in society will be called "educational capital." Of course, measuring a variable
of this kind is difficult. As a point of departure, a possible proxy would be the
total number of years of education embodied in the labor force. Concentrating
on the role of formal education, other possible sources of accumulated "know-
how" as, e. g., "learning by doing" are neglected. Educational capital is used
in sector 2 only, which is the knowledge-based industrial sector. To simplify the
analysis, labor is the only input in the production of good 1.2 Educational
capital is sector specific, but not worker specific - it increases the productivity
of all workers in sector 2 only. In this model, therefore, education alters the
quality, but not the composition, of the labor force in sector 2 over time, so that
there are no skill margins within the labor force in sector 2; i. e., labor is homo-
geneous.? We have made the abstraction of specifying (i) the level of education
and "know-how" and (ii) "raw" labor as two separate factors in the production
process. These are the only specified factors of production - physical capital
is disregarded. Also, the production period in the educational sector is over-
looked and there are no "vintage"-effects. "Raw" labor is to be understood as
completely uneducated labor if the model is applied to a LDC, while in a DC-
context it is probably more fruitful to think of "raw" labor as labor with only
compulsory elementary schooling.
The amount of "raw" labor employed at time t in the educational sector will
be denoted by L3(t) and the output of this sector by J(t), given by
(l) a. is a constant> O.
J(t) is net in the sense that any output in the educational sector that is subsequently
used as input (as when students become teachers after graduation) is not included
in J(t).
In the knowledge-based industry the production-function is
(2) Xit) = F(Lit), E(t»
where
X 2(t) = the total production in this sector
• While this is a simplification made to avoid the problem of allocating educational capital
optimally between the two sectors, it is not inconsistent with the fact that there are great differ-
ences in educational capital per worker between industrial sectors.
I A heterogeneous labor force, diversified according to educational background, would be
unmanageable in this model.
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L2(t) = the amount of "raw" labor employed in this sector, and
E(t) = some index of the accumulated level of education and technical
"know-how" in the economy.
L2 and E are assumed complementary inproduction, i.e. a~~~2 >0. F is
assumed to be homogeneous of degree one and strictly concave with positive and
diminishing marginal productivities. Further
(2a) F(L2, O) = F(O, E)= F E(O, E) = 04
(2) says that the level of goods-production in sector 2 depends on the accumulated
level of education and know-how, and on the amount of labor allocated to this
sector. (Production functions expressing the same idea can be found in Haavelmo
[1954]. See, e.g., page 14 and model 7.1 page 36.) The stock of educational
capital is built up through the gross addition to the existing stock J(t), given by
(I). On the other hand, it depreciates since knowledge becomes obsolete and
people forget what they once learned. E(t) is assumed to depreciate at a con-
stant rate Jl. We then get
(3) E(t) = J(t) - JlE(t).
Initially there is a stock of educational capital, Eo, i. e.
(4) E(O) = Eo.
In sector l "raw" labor is the only input in the production process so that
(5) X l = G(LI); G' > O, Gli s O,
where
X I = total output in sector l
LI = the amount of labor employed in this sector.
Further, there is a fixed proportion between the population and the total labor
force, L(t). L is assumed constant, so that,
(6) L(t) = L (given)."
Finally, employment in the three sectors cannot exceed the totallabor force,
(7)
Given the structure of the economy, described by equations (1}-{7) we want to
maximize social welfare. Implicit in the optimal development that emerges, there
• FB=~f. etc.
S This assumption can be relaxed, and it can be shown that the effects of a constant growth-
rate in population are identical to the effects of the rate of depreciation of educational capital.
However, with population growth, (5) must be linear, and the solution of the model will then be
singular, which is the reason why we prefer the present model.
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will be answers to questions such as whether, under what conditions and to
what extent the knowledge-based industrial sector and/or the educational sector
should be developed.
Assume now that we are dealing with a small country with an open economy,
so that both goods can be traded internationally at prices given in the world-
market. The price of good 2 in terms of good 1 is P (PI = 1, P2 = p), assumed
given and constant. Let the instantaneous social welfare function be
U = U(cI, C2)
where
Ci = total consumption of good i; i = 1,2.
U is assumed to be strictly concave with positive and diminishing first order partial
derivatives. The budget constraint applied at every instant is that the value of
total production in terms of world-market prices equals the value of total con-
sumption, so that
(8)
Assume further that the social rate of discount is a constant p> 0, that there are
no restrictions on E at any time and that society's planning horizon is infinity.
We then have the following problem in optimal control theory:
(9)
s.t. Cl + pC2 = Xl + pX2
Xl = G(LI)
X2 = F(L2, E)
E=J-jlE
J = a.L3
LI + L2 + L3 ~ L
Os Li s L; i = 1, 2, 3
E(O) = Eo (given)
lim E(t) is free,...""
Li (i = 1, 2, 3) piecewise continuous.
To solve (9) form the Lagrange expression,
3. ANALYSIS OF THE MODEL
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(10) L = e-P1{U[G(LI) + pF(L2, E) - PC2, c2] + q(rxL3 - Jl.E)
+w([ - Lt - L2 - L3)},
where we have inserted for Ct, X t and X 2 and where w is the shadow price of "raw"
labor (the shadow wage) and q(t) is the costate variable associated with the
equation of motion (3). Necessary conditions for a solution to (9) are that there
exists a continuous q(t) such that:
ti = - U1pFJ,L2, E) + (p + Jl.)q
U lpF L(L2, E) - W s O and = O if L2 > O
Ul G'(LI) - w ~ O and = O if LI > O
aq - w ~ O and = O if L3 > O
U2 =r"
Ul
Consumption is governed by (15). Obviously (7) always holds as an equality,
since U1G'>0. For feasibility we require Xl + pX2>0 for all t. A number of
regimes are possible in the optimal solution. They are enumerated in Table 1.
(Il)
(I2)
(13)
(14)
( 15)
TABLE 1
Regime Control variables
La
A >0 >0 >0
B >0 >0 O
C >0 O >0
D L O O
H O L O
I O >0 >0
3.1. Regime A (The Interior Solution). It is now optimal to allocate labor
to all three sectors. From (12), (13) and (14) we then have,
(16) UlpFL = UIG' = «q = w.
(16) says that for an interior optimum the social value of the marginal product of
labor in both production sectors must at any time be equal to the shadow wage
which in turn must be equal to aq, the shadow price of educational capital multi-
plied by rx- the marginal product of labor in producing educational capital.
To be more complete: q(t) may be interpreted as the increase in the optimal value
of the objective function obtained from adding "one extra unit" of educational
capital per capita to the stock of educational capital per capita at time t. q is
• Here Ul =aau. etc.
Cl
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positive from (14). Along the optimal path for q(t), (11) must be satisfied."
Implicit differentiation in (12}-(14) yields
(I7)
aLI _ a.aq- UIG"
aL2 _ a.aq - UlpFLL
With the optimal Li (i= 1,2,3) now given as functions of q and E, (3) and (11)
are two autonomous differential equations in E and q. This permits a two-
dimensional graphic analysis of the system from which the optimal trajectories of
Li (i=l, 2,3) will emerge. For the slope of the graph of 4(t)=0 in the (q, E)
phase-plane we obtain
Ul p( FEL.Efit + FEE)
U F aL2- IP ELaq + p + J1
From (17), the denominator in (18) is positive. Inserting for ~1from (17)
and rearranging, the nominator can be written as UFIP (FE£Fu -(FElY) which
LL
is negative since F is concave. (18) is therefore negative. The slope of the
graph of £(t)=O is given by
(I8) dq I -dE 4=0 -
J1 - a. aL3
dq I - ~aE~
dE £=0 - aL3a.aq
which from (7) and (17) is positive. The highest possible sustainable E, E is
(I9)
given by
(20) E = a.f.J1 •
In the (q, E)-plane shown in Figure 1, the curve for £=Omust start from (: ' O),
since from (3) and (17) q=~=>E=O and also E=O=>q= w. As E~E, ddPEI
a. a. £=0
~oo. This is because the slope of £=0 is always positive for E<E, while for
E>E, £ is always negative. The form of £=0 is therefore as shown in Figure 1,
where E and the graph of ti =0 are shown as well.
The graph of ti =Q-is falling to the right in the (q, E)-plane and q is always
positive. We therefore know enough to state that in regime A there must exist
T In competitive price adjustment terms (lI) has the following interpretation: In an economy
in which educational capital "rental" is rewarded by its marginal social value product, the price
of a unit ofeducational capital must change so as to reward the "rentier" for waiting less the value
of net rentals received U1pFL - uq.
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h h
H
J
E E(t)
FIGURE 1
a unique stationary state for q and E - (q", E"') such that
(2I)
(22) q" = UIP pF (L (qeD EOO) Eoo)P + JI. E 2 , , •
This point is shown in the phase-diagram. Since q and E are stationary in this
point, L, (i= 1, 2, 3) will also be constant. The equilibrium of the system is
therefore a stationary state where the values of all variables are constant over
time. This state is reached only asymptotically. To interpret the equilibrium
values of E and q, we see that (22) multiplied by (1. is the present social value of a
marginal allocation of labor to the educational sector. In the stationary state
this value must, according to (16) be equal to the (instantaneous) marginal value
of allocating labor to the two other sectors. The arrows show the dynamic forces
working on the system in the different regions of the phase-plane. It is intuitive
and can easily be shown that (qOO, E%) is a saddle-point. That is: There is one
and only one path in the (q, E)-plane leading to (qOO, EOC) such that to each initial
Eo there corresponds a unique qo such that a path starting from (qo, Eo) con-
verges to (qOO, ECO). This "candidate" optimal trajectory is shown in the figure.
It will be shown later that this path is indeed optimal. The solution to the
optimization problem when we have an interior solution is therefore to find the
initial qo and follow the optimal trajectory towards (qOO, EOO). What, then,
characterizes this optimal trajectory? From the figure it can be seen that for
Eo<Eoo, q(t} is falling over time, while E(t) is growing. The level of education
will therefore be growing over time along the optimal path, until EOO is reached
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(asymptotically).
Since
!!_b_ = oLj dq + ~h «s ,
dr åq dr oE dr'
it follows from (17), (23) and Figure 1 that for Eo<Eocc, tile part of the work-
force allocated to the knowledge-based industrial sector, and the part of the
labor-force employed in sector 1 should increase over time along tile optimal
path. Accordingly, tile part of the labor-force that is optimally allocated to
the educational sector must be falling over time when Eo<Eoo.
The lower the initial E is, the higher must the initial q and therefore L3 be,
with a correspondingly lower initial level for L2 and LI'
While the initial L3 must be set above its optimal stationary value when Eo
< Eoo, opposite conclusions will hold for the case when the initial educational
intensity is higher than EOO. Lit) should then increase over time, while LI'
L2 and E will be falling over time along the optimal path. If finally, by accident
Eo =E", Lj(O) (i= 1, 2, 3) should be chosen equal to their optimal constant values
and the optimal policy is to keep Lj (i = 1, 2, 3) constant over time.
(23) i = l, 2, 3.
3.2. Other regimes. As shown in Table 1, in addition to A, five other regimes
are possible as part of the optimal solution. Let us treat them in turn.
B: L3=0 is optimal if (14) holds with inequality sign, so that cxq<w=UIG'
= U IPF L' The marginal product of labor in producing knowledge multiplied by
the shadow price of knowledge is less than the shadow price of labor employed
in the other two sectors. The "border-line", b, h:'tween A and B, i.e., the locus
of all points where L3 =O is an interior solution 14) will in Figure 1 lie to the
right of the curve £=0 in A. This is because, from (17) ~1<O so that L3eA
>L3eb-EeA<Eeb for a given q. In addition Eeb~E. Since ~1<O
and O!:3 >O from (17), b must have a positive slope in the (q, E)-plane. Also,
vq .
in B, E will have no non-trivial stationary since E = - J.1Eso that E will be falling
in B. fllq=o in B is given by (18). q is therefore increasing along the optimal
path in B. This means that the optimal L2 decreases in B, which again must im-
ply that LI increases over time in this regime, since L3 = O.
C: L2=Oif (12) holds with an inequality sign so that UlpFL<w=cxq=UIG'
in which case the value of labor's marginal product in the knowledge-based
industrial sector is less than the shadow-wage. From (2a) and (11)
(24) q(t) = qoe(I'+P)1 in C.
We then have Ul G'(LI) = cxqoe(P+P)1so that LI is decreasing and L3 increasing
in C. For "large" t, L3 approaches L as LI approaches zero. E must therefore
be increasing in C. The "borderline", c, between A and C, i. e., the locus of all
points such that LI =0 is an interior solution to (12), will be to the left of the curve
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£=0 in Figure 1. This is because ~~ >0 from (17) so that LI EA > LI E
c_u E A >U E C for a given q. In addition we have from (17) that ~iJ~l <O so
that also c must have a positive slope in the (q, E)-plane.
D: L2 = L3 =Oat the same time if and only if
aq I< w = UIG'(L).
U1pFL
In that case there is activity in sector Lonly, Due to (2a) q in D is given by (24).
In D, q need not be positive so that (24) is satisfied for q=O for all t. q<O is
impossible, since from the economic interpretation of q, a negative q would im-
ply a negative marginal productivity of educational capital, which contradicts
the assumptions on (2). Also q >O is impossible. When D is the final policy
this is so since
lim q(t) = 00
t ...co
so that the economy would sooner or later be in C which contradicts the assump-
tion that D is the final policy. If D was assumed not to be a final policy, G'(L)
is a constant, q is then growing exponentially. Assume then, that L3 switches to
a positive number at t' > to. If the horizon is finite, such a policy cannot be opti-
mal since the marginal loss G'(L) is constant over time, while the marginal gain
due to an increased educational capital is falling over time because the pay-off
period is shrinking over time. If the horizon is infinity, the pay-off period will
also be infinite, so that both the marginal loss and the marginal gain are constant
over time. If a marginal reallocation from sector 1 to sector 3 is profitable at
t', it is so also at til< t', including to and we are in C. Consequently q =0 in
t
D.8
H: The optimal L2 is now equal to L, so all activity is concentrated to the edu-
cational intensive industry. E will be decreasing in H, since £= -Jl.E and q=O
when q=~{pFJ.L, E)} so that
p+Jl.
(25) ddE
qI = U+l {pFEE(L, E)} < O.
4=0 P Jl.
q is therefore increasing in H. The borderline h of H, i.e. the locus of (q, E)-
values such that L2 = L is an interior solution to (12), is the set
h = {(q, E)IUIPFL(L, E) = IXq}.
• When D is the final policy and the horizon, T. is finite this follows from the transversality
condition
e-·7'q(D=O
which, together with (24), is only satisfied for q=O for all T'<so.
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Along this borderline we then have
(26)
so that the boundary of H has a positive slope in the (q, E)-plane.
J: The optimal LI is equal to zero if UIG'(L1)<w=U1PFL=et.q, i.e., if the
value of the marginal product of labor in sector 1 is less than its value in alterna-
tive employment. As in regime A, the slopes of 4=0 and £=0 are given by (t8)
and (19). Because of this there will be an intersection of 4(t)=0 and £(t)=O
in J, as in A, which is also a stationary state with the saddlepoint property. Ex-
cept that LI =0 in I, it is fairly obvious that the optimal path and the optimal
policy in I have the same properties as in A.
3.3. Optimal Policies. The problem of finding the optimal policy also
includes the problem of finding those switches between the six regimes which
are compatible with the conditions for optimality. Jn other words the problem
is to find the optimal sequences between the regimes over time. Within each
regime there is then an optimal development of Li' Xi' q and E as already ex-
tensively discussed under regime A.
What other regimes, then, may A switch into? Since q and E always approach
qOC and E" in A, A cannot switch into any other regime. Regarding B, E is
falling in this regime so that B must switch into A. Since in B: q< UIP FL;
O(
while in C; q » Ut P FLo B cannot switch to C because that would mean a jump
O(
in q, which is impossible by the maximum principle. A switch from B to D is
possible. B cannot switch to H since by (17) Lz is falling in B. Neither can B
switch to J since q < .!!..LG' in B while in Iq> .!!..LG' so that a jump in q would be
ex ex
required, which is impossible. Regime C must switch into A or I, since it would
not make economic sense to keep up the activity in the educational sector if no
production in sector 2 were to take place in the future. C cannot switch into B,
D or H since that would require a jump in q. D cannot switch into any other
regime. Jn D, q=O for all t, so that aq-cw initially must hold permanently.
In regime H, E is falling so that q is increasing along the optimal path. H cannot
switch to either C or D, since that would require a jump in q. Since E is falling,
U lPF L(L, E) must be falling over time in H. G'(O) is a constant. We must there-
fore have one of the following switches for H;
i) to I if aq =Ul pF L(L, E) while still Ul G'(O)<w
ii) to B if Ul G'(O)= U lPF L(L, E) while still «q <w
iii) to A if, by accident, «q and U lPF L(L, E) "reach" Ul G'(O) simultaneously.
Finally, regime I cannot switch to any other regime for the same reasons that A
cannot. We are then left with the following possible policy sequences for the
optimal policy;
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c<:::::;
D
B, C and H are regimes that cannot be sustained along the optimal path, whereas
A, D or I are final regimes - regimes that sooner or later will be established.
When one of the final regimes has been established, it will be everlasting for
constant values of the parameters including p. If regime I is established finally
the economy specializes in producing "knowledge-intensive" goods. If D is the
final regime, the economy specializes in goods produced in sector l. If A is the
final regime, it is optimal for the economy to produce both goods, i.e., non-
specialization is optimal.
The optimal policy if the economy initially is in A has already been extensively
discussed. With the help of Figure 1, based on the properties of regimes B, C
and H, - already explained, - the optimal path if the economy initially is in
B, C or H will now be discussed. Let us assume that A, and not I or D, will be
the final regime. The optimal policy is now: If Eo<Et, choose qo such that
(qo, Eo) is on the unique path in the (q, E)-plane that leads to (qt, Et). When
this point is reached, proceed as explained earlier under regime A when E <EOO.
If the economy initially is in B, that is if E2 <Eo <E3, choose q 2<q <q 3, such that
(qo, Eo) is on the optimal path leading to (q2' E2) from which the optimal policy
is as under A. If, finally, the economy initially is in H, choose qo such that (qo,
Eo) is on the unique optimal path in H that leads to (q3' E3), from which the opti-
mal path is as explained under B. (As mentioned earlier, H might switch directly
to AJ in which case the optimal path does not pass through B).
To be more detailed: Assume that the economy is initially in H, an extreme
case with a superabundant knowledge level in the "intelligence-industry" sector.
All available labor is allocated to this sector, E is falling and q increasing along the
optimal path. When q reaches q3' while still UtG'(O»ilq, labor is now allocated
to both production sectors such that the part of the available labor force that is
optimally allocated to the knowledge-based industrial sector is decreasing, while
the part allocated to the rest of the goods-producing sector is increasing. This
is the optimal process until E=E2 at which point the system switches into its in-
terior mode, A, with LI (i=l, 2, 3»0 where L3 now increases towards L'f, while
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LI and L2 decrease towards L':' and L';. Assume next that the economy is in C.
Initially it is then non-optimal to have an industrial sector based on knowledge,
but it is profitable to invest in expanding the level of education in society at the
same time as goods-production in the traditional sector is carried on. In this
phase, the part of labor allocated to the educational sector should be increasing
over time, while LI is falling along the optimal path. C will switch into A when
q reaches ql and E=EI• At this point production in the knowledge-based sector
is started up and the part of labor that is allocated to this sector should be steadily
increasing towards its stationary value L';, while now the parts of labor allocated
to the educational sector and to traditional goods-production should be decreasing
towards their stationary levels.
That the "candidate" optimal policies leading to A, I or D are reallyoptimal,
is clear from the following
,1) The Lagrangean (10) is concave in E, C, (i= l, 2) and Li (i = l, 2, 3)
(27) for a given q(t) and t.
l 2) lim e-Plq(t)(E(t) - Ert» = O
I-rt>
This is so since in A and I, q approaches s" when t-+oo while E approaches Ert>.
q == Oin D so that 2) is also satisfied in D.
The analysis up to now is based on given constant values of the parameters of
the model. We shall now study how the results found depend on these pa-
rameters. Some effects of exogenous technical change will also be discussed.
4. EFFECTS OF CHANGES IN PARAMETERS, PRICES AND TECHNOLOGY
Assume now that we are in regime A. To study how the optimallevels of q, E,
Li (i=l, 2, 3), and X, (i=l, 2) at any time depend on the parameters of the
model: a, Jl. and p, we differentiate implicitly in (3) and (11). Evaluating the
derivatives at ei = E =O, we get the following effects on the optimal steady-state
E and q, Ert> and qrt>:
(32)
fJErt> = _l_{a fJL3}
ap D q fJq
aErt> = .!-__1_{UIPFEL aL2 + p + Il}fJa D åq
fJErt> l { fJL3 U EF fJL2 }~=Daqaq- IP ELaq+P+Jl.
ajrxrt>= - ~3 {UIPFEJT ~1+ FEE}
~ = - _!L{rx fJL3 - Jl.}åp D fJE
(28)
(29)
(30)
(31)
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(33) oqm = _1_{Ut PE(FEL of:_7...+ FEE) - q(oe oL3 - p.)}op. D· oE . oE
where
D = Ula.p O~3 (FEL ~1+ FEE)
- (a.~1-p.)( U,PFEL O~2 - (p + p.») < O.
From (16) L'[' (i= 1,2,3) depends on s" and Em, which again are functions of
p, p. and a.. Inserting for LI (i = 1, 2, 3) in
ec: eis åq" oLoo oEoo__ I = __' __ + __ 1 •
å« åq" åa oEoo oa.'
we can study how the allocation of labor among the three sectors depends on the
value of a., and similarly for p and p.. From (29) and (31), it is clear that a positive
shift in the productivity of the educational sector, a., due to, e. g., more efficient
training methods, leads to a higher optimal educational capital. q is reduced.
By (17) this means that an increase in a.leads to a higher L2 so that a larger part of
the work-force is allocated to the knowledge-intensive production sector. LI
is also increased, which implies that L3, or the part of the labor force that is allo-
cated to the educational sector is decreased when a. increases." An increase in
a. would therefore lead to a higher optimal stationary level of E, X I and X2'
From (28) and (32) it follows that the optimal stationary educational capital is
decreased if the social rate of discount gets a positive shift, i.e., if society chooses
to evaluate production today higher, relative to production tomorrow. s" is
decreased when p increases. From (17) we see that LI increases when p increases,
so that the part of the labor force allocated to sector 1 is increased when the social
rate of discount gets a positive shift. Since EOO is reduced, the part of the labor
force allocated to the educational sector must be reduced when p increases.
The effect on the allocation of labor to the knowledge-intensive sector from an
increase in p is not clear. From this it follows that production in sector 1 increases
when p increases and, consequently, production in sector 2 must fall. (30) and
(33) show that a faster depreciation of educational capitalleads to a lower optimal
knowledge-level and to a lower q. In turn this means that LI is increased, so that
the part of the labor force going to the two remaining sectors must decrease.
The distribution of the reduced part of the labor force between these two sectors
depends on how much the marginal product of labor in the knowledge-intensive
sector is reduced when educational capital goes down. In any case production
in sector 1 will increase so that production in sector 2 must fall.
If we associate the rate of depreciation of human capital p. with the death-rate,
(34) i = 1,2,3
I This means that if, e. g., a is increased at t', L. would make a negative jump at r', After
t', L. would again increase towards the new and lower optimal stationary level.
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it is interesting that the higher the death-rate is, the lower is the optimal level of
knowledge in the population. Since the effect of J1. on L2 and L3 is not clear, it
is possible to imagine two countries of which one has a higher death rate than the
other and where this countryoptimally allocates a larger part of its labor force to
education only to obtain a lower level of knowledge among its population. This
shows the relevance of demographic factors for optimal development of a knowl-
edge-based industrial sector, and for optimal educational policies. Therefore, as
long as industrially underdeveloped countries have a higher J1. than developed
ones, it is, ceteris paribus, optimal for them to have a lower level of knowledge
in their work force than developed countries.w
Proceeding as above, it is easily seen that a rise in the relative price of the
knowledge-intensive good raises the optimal educational capital and its shadow
price, q. From (17) it then follows that fewer people are allocated to sector 1.
Since Err; is increased, a greater part of the work-force must be allocated to the
educational sector. The effect on L2 is not clear. Not unexpectedly, the produc-
tion of the knowledge-intensive goods must rise in response to an increase in its
price, since X I falls.
This paper is about endogenous technical change. Technical change may also
be exogenous as some technological progress in a small country consists in copy-
ing new inventions. Exogenous technical progress in the educational sector would
mean a steadily rising (X over time in (3), which means a steadily increasing E
and falling q, so that LI and L2 are increasing and L3 falling over time. Exoge-
nous technical progress in the knowledge-based sector only is from (11) equivalent
to a steadily increasing relative price of the knowledge-intensive good, p. Over
time, q and E are then steadily increasing with E approaching E. A steady
increase in E is only possible if the part of the population allocated to education
is increasing over time, so a situation with no technical progress in the educational
sector, but with exogenous technical progress in the knowledge-based produc-
tion sector leads optimally to an even increasing part of the population being
employed in the educational sector.
In periods with rapid technological progress in the knowledge-intensive sector,
effects of the latter type may be relevant. In such periods the conclusion in the
basic model that when Eo <Err; the optimal L3(t) should decrease over time must
be reversed. Such a development for the whole future is hardly optimal since
q(t) is steadily increasing, which means that a condition corresponding to 2) in
(27) above need not to be satisfied.
5. CONCLUSION
The principal dynamic results from the analysis are:
(1) If, from a given point in time, it is profitable to develop a knowledge-
Il In a model with population growth, a constant, exogenous growth-rate in population would
have the same effect.
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based industrial sector, there wiII be a unique, stationary allocation of the work-
force between the three sectors that is optimal. This includes the case where
specialization to knowledge-based production is optimal. From a given initial
situation this stationary state, where all the variables are constant over time, is
reached only asymptotically along a unique optimal path. The optimal statio-
nary allocation of labor hetweerr'the sectors is independent of the initial condi-
tions. Provided the initial level of knowledge in society is less than the optimal
level, the optimal path towards this state has the following properties:
(i) If both goods are produced, the part of the available labor force that is
allocated to sector 1, which does not use educational capital in production,
should be increasing over time, so that production in this sector is always in-
creasing.
(li) The part of the labor force allocated to the educational sector should fall
over time towards its optimal stationary level, whereas the part allocated to the
knowledge-based industrial sector should increase towards its optimal stationary
level.
(iii) As a corollary, the lower the initiallevel of education is, the higher should
the initial allocation of labor to the educational sector be, with a correspondingly
lower part going to the goods-producing sector.
(2) Conclusion (li) above may be temporarily reversed in periods with fast
technical progress in the knowledge-intensive industry, relative to the educational
sector.
(3) It may be optimal not to develop a knowledge-based industrial sector ini-
tially. In this phase the economy specializes in producing the "traditional"
good while at the same time building up the educational capital. When the level
of knowledge has reached a certain level, time is ripe for beginning to allocate
labor to a knowledge-based industrial sector as well. During this initial phase the
allocation of labor over time has the following optimal pattern: The part going
into the educational sector increases over time, so that the part going into the
"traditional sector" decreases along the optimal path.
(4) Permanent specialization in production of good 1 may also be optimal.
In this model there is then no reason for keeping up an educational sector. If
educational capital is initially abundant it may be optimal to have a knowledge-
based industrial sector initiallyeven if it would not be optimal for ever. There
would then be no activity in the educational sector, while to utilize the existing,
but shrinking, educational capital, activity in the knowledge-based industry is
phased out over a period until it is finally shut down. After that the economy
specializes in good 1.
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Summary
In the first part of this paper, a theory of educational choice is sketched, assuming
that the individuals regard the choice of education as an investment decision.
Based on earning on the 1st of September, 1966, private returns to 17 types of
higher education in Norway, compared to secondary education, are then calculated.
The observed pattern of returns is discussed in relation to the theory sketched.
Finally, "social" returns are calculated and some comments are made on their
relevance for policy purposes.
1. Introduction
This paper has two parts: the first deals with private returns and the second
with "social" returns. The article is based on the method pioneered by T. W.
Schultz [7] and elaborated on by G. Becker [2].
In two respects, however, this article differs from similar works on returns
to education:
(a) Whereas in the theoretical part of [2] G. Becker analyzed investment in
education mainly from the point of view of the firms, the emphasis in the first
part of this article is on the educational decisions of the individuals.
(b) The problem in this type of work has usually involved calculating re-
turns to moving from one educational level to another (e.g. from high-school
to college). In this paper returns to different typea of higher education have
been calculated.
2. Private Returns
The purpose of this part of the paper is twofold. The first aspect is to answer
the matter-of-fact questions of whether there are positive returns to higher
education in Norway and whether there are significant differences in returns
between the different categories of higher education. The second aspect in.
volves the question of whether the observed pattern of returns may be ra-
tionalized economically. In order to answer the second question we need 8.
theory of educational choice based on economics, the implications of which
may be tested against the observed pattern of returns.
1I am grateful to Agnar Sandmo for valuable comments on the manuscript.
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2.1. Sketch o/ an Economic Theory of Educational Choice
Generally. the different characteristics of e.g. education k may be represented
by a vector
VI'" is some measure of individual 1's expected lifetime income in educational
category k and Xl"" •••• x,.,. are different non-monetary characteristics of going
through education k, during and after the educational period. Individual i
will choose education k if
(uL denotes individual 1's utility from education k). We assume that an in-
dividual regards the choice of education as an investment decision. This means
that
ut( )> u;( )
if
Vi'" > l'".
This assumption therefore means that the effects on the choice of education
of non-monetary differences between different types of higher education are
negligible compared to the effects of differences in lifetime earnings.
Obviously this does not represent the "whole truth" about an educational
decision. The purpose is to deduce observable hypotheses from such a be-
haviour assumption in order to see how far these hypotheses are able to "ex-
plain" reality when confronted with the pattern of returns. Assume therefore
an individual who, having finished his secondary education. is faced with
several educational alternatives including no further education. An expected
future age-income profile corresponds to each of these alternatives.
Let
w1"'(O) = expected income in educational category k for individual i in year t
after commencing his education. evaluated at the point in time of
calculation O. (1:=1 denotes no further education. 1:=2. _..• r denotes
different categories of higher education).
c""(O) = the corresponding expected private cost of undertaking education
(books, fees, etc.).
Individual 1's expected dillerentiol returns from choosing some type of
higher education instead of entering the labour market at once will then be
given by
VJ"'(O) = ~ t'C{(W:k(O)_~(O)-C:k(O)}; t:
2
1,- •• ,8"
C-l ~- , ••• ,r
Swed. J. of ECOflomics1972
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Vc is the discount factor (1+i)-C where i is the subjective rate of disoount.!
Since Vlk(O) is a subjective estimate, another individual may expect diHerent
returns from the same type of education.
If the individual regards the choiceof education as an investment decision.s
the decision rule for individual j is:
l. If V1k(0) <Ofor k =2, ..., r do not undertake higher education.
2. If VJk(O)>0 for some of the ka choose the alternative with the highest
VJk(O).
Obaerved Age-income Pro/ilea
Let
wNO) = the average yearly income for persons with education k(k =2, ..., r) in
year t after commencingtheir education, observed at time O.
cf(O) = the correspondingcost of education.
w~(O) = the average yearly income for persons with secondary education in
year t after entering the labour force.
From cross-sectiondata we can then observe
T
Vk(O)= ~ vc{w~(O)-whO)-c:(O)}; k=2, ..• ,r
C-l
Vk(O) may be observed for alternative values of the rate of discount.
Due to the possibilities of substitution between labour of diHerent "vint-
ages" we may assume that all w:(O)s depend on the number of persons in
educati~nal category k at time O,denoted by Nk(O). Thus we get
wf=t:(Nk(O)), t=I, •.. ,T
For Vk(O) we have accordingly that
Vk(O) will be a decreasing function of Nk(O) since
and, assuming decreasingmarginal productivity of labour, each term in this
sum will be negative.
I The reason why a subjective rate of discount, and not a market determined rate of
interest, is used, is that no perfect loan market exists.
I It might perhaps be noted if the individual derives no utility from the non-monetary
aspects of education, this kind of behaviour is consistent with utility maximization over
time, see e.g. Irving Fisher's combined saving and investment model as presented by
Sandmo in [5].
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On the Relation between Expected and Observed Magnitudes
It is reasonable to assume that an individual planning to undertake higher
education bases his expectations as to future earnings on observed earnings.
This can be represented by the expectation functions
These expectation functions have to be specified in order to establish a relation
between expected and observed magnitudes. The simplest alternative would be
(I)
A less far-reaching simplification would be
Wfk(O) = w~(O) (I + I~O)' (2)
where uJ is the percentage growth in income per year expected by person j.
For the present value of undertaking education k (I) would mean that
(3)
whereas (2) would mean that
(4)
assuming the percentage growth in costs per year also equals UJ.
(3) or (4) would be the case for all individuals only if they were identical with
respect to the subjective rate of discount, earning capacity and expectations
of future growth in income. This is not very reasonable, even as a simplifying
assumption.
A more plausible assumption regarding the relation between expected and
observed returns would be the following
yJk(O) > yJl(O) for all j
This means that at time O all individuals expect higher future returns in cate-
gory k than in I if observed returns from cross-section data at time O are higher
in k than in I. As an assumption especially regarding choice between alterna-
tive higher educations this does not seem too unrealistic. Of course there may
be individuals who for special reasons expect higher returns in the category
with lower observed returns but presumably such individuals will constitute
8wed. J. of Eoonomio& 1972
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& decreasing minority as the difference yk(O) - Y'(O) increases.
The Pattern o/ Besurn«
We now have
(Ilo) yJ1c(O)> VII(O) for all i
if
yk(O) > V'(O)
(b) The decision rule for all i:
li Vlk(O) <Ofor all k(k = 2, ..., r), do not undertake higher education.
li some Ylk(O) >0, choose k instead of / if
that is if
(c) Yk(O) is a decreasing function of Nk(O).
Due to the decisionrule education k will attract students as long as Yk(O) >0.
Assuming no shifts in demand for labour with different educational back-
grounds we should expect the stream of students into the diHerent types of
higher education to result in a development where the diHerential returns for
all categories tended towards zero. The speed of adjustment of the "market"
will depend on the 1ength of the educational period and on how free the choice
of education is.
As regards the last question we may distinguish between the case with ex-
cess supply of all types of higher educational services so that choice of educa-
tion is perfectly free, and the case with excess demand for all or some of the
types of higher education so that choice has to be restricted in some way.
Case I: The individual is now a "quantity-adjuster" in the sense that he can
choose freely between a number of V1k(O)which his own decisions will not af-
fect noticeably.
Assume that the length of the educational period in category k is O and that
the demand curve for this type of educational skill is unchanged over time. If
now initially, yk(O) >0 greater and than all other V(O), Nk will increase so
that at point in time 0+0 it will be equal to Nk(O+O). As a result yk decreases
to Vk(O+8). We therefore have
Nk(O +8) > Nk(O)
Yk(O) > Vk(O +0)
Swed. J. of Economic. 1972
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If we denote the point in time (O+0) Ol we will in 0l have a new
W~(Ol)' W:(Ol)' ... , W~(Ol)
and a corresponding new Vk(Ol)' If still yk(Ol) >0 and greater than all other
V(Ol) we will have a new increase in Nk from Nk(Ol) to Nk(02), where again
O.=01+0. A new Vk(02) < Vk(Ol) will correspond to Nk(02) and so on as the
process continues.
The decision rule will imply that
Nk(O) stays constant as long as Vk(O) =O
Nk(O) increases as long as Vk(O) >O
Nk(O) decreases as long as yk(O) <O
Omust be regarded here as an arbitrary "running" point in time of calculation.
During the process the different educational categories will continually change
place with one another in the "returns hierarchy" and the process will go on
until observed average differential returns are (approximateJy) equal and equal
to zero for all k.
Assume that this happens at time OL' i.e. that
(6)
A situation characterized by (5) may then be called an equilibrium situation.
Since
T
Vk(OL)= 2 Vc {W~(OL) - wl(OL) - C~(OL)}=O for all k
C-l
an equilibrium situation implies that the present value of lifetime earnings in
all higher educational categories must equal the present value of lifetime earn-
ings without higher education plus the private costs of undertaking higher
education.
Oase I I. We now have excess demand for all or some types of higher educa-
tion. The excess demand may be temporary in the sense that the net inflow
into an educational category is sufficient to increase the number in the cate-
gory to the equilibrium level. But in this case it is reasonable to assume that
the duration of the equilibrating process will be longer than in the case with
excess supply. The point is, however, that as long as the supply restrictions
are effective they will imply positive differential returns in the category.
Excess demand may also be permanent if the net inflow into a category is
too small to increase the number in the category to the equilibrium level. Thus
excess demand will be permanent.
This means that excess demand for some types of higher education, be they
Bwed. J. of Economics1972
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temporary or permanent, implies positive observed differential returns in
these educational categories. It also means that no equilibrating mechanism
exists in this case to even out returns between these educational categories.
Hypotheses: From an investment point of view weget the following hypoteses
on private returns to higher education: (1) Observed average differential re-
turns to all types of higher education with excess supply will be equalized and
equal to zero in equilibrium. (2) Observed average differential returns to all
types of higher education with excess demand will be positive and will not be
equalized.
What are the possibilities of testing such hypotheses in the "market"! These
hypotheses are based on static equilibrium conditions assuming an unchanged
demand curve for different educational skills. The demand for educational
services may of course also adjust to changes in expected returns due to shifts
in demand for educational skills. But to the extent such shifts make expected
returns more unstable, it will be more difficult to reach the equilibrium situa-
tion, even if the "market" always tends towards it. For this reason and due
to the rather long "production period" in higher education it may be doubt-
ful whether an equilibrium situation will prevail in the categories with free
entry at the point in time of observation. On the other hand: The supply-
conditions within higher education in Norway are stable in the sense that the
fields of study to which entry is restricted to-day have had excess demand
during the whole post-war period. Therefore it seems that the returns to edu-
cation in different educational categories have stabilized on or fluctuates
around different levels according to whether excess supply or excess demand
prevails.
2.2. Data and Method
Data on Incomes and 00818
Incomes on September lat, 1966, in different higher educational categories
according to age and education, including employees with secondary educa-
tion in banking and insurance, have been gathered from official publications
on wage-statistics &8 well as from the earnings statistics of different profes-
sions. Since the age-income profiles are very space-consuming, they are omitted
here.! Problems regarding differing earnings concepts, representativity
and corrections so that all incomes refer to 1.9.1966 are all discussed in [1],
pp. 26-38. The profiles are based on mens' earnings only. The two categories
with secondary education are included to provide information on earnings
foregone when studying and to represent the alternative income without high-
er education. Since no information on incomes during the educational period
exists, they are disregarded. Grants and/or loans are also disregarded.
Incomes foregone while studying are directly observable from the age-
l They may be found in [l], Table 3, p. 34.
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income profiles. Private costs for books, fees, etc. in higher education are
omitted here due to lack of space.!
Some Problems o/ Method
It is well known that returns to education may be expressed either as a rate
of return or as a present value. We will remark brieflyon the well-known
question of which concept is the more fruitful whencommenting on the results,
At this stage it suffices to say that both rates of return and present values
have been computed. As to the choice of discount-rate, the main point is that
without a perfect loan market lifetime income cannot be discounted using a
market rate of interest (see e.g. Sandmo [5].) The rate of discount will depend
on each individual's subjective rate of time preference, and the discount rate
will vary positively with the strength of preference for consumption in the
educational period. The present values have been computed for alternative
discount rates of 4, 6 and 8%. The reason why these values of the rate of dis-
count have been chosen is discussed in detail in [1], pp. 40-44.
An observed age-income profile from cross-section data to-day will differ
from a future age-incomeprofile starting to-day due to increasing real income
per capita over time. Returns calculations assuming a growth in real income
per capita of 3 % per year are therefore also presented. The figure 3% is based
on a growth in NNP of 4% per annum, a growth in population of 1% and
unchanged relations between the returns to different educations.
Uncertainty mayenter the expected returns with respect to the length of
the educational period, the drop-out possibility and also with respect to the
dispersion of earnings within a profession. The data used for this article did
not allow calculation of any measure of these types of uncertainty. The re-
turns figures are therefore based on graduation at normal time and on the
arithmetic mean of incomes in all age groups within each profession.
2.3. Result8 and Oomments
Average differential returns to certain types of higher education before and
after taxes are shown in Tables 1 and 2.2 The returns are expressed either as
a rate of return or as a present value calculated for alternative discount rates
of 4, 6 and 8%. The returns are calculated either directly from cross-section
data or assuming a future rate of growth in income per capita of 3% per year.
Returns are given separately for privatelyand publicly employed where this
information is available.
Some comments on the tables:
(a) Two figures are given in the column for the rate of return. They may be
regarded as the upper and lower limit for the rate of return in the category.
The upper limit means differential returns relative to the category "secondary
l May aløo be found in [l], Table 4, p. 39.
• For the way taxes have been computed, see [l], pp. 45-46.
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education employed in banking", and the lower limit means relative to the
category "secondary education employed in insurance'. Present values are
only given for the upper limit in order to simplify the presentation. Doing so
means that returns to higher education will perhaps be a bit exaggerated,
but the relation between the returns to the different categories of higher edu-
cation will not be affected.
(b) "_,, in the rate of return columnsmeans that no positive rate of return
exists. In all caseswhere the rate of return is positive it is unique since there
is only one sign change in the accumulated income streams. From the tables
we see that a ranking according to returns between the different educational
categories sometimes differs depending on whether rates of return or present
value at alternative discount rates are used. An example of this is the cate-
gory "science", where the rate of return is higher for the lower degree, while
the present value for all discount rates used is higher for the higher degree.
This shows that it is meaningless to speak of the "returns to education"
without specifying the rate of discount, i.e. how future income is evaluated
relative to income to-day. When this evaluation (the discount rate) is given,
the rate of return will only tell whether the returns to an education is positive
or negative. The present values just be used to obtain a ranking between
the altematives, since a larger sum of money to-day is always preferred to a
smaller.
Interpretation of the Resuli«
l. Are there positive private returns to higher education in Norway?
Using a discount rate of 6%, Table l shows that present valuesbefore taxes
from cross-sectiondata are positive for all categories except Arts (lower de-
gree), Law (public employment) and teachers' college.Calculatingwith an ex-
pected growth in real income per capita of 3% per year all categories except
teachers' collegewillhave a positive present value before tax even using a dis-
count rate of 8%. After tax this will be the casewhen using a discount rate of
6% (Table 2).
Returns after taxes including probable future increase in incomes would
seem to be the concept of greatest interest to an investor in education. Thus
it is fair to say that with a reasonable discount-rate (of 6%) it is profitable
to go through the types of higher education we haveexamined,except teachers'
college.
But the tables show that there are great differences in return between the
different types of higher education.
2. The Pattern of Returns
The question here is whether the pattern of returns is compatible with the
hypotheses from the theory sketched at the beginning of this article.
(a) Are observed differential returns to all types of higher education with
8wed. J.of Economics1912
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free entry equal and equal to zero! Strictly speaking, this question is difficult
to answer because the individual discount rate is subjective. We must there-
fore simplifyand choose a discount rate equal for all individuals.
Studies with free entry are Arts, Sciences, Law and Economiee.! From the
tables it is obviously difficult to find support for the hypothesis that the in-
dividuals have chosen education in such a way that returns between these
educations have been evened out. This is so regardless of which discount rate
is used. Even if measures of significance are lacking in this primitive "test"
we may legitimately conclude that our calculations do not support the hypo-
thesis that returns to studies with free entry should be approximately equal.
On the other hand we have found positive returns to these studies which should
indicate that none of them has been so attractive per se that the monetary
returns have been pressed below a reasonably profitable level.
(b) Are the observed differential returns to all types of higher education
with restricted entry positive and greater than the returns to the types with
free entry?
The answer here is yes, with some minor qualifications, depending on the
way of ranking. We have already mentioned the studies with free entry.
Entry to the others listed in Tables 1 and 2 are restrioted.t Disregarding for
the moment teachers and medical doctors, a ranking based on the rate of re-
turn from cross section data before taxes in Table 1 shows that aU categories
from studies with restricted entry top the list, the only exception being law-
yers in private service (in the 8th place). The same wayof ranking after tax
would add the category "Economics" to the exceptions. A ranking according
to present values at discount rates of 6 or 8 % from cross-section data before
or after taxes gives similar results. The inclusion of a 3% rate of growth in
incomes per year does not change the picture noticeably.
Returns from the types of higher education that traditionally have had
restrictions on entry are markedly higher than returns from studies with free
entry. This result is unquestionable.
An apparent exception is Medicine, but the income concept used in the sta-
tistics for this profession probably underestimates the earnings so that this
category is probably no exception to the rule. This question is discussed in [1],
pp. 64-65.
The difference in returns between studies with restricted and free entry
would have been even greater were it not for the considerable number of
engineers, business graduates, dentists and doctors that complete their studies
abroad and return to Norwayevery year. If this additional supply had not
existed, pay and returns to education in these categories had beeneven higher.
l Free entry means that everyone who has paased the matriculation examination may
begin studying these subjects.
I This means that only a fixed number of those wishing to begin studying these subjects
are admitted. Admission is nsually based. on the marks obtained in the matriculation
examination.
Swell. J. of Economic, Ul72
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The most paradoxical result from the calculations is the negative returns to
teachers' training. The returns are negative at all discount rates, but demand
for this type of education is far in escess of supply. One possible reason for
this popularity may be the fact that demand is dominated by women, who
find that economic prospects are favourable for them in teaching, relative to
other possibleoccupations, since the differencein pay between men and women
are less in teaching than in most other occupations. (Moreon this question in
[1], pp. 68-70.) A similar pattern is found in Germany [6].
2.4. Oonclusion.!
We have found that going through all types of higher education with free
entry in Norway is profitable at a "reasonable" rate of discount, but the cal-
culations do not support the hypothesis that returns are "evened out" between
these educational categories. A possible interpretation of this might be that
there is no reason for believing that the choicebetween studies with free entry
is made solelyon economic grounds. On the other hand the positive returns
to all these studies might indicate that the choice whether or not to under-
take higher education is based on a profitability calculation. In any case these
studies have not had such an attraction per se that the returns have been
pressed below a reasonably positive level.
There are markedly higher returns to studies where entry is restricted than
to studies with free entry. This difference is compatible with the assumption
that the individuals choose the type of education with the highest economic
returns. (This means in general; of course there are individual exceptions to
the rule.) One might ask whether such a difference in returns between studies
with free or restricted entry could have come into existence for reasons other
than the one we have assumed.
Suppose therefore that the choiceof education were not an investment de-
cision.An education with restricted entry wouldstill be a study where demand
for educational services was in excess of supply. But the demand would now
depend on the "utility" of the study in question. Since there would be no a
priori connection in this case between the total demand for an education and
returns from this education, a study with restricted entry might imply nega-
tive as well as positive returns, and the same would be the case for studies
with free entry. Thus, without assuming that the choice of education is an
investment decision it is impossible to say that studies with restricted entry
will imply greater returns than studies with free entry.
3. Social Returns
So far we have attached no social significanceto the returns fromhigher educa-
tion. The question is now whether returns calculations similar to those already
made may be of some help in the problem of allocating resources optimally to
8wed. J. ol BcollOmic61972
112
Jostein Arrestad
and within the educational sector. In other words: Is it possible to establish
criteria for where and how much to invest in higher education?
Such criteria must be derived from some social welfare function. Although
rarely made explicit. the social welfare function usually postulated when
calculating social returns to education. is
r T
W(O) = ~ ~ Vc [W~(Nk(O» Nk(O) - c,kNk(O)]
k-2C-!
(6)
This means that the educational policy at the point in time of calculation
zero should aim at maximizing the expected total net present value from higher
education.
Here Ve is the discount factor. now based on the social rate of discount;
w~ is expected average differential income before taxes in educational category
k (compared to secondary education) in year t after zero. and c~ is the expected
average social cost of education k in year t. assumed constant. Nk(O) is the
number of persons with education k at time zero.
The rationale for this welfare function is that earnings express social bene-
fits and that monetary costs express real resource costs.
W(O) is maximized when
~ [k k dw~ k]
L.VC Wc +N (O) dNk(O) - Cc = O. k=2 •...• r (7)
This means that at the "running" point of time of calculation zero we have
an optimal number of persons in an educational category when the expected
social net present value from the marginal person in all higher educational
categories equals zero. This investment criterion therefore says that the ex-
pected social marginal differential returns should equal the expected social
marginal cost in all educational categories. Due to measurement problems the
second term in the brackets is usually ignored. We then get
or
~ k_~ k
L.VC Wc - L.Vc Cc
This means that the present value of expected average differential earnings
should equal the present value of expected average social costs in all higher
educational categories. Since measurement is possible in this case. this is the
criterion used. In practice the investment criterion therefore simplifies to:
Invest in those categories where the present value of expected future differ-
ential incomes (judged from cross section data to-day) exceed the present
value of expected future costs.
Swell.J. of Economic81972
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Table 3. Public expenditurtl8 per student per year in 1966 (norw. crowns)
Teacher's colleges
University of Oslo
Faculty of Law
Faculty of Arts
Faculty of Science
Faculty of Medicine
Faculty of Dentistry
Faculty of Social Sciences
Norwegian School of Economics
and Buainess Administration
The Technical University of Norway
The Agricultural College of Norway"
7500
2600.
3800
9900
25500
26300
4300
7400
13500
46800
Source: [l], p. 105.
A The part comprising research expenditures in this figure is extraordinarily large.
Data and ResuUs
Earnings and costs are obtained in the same way as before, by observing them
from cross-section data and correcting for expected future income growth.
The only difference between a calculation of private returns before taxes and
a calculation of social returns is that the costs not borne by the individual
undertaking education have to be added to private costs of education. To this
end public expenditure per student per year in Norway in 1965 is presented in
·Table 3.
From Table 3 we see that public expenditures per student vary considerably
between the different types of higher education. Adding these costs to private
costs of education gives the best possible estimate obtainable on social costs
of higher education in Norway.
Using this cost concept, "social" returns to higher education have been cal-
culated. The results are presented in Table 4. (In this table rates of return
are presented for the upper limit only.)
The ranking according to returns in this table is somewhat different from
the ranking in Tables 1 and 2. The reason is, of course, the considerable dif-
ferences in social costs between the educational categories, caused by the
introduction of public expenditures on higher education. The relation between
high returns and studies with restrictions on entry is not 80 clear in this case
as in the case of private returns. But the important question in connection
with Table 4 is: Can w;e attach any normative significance to the returns
figures in the table?
Some Comments on Policy
It is well-known that calculations of "social" returns to education have been
severely critizised. The critique falls naturally into two parts:
(a) Questioning whether the economy functions in the way necessary for
identifying earnings with social benefits and monetary costs with real
resource costs, and
Swed. J. of Economic8 1972
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Table 5.
Downward bias Upward bias
1. Positive marginal external effects
2. Departures from perfect competition
3. Education also a consumption good
4. Average return greater than marginal
return
5. "Returns to education" do not repre-
sent returns to education alone
(b) questioning whether the "returns to education" reallyare returns to
education alone, and not also to a number of other factors.
This is not the place to repeat and evaluate the critique in detail, l but the
following classification shows how the main points of criticism, if justified,
would tend to bias the estimates of "social" returns given in Table 4.
Some very brief explanations of the points in Table 5:
1. If positive marginal external effects exist in an educational category,
personal earnings will not measure the full social benefits from the education,
and hence the returns estimates in Table 4 will be biased downwards.
2. If we regard a person with a special education (e.g. an engineer) as a fac-
tor of production, the price of the factor will, in equilibrium, be equal to the
value of its marginal product only if the economy is perfectly competitive.
Departing from perfect competition in the product and/or factor market, the
price of the factor will be lower than the value of its marginal product. The
earnings will in such cases not reflect the full social benefits from this type of
education so that also for this reason the figures in Table 4 will be biased down-
wards.
3. If a type of education were also a consumption good, people would be
willing to pay for this type of education without getting any monetary returns,
and consequently the figures in Table 4 would be biased downwards for this
reason as well.
4. Ignoring the second term in (7), Le. basing the returns figures on average
instead of marginal returns gives the figures in Table 4 an upward bias.
5. Obviously higher education is not the only factor that affects personal
earnings. If there is a positive relation between the level of education and some
of these other factors (as ability, parental status, race and sex) the figures in
Table 4 will be biased upwards.
It should be obvious by now that the figures in Table 4 cannot simply be
taken as the social returns to education; each of them has to be evaluated in
the light of the objections summarized in Table 5. Thus every statement on
the social returns to any investment in education will be disputable. There-
fore the reader is left to draw his own conclusions from Table 4. The value of
1Merret [4] is representative of the criticism, whereas Blaug [3] contains a defence for
"social" returns calculations.
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the figures in that table is, in my opinion, that they may form a precise point
of departure for such discussion, not that they give a definite answer.
Whether the figures in Table 4 are accepted as a point of departure for dis-
cussions on the social returns to educational investments depends of course
on whether it is accepted that the objective of the educational policy should
be to maximize the welfare function (6). To construct welfare functions for
the educational policy other than (6) is no simple task. Other possible aims of
educational policy besides economic efficiency are
(a) equalization of educational opportunities,
(b) "self-realization" for the individuals in the educational system,
(c) free choice of education, and
(d) that the educational system should have a critical function in society.
We shall not attempt to solve the problem of how these targets might enter
a more complex welfare function for the educational sector together with the
efficiency target. Note, however, that if the efficiency consideration enters
into a more complex welfare function, a policy which maximizes solely with
respect to the efficiency variable will in general not lead to a maximum of
the more comples welfare function.
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l. INTRODUCTION
Economic analysis of natural resources has traditions going back to
Malthus and Ricardo. The basis for the modern treatment of the best use of
an exhaustible natural resource is the classical article by Hotelling [3].
Lately the problem has also been analyzed from a macroeconomic point of
view by, e.g., Koopmans [5] and Vousden [8]. In these models either all
consumption in the economy is provided from the resource, or an additional
source of consumption, outside the model, is postulated. The assumption of
no alternative sources of consumption is extreme and unrealistic. The assump-
tion of an alternative, exogenous source of consumption has been introduced
by Vousden in "e8] as "a convenient simplification of the relevance of the rest
of the economy to the resource-use decision." But except for foreign aid, and
the most primitive subsistence agriculture, the time path of the alternative
consumption will depend on the stock of physical capital in the economy and
the savings ratio together with the growth in labor supply and technological
progress. It seems reasonable to think that, e.g., the optimal savings ratio
will depend on the availability of natural resources in the economy. On the
other hand it does not seem reasonable to assume that the optimal path
of resource depletion will be completely independent of, e.g., the stock of
physical capital in the economy and the resulting potentiality for consumption
from sources other than the current resource extraction. This shows the need
for °an integrated model of the economy where optimal savings and resource
extraction can be determined simultaneously. The purpose of this paper is to
present and analyze such a model for a small, open economy. The inter-
relationship between the optimal rate of investment and the optimal depletion
of natural resources is explored by Heal and Dasgupta [2]. However, their
model is rather different from the following model, which has the recent
petroleum discoveries in the North Sea as its background. We consider an
open economy where the resource good is exchanged for other goods in the
0022-0531/18/0191--0163502.00/0
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world market. The problem of optimal extraction of a nonrenewable resource
in an open economy has earlier been analyzed by Vousden [9], Kemp and
Suzuki [4], Van Long [7], and Strøm [6]. Common to all these contributions
is the fact that there is no physical capital accumulation in their models, so
that the problem of determining the optimal accumulation of capital,
together with resource extraction, disappears. In this paper the central issues
therefore are:
(1) What is the optimal intertemporai pattern of physical capital accumu-
lation in an open economy with a considerable stock of an exhaustible
resource?
(2) What is the optimal intertemporal pattern of extraction of this
resource?
(3) How are the decisions implicit in (l) affected by conditions in the
resource sector?
(4) How are the decisions implicit in (2) affected by conditions in the rest
of the economy?
2. THE MODEL
The following variables are used:
C(I) Total consumption per capita
c An exogenous source of consumption
v(1) Resource extraction per capitase,) The (average) savings ratio
k{l) Physical capital per capita
f{k) Production per capita, exclusive of resource extraction
P(I) The price of the resource relative to the "price" of other goods in the
world market
be,) Total extraction costs per capita
U Social welfare
p The social rate of discount (constant)
n The rate of growth in total population
IL The rate of depreciation of physical capital
xCI) The stock of the resource per capita
n{l) Net proceeds per capita from resource extraction
The problem is then
max lex> U{cCI» røt d!
o ~
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s.t.
(i) c(t) = (I - s(t»[f(k(t» + n(t») + c,
(i i) k(t) = s(t)[f(k(t» + n(t») - Ak(t),
(iii) n(t) = pet) vet) - bevet»~,
(iv) ,\ = n + /L,
(v) -x(t) = v(t) + nx(t),
(vi) O ~ s(t) ~ l,
(vii) O ~ v(t) ~ ii,
(viii) ko,.Yo given,
(ix) lim,~",x(t) > O, limt~o:k(t) free,
(x) p, n, /L, c, and p(t) exogenously given.
Stated in words, the problem posed is to find such paths over time for
resource extraction and total savings that the present value of total social
welfare is maximized. The planning horizon is infinity. Instantaneous
welfare depends on consumption per capital and we assume that U' > Oand
U" < O.Total population is assumed to grow at the same rate as the labor
force. Consumption per capita is given by (i), where n is defined in (iii). All
net earnings from resource extraction are used for import, so that the current
account is always balanced. pet) is assumed to be independent of the amount
exported ("small country" argument). Relation (ii), the expression for the
increase in capital intensity, is familiar from ordinary growth theory. (iii)
expresses net earnings from resource extraction, where b' > O and b" ~ O.
(v) says that the stock of the resource per capita is reduced by the extraction
per capita v, and is also diluted by nx because of the growth in population.
By (vi) s must be nonnegative and it cannot exceed one. (vii) says that the
resource extraction is irreversible and that there is some upper bound ii on
extraction per unit of time, due to, e.g., limited pipeline capacity or limited
loading capacity for tankers at the production platforms, caused by climatic
and/or geographical conditions. In addition to the assumption of a balanced
current account, the structure of the model above also assumes:
(a) No search activity for new resources.
(b) No uncertainties. In particular the future relative price of the
resource is assumed known.
(c) The stock of the resource does not affect social welfare or the
extraction conditions, except that it restricts total extraction.
(d) External effects are disregarded. Examples might be pollution due
to oil spill, blowouts, reduced fishing possibilities, or the fact that two (or
more) countries are extracting petroleum from the same reservoir.
(e) The producing country does not use the resource as an input.
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Assumptions (a) to (e) are not trivial. Still, this model contains aspects
from "real life" not found in any of the contributions quoted above.
3. OPTIMALITY CONDITIONS AND POLICY REGIMES
To analyze the problem, form the (present value) Hamiltonian function
H = e-øt{ U[(l - S(t»(f(k(t» + ll(t» + c] + ql(t)(s(t)[f(k(t»
+ ll(t)] - Ak(t» - q2(t)(V(t) + nx)(t»}, (l)
where we have substituted for c in U from (i). ql(t) and q2(t) are the so-called
co-state variables, associated with k(t) and x(t), respectively. According to
Pontryagin's maximum principle, a solution to the problem posed must
satisfy the following necessary conditions! :
(a) There exist continuous functions of time, ql and q2 , such that
til = -U'(l - s)f' - [sf' - (p + A)] ql'
ti2= (p + n) q2 .
(2)
(3)
(b) For all t, H is maximized in s and v, so that
s(t) = I
= E[O, l]
=0
if ql(t) > U',
if ql(t) = U',
if ql(t) < U';
v(t) = ii
= E[O, ii] if q2(t)= qlll' (4)
= O if q2(t) > qlll'
A number of policies are therefore available to the economy; see Table I.
Regimes G, I, and J are of limited economic relevance and will not be
referred to any more.
Equation (3) yields
(3')
q2 is the shadow price of the resource, so that qlt) denotes the addition to the
optimal value of the criterion function of leaving the marginal unit of the
resource at t unexploited, ql is the shadow price of physical capital per
worker. By (4), if the solution for v is interior, the shadow price of the re-
source, q2 , is equal to the marginal proceeds from extraction times the shadow
l Such a solution will be reallyoptimal, since (a) the Hamiltonian is concave in k, x, s,
and v for given q,(t), q2(t), and t, and (b) it is shown later that x(t) will be exhausted in
finite time and that q,(t) and k(t) approach finite limits as t goes to infinity.
t q•.o is of course not an exogenously given constant-it is determined in the optimization
process. qt.o < O is disregarded as economically uninteresting.
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TABLE l
Variables
Regimes s v c ql q.
A v c > U' < ll'(V)ql
B E [O, v] C > U' = ll'(V)ql
C O C > U' > ll'(O)ql
D E [O, I] V (I - s)(j(k) + ll(v» + c = U' < ll'(V)ql
E E [O, I] E (O, v] (I - s)(j(k) + fl(v» + c = U' = ll'(V)ql
F E [O, 1] O (I - sXf(k» + c = U' > ll'(O)ql
G O o f(k) + ll(v) + c <U' < ll'(V)ql
l O E [O, v] f(k) + ll(v) + c < U' = ll'(V)ql
J O O f(k) + c < U' > fl'(O)ql
price of capital. For an interior solution for s, this shadow price is equal to
the marginal utility of consumption per worker. In that case, the shadow
price of the resource is equal to the marginal utility of resource extraction in
terms of consumption per worker fl'U'. Given k, ql , and q2' (4) determines
the optimal s(t) and V(/) so that total consumption and capital-accumulation
are determined. Let us study each policy in turn, assuming for the moment
that p{/) is a constant p.
3.1. The Interior Solution (Regime E)
Since ql = U' in E, it follows from (2) that
th = (-1' + p + >') ql (5)
so that
if k > k*,
if k = k*, (6)
<o ifk -c k:",
where k*, the modified golden rule capital intensity, is uniquely defined by
1'(k*) = p + >., irrespective of conditions in the resource-extraction sector.
Differentiating ql = U' with respect to t, and using (5),
c = (U'jU")[ -1' -I- p -I- >.]. (7)
(7) is familiar from optimal growth theory and says that along the optimal
path consumption is increasing (decreasing) as long as the capital intensity
of the economy is below (above) the optimal steady state capital intensity k*,
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defined above. Regarding resource extraction, differentiating IT'(v) ql = q!
with respect to time and solving for ti, we obtain
Inserting for q2 and ql from (3) and (5), respectively, and using (4), this
simplifies to
i' = (IT'/nU)(f' - /L). (8)
Due to the assumptions on the cost function, (8) says that, along the op-
timal path, resource extraction should decrease (increase) as long as k is less
(greater) than h, where h > k* is defined by j'(h) ~~ /L. In addition to the
cost structure in the extraction sector the optimal extraction path also depends
on the capital intensity oj the economy. If the economy is growing (k < k*),
the shadow price of capital (equal to the marginal utility of consumption) is
falling and the user cost of the resource is increasing, both contributing to a
falling optimal path of resource extraction. In a contracting economy
(k > k*), the shadow price of capital (equal to the marginal utility of con-
sumption) is increasing, counteracting the growing user cost of the resource.
For k = h the relative rates of growth in ql and q2 are equal, thus the rise in
user cost is exactly offset by the rise in the shadow price of capital. For
k ~ h, qt/ql ~ q2/q2 . In a contracting economy resource extraction is there-
fore increasing for k > h, it is constant for k = h, and it is decreasing for
k < h. Furthermore, when k < h, (8) shows that when b" -+ O,v(t) -+ - 00
which means that when marginal extraction costs are constant for the per-
missible values of v, the interior solution cannot last for more than "an instant
of time't"; i.e., this regime cannot be part of an optimal policy sequence when
b" = O. From (5) and (6) it is intuitively plausible that there is a unique
equilibrium situation (q*, k*) in this regime. This equilibrium is a saddle-
point; i.e., to every intial ko there is a unique optimal path leading to (q*, k*).
(The proof is given in presentations of the one-sector optimal growth model;
see, e.g., Burmeister and Dobell [l, Chap. 11D. Along this optimal path (7)
and (8) hold, so, for ko < k*, c is increasing while v is decreasing. While this
equilibrium is reached only asymptotically, regime E williast only for a finite
time until extraction stops and the resource is exhausted. From (4), optimal
resource extraction in E is governed by
(p - b'(t{t» U'[(l - s(t»(f(k(t) + n(v(t») + c] = q2.0e<ø+nH. (9)
Jn (9), limt~roRHS = 00, while LHS(v) < LHS(O) < 00. Thus (9) cannot
hold for t -+ 00. There is some finite t, T,where v goes to zero and the extrac-
• This can be seen more clearly by assuming ll'(V)ql = q. , with b" = 0, to last for some
interval of time. This is only possible for f' = 1-'. But k has no stationary in k, hence E
cannot last for more than "an instant of time."
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tion period is over. With a finite T, the transversality condition for x(T) is
(10)
Since q2(t) in E is always positive from (4), (10) is only satisfied for x(T) = O.
The same conclusions hold for regimes B and l. At T the resource will therefore
be exhausted.
3.2. Other Regimes
B: Jn this regime the only source of consumption is the exogenous com-
ponent, which provides the society with a subsistence level of consumption.
At the same time, capital scarcity is extreme; this is why all production is
saved. Equations (5), (6), and (8) hold also in this regime, and again, if
extraction costs are constant, this regime cannot be part of an optimal
policy.
A, C: These policies are boundary policies in the sense that the values of
the control variables are at their boundary points. For these policies the
exact behavior of the system may be inferred from these boundary values
together with the initial conditions on kand x. Since s = I, (5) and (6) hold
also in these regimes.
D, F: In D resource extraction is maximal. In F there is no extraction;
(5), (6), and (7) hold in both cases. As in regime E it can be shown that there
is a unique equilibrium, which is a saddlepoint, for each of the regimes D
andF.
Having studied the behavior of the economy within each possible policy
regime, we now proceed to an analysis of possible switches between these
regimes to find optimal policy sequences over time.
4. OPTIMAL POLICY SEQUENCES
The necessary conditions for the various switches to take place between
the different policies are summarized in Table IL Piecing the different policy
regimes together is particularly simple in this model. even if we have two
co-state variables, since q2 is growing exponentially. As an illustration, follow
the possible optimal sequence from an initial situation in regime A. Such an
economy is extremely poor in physical capital. k o .-; k * and ql is falling. The
shadow price of physical capital capital is higher than the marginal utility of
consumption. All production is accumulated in order to expand the capital
stock of the economy. On the other hand the economy is rich in the resource,
which is extracted at a maximal rate. Since c = c is a constant in A, U'(c) is
a constant. Over time ql is falling and q2 is increasing so that U' and q2/ll'(f)
are approached "from above" by ql' Policy A therefore cannot be sustained.
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If, at some t, U'(c) = ql' while still q2 < II'(v) ql , the economy switches
to D, where now consumption is above subsistence level, while the resource
is extracted at a maximal rate. Total consumption is now increasing over time
and ql = U' is falling. The economy is accumulating capital also in this
regime. Capital scarcity is less extreme than in regime A, and the resource is
abundant. Of course, the initial situation of a real economy is usually in D
or E. A plausible example of an initial situation in D is the United Kingdom
after the recent petroleum discoveries in the North Sea. Policy D is also a
transient policy since q.JII'(v) is increasing while U' = ql is falling. Sooner
or later the economy will therefore switch to E, with resource extraction at
less than a maximal rate. Consumption is still increasing even if resource
extraction is now decreasing towards zero over time. An example of an
economy where the initial situation seems to be in this regime is Norway,
where initial oil production is well below the possible maximum. When
extraction ends, the resource is exhausted and the economy switches to F
which is the final policy, which, once established, will last forever. In F the
optimal development is the same as in the one-sector optimal growth model,
with consumption and the capital intensity increasing towards their optimal
steady-state levels.
Alternatively, if, at some t, q2 = II'(v) ql , with ql > U'tc), the economy
switches from regime A to B, where now resource extraction is less than its
maximum and falling, while still all production is used for accumulation
purposes so that consumption per capita equals c. B may of course also be
the initial situation. B is also a transient regime. q2 will be increasing over
time while ql is falling. From B the economy must switch to either E or C, or,
by accident, directly to F. If ql "reaches" U'(c) while q2 = II'(v) ql , the
economy switches to E, with the optimal path as explained above. The other
possibility is that ql > U'(c) while q2 = II'(O) ql . In that case the economy
switches from B to C where resource extraction has ended while capital
accumulation is still maximal. Since ql is falling towards U'tc), a switch
from C to F must eventually take place. Finally, A may also by accident
switch directly to E, if ql happens to be equal to U'(c) exactly at the point in
time where maximal resource extraction stops. From an initial situation in A.
the optimal policy sequence will therefore be one of the following:
(a) A DEF, (b) ABEF, (c) ABCF, (d) AEF, (e) ABF.
In all sequences extraction is gradually reduced. Maximal extraction until
extraction stops is inoptimal, since such a policy would require a jump in one
of the co-state variables, which is impossible by the maximum principle. In
Fig. I the sequence DEFis illustrated graphically by q10and q20.The economy
is in regime Duntil,' with ql > q2/II'(v). From t to t" it it is in E, with
ql = q.JII'(v), after which it is in F with q.JII'(O) > ql . Resource extraction
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FIGURE l
ends at I} , when the resource is exhausted. An interesting question is now:
How does the optimal extraction policy depend on the initial situation?
Consider first a positive shift in ko , with everything else equal. From the
one-sector optimal growth model we know that a higher ko would imply a
lower ql(/) everywhere. A higher ko would cet. par. also mean a lower q2.0'
If not, the intersection of ql(t) and q2(t)/II'(O) would take place for t < t" so
that the resource extraction period would be shortened. From the figure it is
seen that the time period when extraction is maximal (regime D) is reduced
when cer. par. q} shifts down. Also, for q} = q2/II'(v) to hold for every t with
a lower q}(t), II'(v) must increase; i.e., V(/) must be reduced for every t. But a
shorter extraction period with reduced extraction everywhere cannot exhaust
the resource, hence it is inoptimal by (10). q2.0must therefore fall when ko
gets a positive shift. Suppose then that q2.0 falls so that the extraction period
is unchanged. The new situation is illustrated by q}l and q21 in the figure.
q}l(t) is less steep than q}O(t); this follows from (5). qJq2 is unchanged.
Because of this, going backwards from I", the difference between the two
curves is less in the new situation than in the old; i.e., q}o - q2°/II'(O) >
q}l - ql/II'(O) for all t < I} , and the inequality increases as I goes towards
zero. Thus, for q} = q2/II'(v) to hold, this means that I/II'(v) is less in the
new situation, or that the extraction level is less now for all I < t", except in
the period when D is operative. But the time period when this regime is
operative must fall-this follows from the same argument, and is clear from
the figure. Again this would mean that the resource is not exhausted at t} ,
hence the extraction period must be lengthened when the initial capital intensity
gets a positive shift. Regarding a positive shift in Xo , it can be shown along
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the same lines that cet. par., ql(t) and q2(t) must both fall when Xo increases.
Resource extraction and consumption increase and the extraction period is
increased.
A more general question is: Under what initial conditions in the economy
are each of the sequences (a)-(c), or parts of them, optimal? Suppose initially
that EF is optimal and that ko now gets a negative shift. We then know that
l'(t) shifts up and the period when E is operative is reduced. Over time I:(t) is
falling, so for a sufficiently great negative shift in ko, v(t) would be equal to
jj for some timeperiod, regime D would be operative, and the optimal
sequence would be DEF. For still lower ko, regime A might be optimal
initially so that the whole sequence (a) would be relevant. For even lower ko ,
ql might not have reached U'(c) when extraction is reduced from its maximal
level and (b) would be the optimal sequence. Finally, (disregarding (d) and
(e», sequence (c) would be optimal for the lowest ko •
Consider next the effects of changes in p, the social rate of time preference.
In the capital sector, an increase in p leads to a fall in k*. From the theory
of optimal growth in the one-sector model we know that, for a given k, this
leads to a lower ql and to a lower s for each k. Also increased social preference
for consumption "today" relative to "tomorrow" would tend to concentrate
resource extraction more towards the beginning of the planning period and to
reduce the extraction period. This is accomplished by keeping the economy
in E for a shorter period when p increases. As p increases still more and tI
decreases, the optimal policy sequence may change from EF to DEF, and so
on. Changes in the exogenously given rate of growth in population, n, have
the same effects as changes in p.
Finally, consider the effects of an exponential trend in p(t) so that p(t) =
poeSI. Instead of (8), we now obtain
(lI)
from which it follows that, cet. par. an exponential rise (fall) in the relative
price of the resource would tend to reduce (increase) the rate of fall in extraction
along the optimal path. For sufficiently high rates of increase in the relative
price of the good the optimal extraction path may be rising. Inserting for p
and IT'and rearranging, (lI) shows that
v(t) ~ O asj'(k) ~ f3/(1 - b'[p) + p.. (12)
From (4), O < b'[p < l, so that the RHS of (12) is always greater than
f3+ p.. As long as the marginal productivity of capital in the economy is
greater than the RHS of (12), the optimal devlopment of the economy will in
principle be the same as when f3= O. Ifthe economy is more capital intensive,
however, resource extraction will rise over time along the optimal path when
there is a positive exponential trend in the relative price of the resource. In
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general (12) shows that the higher this trend is, the lower must the capital
intensity be for falling resource-use to be optimal, or conversely, the higher
the capita} intensity of the economy, the lower the price rise needed to make a
rising extraction-path optimal. The economic explanation is that when the
relative price of the resource is rising, the increasing user cost of the resource
and falling shadow price of capital are counteracted by the price rise. Jf
capital is "scarce," however, its shadow price may fall so fast that it offsets
the rate of increase in the resource price over and above the user cost. Jn that
case optimal extraction would still be falling over time. Conditions for this
case are given in (12).
5. COMPARING THE RESULTS WITH EARLIER MODELS
(a) The Resource Model
The results obtained on the optimal path of resource-use in this combined
model are somewhat more general than those found in earlier contributions.
The optimal extraction path now depends on conditions in the rest of the
economy. When the relative price of the resource is given and marginal
extraction costs are constant, we have shown that an interior solution to v
and s simultaneously cannot be optimal. Jf the solution for the savings rate
is interior, resource extraction should either be zero or at its maximum; and
vice versa. This is so even if the social. welfare function in the model is
concave. A comparison with the results in the resource model by Vousden [8J
is therefore not completely straightforward. Jn his model marginal extrac-
tion costs are constant. Jn a growth-model context, the alternative constant
source of consumption postulated in his model must be interpreted as a
steady-state consumption level, associated with some interior constant
savings rate s*. At the same time v is also interior and falling in his model,
which is incompatible with the necessary conditions for optimality in the
combined model, where t' is either zero or v in a steady state. When marginal
extraction costs are rising, however, an interior solution for s and v simul-
taneously is relevant in the combined model. With constant prices and the
capital intensity less than or equal to the modified golden rule. capital inten-
sity, extraction is either constant for some initial period and then falling, or
always falling. The extraction period is finite and the resource is always
exhausted when extraction ends. All these results are similar to those found
by Vousden in [8]. However, the result on the effect on the optimal extraction
path from changes in the initial capital or resource stock bears little resem-
blance to the result in [8] that "the optimal time of exhaustion will increase
as the alternative source of consumption, C, falls."
Since the welfare function is the same in both models, the contrast in the
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solutions must be due to the difference in supply conditions. In the resource
model the resource may be used for consumption purposes only. Extracting
the resource is tite only source of consumption in addition to the exogenous
component. Sinceconsumption from the resource is subject to a finite upper
bound on cumulative extraction, society must-in order to survive-stretch
out the use of the resource when the alternative source of consumption falls.
In the combined model, the resource extracted may also be used for capital-
formation purposes, and survival can be secured on basis of the physical
capital stock alone. The future benefits to be derived from an extra unit of the
resource extracted for investment purposes is higher the smaller the capital
stock already attained. The optimal resource-use in the combined model is
therefore slowed down when the initial capital intensity gets a positive shift.
Also, with an initial capital-intensity higher than the modified golden
rule, a rising extraction is possible for some time. In such a contracting
economy, an increasing shadow price of capital (equal to the marginal
utility of consumption), which makes investment and consumption more
valuable in the future, tends, cet. par., to make it optimal to postpone extrac-
tion; this effect must be balanced against a rising user cost of the resource.
The combined effect may well be to keep back production for some time, in
contrast to the ordinary case where a falling shadow price of capital and an
increasing user cost of the resource both lead to a higher extraction now than
in the future. While a contracting economy may be of limited practical
interest, the relevance of the capital intensity on optimal resource-use is
obvious in the case of a rising price of the resource. In that case the increasing
user cost is counteracted by the rising resource price. In a model without
capital, extraction rises if the rate of growth in price is higher than in the
user cost. In a model with capital, this pattern is accentuated if capital is
above its optimal steady-state level, since then the social value of capital (or
consumption) over time increases as well. ff capital is scarce, however, its
shadow price is falling, and it may fall so fast that it offsets the rate of increase
in the resource price over and above the user cost. In that case optimal
extraction would still be falling over time. Such a country is too poor to
afford to wait for the higher prices, at least for some initial period until the
capital stock of the economy is built up.
(b) The Capital Model
The problem now is how the optimal path of consumption and capital
accumulation in an economy is affected by conditions in the resource sector.
To follow Vousden [8], assume that the economy initially, before resource
extraction is started up at to, is in a steady state; i.e., k = k* and s = s* =
'Ak*//(k*). Assume further that after extraction has started up, the economy
is in regime E, so that extraction starts at less than its maximum. At the
outset we may safetyassume that consumption is a normal good for all t so
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that there is some increase in consumption when extraction starts. From (4)
this means a negative shift in ql at to. Also, as in the one-sector optimal
growth model it can be shown from (4) that (JS/Oql> O, so that the savings
rate/alis when extraction begins. But since the value of total production in the
economy increases when extraction begins, total savings may a priori be
increased or reduced (or stay constant). To show that total savings must rise,
suppose the opposite. If they fall for t = to + £ (£ > O and sufficiently
small), k falls below its steady-state level k*. But from the one-sector optimal
growth model a reduced k must imply a higher shadow-price ql , so this is a
contradiction. By the same argument, k cannot stay constant when ql gets a
negative shift. Hence total savings rise when extraction begins. k increases
above its steady-state level, so by (6), ql increases over time, which means that
c is falling over time along the optimal path. Over time, k and c approach
their optimal steady-state values asymptotically from above, while ql in-
creases asymptotically towards its optimal stationary value. The optimal
development of c, ql , and k is illustrated in Fig. 2. At tI , when extraction
ends, c and k are both above their optimal stationary values.
Since the optimal steady state is unlikely to materialize in any actual
economy (it is reached only asymptotically), the above thought-experiment is
somewhat illegitimate. Consider therefore the case when k < k* when a new
resource, like a petroleum reservoir, is discovered and exploited. We may
c It )
<;1 ( t )
k(t)
t
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FIGURE 2
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again safely assume that consumption gets a positive shift when extraction
begins so that ql(t) shifts down. By (6), ql(t) must be falling, since k < k*
also after extraction begins, which means that c(t) is increasing. Two cases
may be distinguished. The case in which c(t) < c* for all t is illustrated in
Fig. 3, where the optimal paths of c, ql , and k are shown. If, however, ko
is sufficiently close to k* and/or the new resource is sufficiently rich, c(t) and
k(t) may increase above their optimal steady-state levels; see Fig. 4.
In this case, as in the case discussed in connection with Fig. 2, consumption
shifts up above its optimal steady-state level when extraction begins, and,
correspondingly, ql shifts below qt. k is increasing. Since now keto) < k*,
however, ql falls and c(t) increases for some period after to, until, at i,
k = k*. In l, til = 0, and immediately after, when k > k*, ql is increasing.
This means that c(t) has a maximum in l. For t > i the optimal development
of the economy is identical to the case when ko = k*, discussed in connection
with Fig. 2. (7) may be rewritten as
c/c = (-1' + p + A)/W, (13)
where OJ = cU"/U' is the elasticity of marginal utility. When extraction
starts, total savings increase so that k increases faster than before the extrac-
tion period. With W (approximately) constant in the relevant range, it
follows from (13) that the relative growth in consumption is reduced when
c(t _-
t
J
t
l
1('
FIGURE 3
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extraction starts. The optimal reaction to a newly discovered resource is
therefore a positive shift in initial consumption combined with a reduced
relative growth in consumption. Figures 2-4 show that with resource extraction
ql(l) is less than ql(t) without extraction for all I, including t > ti. This means
that also in the post-extraction period society will enjoy higher levels of capital
and consumption per capita than it would have done without a resource extrac-
tion period.
6. CONCLUSIONS
(i) A dynamic model for an open economy where savings and resource use
can be optimized simultaneously has been analyzed. The results are some-
what more general than those found in earlier contributions. With constant
prices and the capital intensity of the economy less than or equal to the
modified golden rule, however, extraction is either constant for some initial
period and then falling, or always falling, along any of the possible optimal
sequences for the economy.
(ii) When the price of the resource depends exponentially on time, it is
optimal if, and only if, the rate of increase in the price of the resource is greater
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than some critical value, determined partly by the capital intensity of the
economy, to depart from the optimal sequences mentioned above. In that
case resource extraction is increasing over time, and it may be optimal to
leave the resource in the ground for some initial period. When the capital
intensity of the economy increases, the price rise needed to make such a policy
optimal is reduced.
(iii) It has been shown that as the initial capital stock of the economy
increases, the extraction period is lengthened and the extraction level is
reduced for every t. The resource is exhausted when extraction ends and the
extraction period is always finite. Extraction should be reduced gradually
towards zero, where extraction ends.
(iv) If a resource is discovered and exploited, the optimal savings rate in
the economy falls, while total savings increase. Compared to a situation
without resource extraction, consumption gets an initial positive shift, while
its relative rate of growth along the optimal path is reduced. Consumption
and the capital stock will be higher also in the postextraction period.
(v) Finally, it should be noted that with constant marginal extraction
costs-an assumption often made in the literature-an interior solution for
savings and resource extraction at the same time cannot be optimal.
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RESOURCE EXTRACTION,
FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS AND CONSUIVIPTION
IN AN OPEN ECONOl\1Y
Jostein Aarrestnd"
Norwegian School of Economics and Business Adrninistration, Bergen, Norway
Abstract
Macroeconomic models of optimal resource use over time assume either a closed
economy or an open economy without borrowing or lending abroad, A model of
resource extraction in an open economy with borrowing/lending abroad is presented
in this paper. When financial t.ransactions are possible, the optimal path of resource
extraction is separated from the optimal consumption stream, which is brought
about by financial transactions. Optimal strategies over time for consumption,
financial transactions and resource use are derived. The properties of these time
paths are compared to the results of earlier studies.
1. Introduction, the Model and Optimality Conditions
Optimal extraction of exhaustible natural resources over time has been
analyzed from a macroeconomic point of view by e.g. Koopmans (1973),
Vousden (1973) and Heal & Dasgupta (1974). These contributions assume a
closed economy. Optimal resource extraction in open economies has been
analyzed by Vousden (1974), Strøm (1974), van Long (1974), Kemp & Suzuki
(1975) and Gehrels (1975). While different in several respects, all of these
studies, except Gehrels (1975), have one common feature-explicitly or im-
plicitly the current account is always balanced, i.e. no borrowing or lending
abroad is assumed to take place. Gehrels recognizes this possibility. His setup
is interesting, but given the complexity of his model, which also includes
physical capital accumulation, the analysis is rather cursory. For this reason
there is scope for a more explicit treatment of the interrelationship between
optimal resource extraction and financial transactions over time in an open
economy. This paper has the recent petroleum and natural gas discoveries in
the North Sea as its background, but the theory is applicable to any society
with a substantial stock of an exhaustible natural resource which is mostly
exported, but where the volume of export is too small to influence world
prices of the commodity.
• I am indebted to a referee for well-taken criticism on an earlier draft.
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The following variables "ill be used:
c(t) = total consumption per capita
c(t) =an exogenous consumption per capita, from a source outside the model
cv(t) =consumption per capita financed by the sale of the resource abroad or
by borrowing or reducing the country's stock of financial assets
vet) = resource extraction per capita
Pv(t) =thc net price of the resource on the world market (net of a constant
marginal extraction cost)
Pe(t) =the "price" of consumption goods on the world market
bet) = stock offoreign bonds or, if negative, foreign debt, per capita, in nominal
units
x(/) = stock of the resource per capita
V = instantaneous social welfare
(! = social rate of discount
n --rate of growth in total population
f.t =ratc of change in thc exogenous component of consumption
a = rate of return on foreign bonds or rate of interest on foreign debt
y = rate of change in the resource price over time
p = rate of change in the price of consumption goods over time
T =time-horizon, finite.
The problem is then
Max foT V(c(t» e-pl dt
s.t.
(i) c(t) = cv(t) + c(t)
(ii) Pe(t)cv(t) =Pv(t)v(t) +ab(t) -nb(t) -bet) :;:?- O
(iii) - i(t) = vet) + nx(t)
(1\') bet) = bet)
(v) bet) ;;, -z for b < O
(vi) vet) :s;; iJ
(vii) vet) ~ O
(viii) p,.(t) = Pv.oCYI
(ix) Pe(l) =Pe.oefJt
(x) c(t) = coe"I'
(xi) x(O) = xo, b(O) = O
(xii) x(T), ur,» O
(xiii) (!> n, a, y, p, Pc.o, Pv.o, fl, co' z, iJ and l' exogenously
given constants.
(l)
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Verbally, the problem is to find such paths over time for resource extraction
and foreign borrowing/lending that the present value of total social welfare
is maximized. The planning horizon is finite. It may be 20, 50, 100 years or
more. A long, but finite planning horizon corresponds to the view that the
time period when the resource is extracted will be merely an "epoch" in the
history of the society in question, so that in the longer view other sources of
consumption are more important. Instantaneous welfare depends on consump-
"tion per capita and we assume that U' >0 and UW <O. The size of the total
population does not affect social welfare. Consumption per capita is, according
to (i), the sum of an exogenous component and consumption goods imported,
paid for either by selling the resource in direct exchange for consumption
goods or by selling bonds abroad as shown by (ii).
From a financial point of view, (ii) says that the increase in bond holdings
per capita, b, equals the value of the resource sold, PvV' plus the dividend
on the stock of bonds, ab, minus the value of imports, PeCv' and the reduction
in bond holdings per capita due to population growth, nb. band b may be
positive or negative. If b is negative, the debt per capita will increase by
the import and the interest on the debt, minus the value of the resource sold
and the population effect. According to (iii) the stock of the resource per capita,
which is initially given, is reduced by the extraction per capita, and is also
diluted by nx due to population growth. (vi) says that there is some upper
bound v on extraction per unit of time for e.g. technical reasons, and according
to (vii) resource extraction is irreversible. (v) says that, when the country
has debts, there is an upper bound on the debt increase. This is due to existing
practices in financial circles as to how much a country of a given size may
borrow abroad during e.g. one year and the national government's fear of
losing control of economic policy due to pressure from abroad. According to
(iv), the debt increase per capita is directly controllable. (viii) and (ix) express
the assumption of constant exponential growth in the prices of the resource
and of consumption goods on the world market. (xi) says that the initial
stock of resources per capita is given and that initially the country has no
debt or claims abroad. To make the problem economically interesting, assume
that xo<vT, so that the rate of extraction cannot be maximal throughout the
entire planning period. Finally, (xii) says that the stock of resources must be
nonnegative and that there must be no debt at the end of the planning period.
b and x are the state variables of the problem. v and b are the control varia-
bles.
In order to analyze the problem, form the (present value) Lagrangean
L = e-Q~{uGe [Pvv+ (a- n)b - bl + c) + qib - qz(v + nx)
-Ai(PVV + (a - n) b- b) + Az(Z + b) + A,(V -v) + A4.V}, (2)
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where we have substituted for c from (i) and (li). Necessary and sufficient!
conditions for a solution to (I) are that there exist continuous functions of
ti~~ ql and q2 such that
41 = - U'( )(<x-n)lpc-(<x-n)Al +eql
42 = (e+n)q2; i.e. qa(t) = qa.oe(ll+nlt
U'( )PvlPc-q2+PvAl-A3+A4 = O
-U'( )IIPc+ql-Al+A2=0
Al ;;:.O; Al[Pv v + (<x - n) b - b] = O
A2;;:' O; A2[z+b] = O
A3;;:' O; A3(ii-v) = O
A4 ;;:'0; A4v = O
e-QT ql(T) ;;:.O; e-QT ql(T)b(T) = O
e-IlTq2(T) ;;:'0; e-OTq2(T)x(T) =0.
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
(11)
(12)
(II) and (12) are the transvcrsality conditions.
ql and qz are the costate variables associated with the equations of motion
(iv) and (iii), respectively. qa is the shadow price of the resource per capita
so that qa(t) denotes the addition to the optimal value of the criterion function
brought about by leaving the marginal unit of the resource unexploited at t.
q2 is often called the "user cost" of the resource. ql is the shadow price of
financial capital. ql(t) denotes the addition to the optimal value of the criterion
function from buying a marginal unit of foreign bonds at t. Suppose now that
cv> Ofor all t E[O, T], so that Al =O. From (6) and (8) we then get
(13)
For an interior solution for - t, borrowing abroad, the shadow price of financial
capital is equal to the marginal utility of borrowing in terms of consumption
per worker, U'[p.. If the shadow price is lower, maximal borrowing is optimal.
Similarly, from (5), (9) and (10) we obtain
(14)
(14) says that for an interior solution for resource extraction, the user cost of
the resource, qa, should be equal to the marginal utility of resource extraction
l The conditions are sufficient since the Lagrangean is concave in æ, b, v and b for given
ql' qa and t.
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Table l
v ... li E[O,ii] O
il
--
b = -z A B C
b> -z D E F
in terms of consumption per worker, U'( )PvIPc' If the user cost is higher, no
extraction should take place; if it is lower, maximal extraction is optimal.
From (13) and (14), the policy regimes shown in Table l are possible in the
optimal solution. i"
II. Analysis
No Borrowing Restrictions
When b> -2, U' =pcql from (13). Inserting for U' in (14) we then obtain
if Pvql > q2!
if pvql = qa
if pvql < ga'
(14')
Also, when U' =pcql' (3) simplifies to
(3')
From (3'), (4) and (viii), the relative rate of change in Pvgl is greater (less)
than the relative rate of change in qa if Y is greater (less) than oc;that is, if
the percentage increase in the price of the resource is greater (less) than the
nominal rate of interest on bonds. Optimal extraction of the resource when
there are no restrictions on borrowing therefore depends only on the develop-
ment of the nominal price of the resource and on the nominal rate of interest
on bonds. The optimal extraction path in this case is independent of the
social rate of discount and the development of import prices. Disregarding
the case where y =oc,(14) also shows that witMut borrowing restrictions, optimal
resource extraction is either zero or at its maximum. Regime E lasts only for
"an instant of time", hence it cannot form part of any optimal policy sequence.
Consider first the case where y>oc (case I). If PV.oql.o>qa.o then Pvgl>q2
for all tE [O, TJ, and v =v for all t. But this possibility is e~cluded by the as-
sumption that vT>xo' Alternatively, if Pv.oql.O<q2.0 and Pvqt <q2 for all t,
the resource is not extracted at all. But the transversality condition (12) is
only satisfied for x(T) =0. Hence this policy is inoptimal and Pvql and qa
must have an intersection. Paths for pvql and qa compatible with the optimal
conditions are shown in Fig. 1.
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Fig. l
For t>tl it follows from (14') that v=v. v=O for t<tl• According to (12),
the resource must be exhausted at T. To study the optimal development of
consumption, differentiate U'(c) =pcql from (13) with respect to t. Using (ix),
(3') and (13) we obtain
C'7 U'( )( - (a.-fJ) +e +n)/U". (15)
(15) shows the absolute rate of change in real consumption per capita along
the optimal path. It follows from this expression that when borrowing restric-
tions are absent, the time form of the optimal consumption path does nal
. depend on the development of the resource price. Since f3 is the percentage rate
of change in import prices, a.- f3 is the real rate of interest, or the real rate of
return on bonds. (15) therefore says that when the real rate of return on bonds
is higher (lower) than the social rate of discount (plus any relative rate of
increase in population), consumption is increasing (decreasing) along the opti-
mal path. Denote the case where a.-f3<e+n by I.l and the case where
a.-f3>(!+n by 1.2. We may now study the optimal time path of financial
transactions. Since cv> Ofor all t and v =O for t < tI' the country must borrow
fort<ll, i.e. b(t)<Ofort<tl• From (i) and (ii) we have -b=Pc(c-c)-(a.-n)b.
Differentiating with respect to t,
(16)
(16) shows that the absolute rate of change in borrowing along the optimal
path consists of three components: the change in the value of resource-based
consumption along the optimal path, the price increase, if any, on resource-
based consumption along the optimal path of real consumption and interest
on the debt increase. Due to the first term, in particular, the sign of b is gener-
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Fig.2
ally ambiguous. Suppose therefore, for simplicity, that the exogenous com-
ponent in consumption is constant, so that fl =0. In case 1.2 real consumption
is increasing along the optimal path. In this case, b <O for fl ;;;'0.For increasing
or constant import prices, the debt would therefore be increasing for t < tI and
there is also some margin for It fall in importprices. For all practical purposes
borrowing is therefore increasing for t <tl in case 1.2. At tI' v jumps from
zero to v. From the expression for c, given in (i) and (ii), and the fact that ql
must be continuous, it follows from (13) that b must make a positive jump at tI.
In fact b must bc positive for t >tl, otherwise the debt would continue to rise
also during the extraction period and until T, which is not compatible with
the t.ransversality condition (11). Whether the repayment of the debt takes
place at an increasing or decreasing rate, however, cannot be seen from (16)
in this case. The optimal borrowing path in case I.l is less clear. Real consump-
tion then falls over time. With· constant prices, borrowing for this purpose
therefore falls over time. On the other hand the debt is increasing, so eel. par.
borrowing for this purpose must increase. The total effect on the rate of change
in borrowing is therefore ambiguous. As in case I.l, there will be a positive
jump in b at tI. In the repayment period, it follows from (16) that unless
there is an extremely steep increase in import prices, repayment of the debt
takes place at an increasing rate along the optimal path.
Next we consider case II where y < IX, which includes the case where the
price of the resource is constant. For the same reasons as in case I, the optimal
paths for pvql and q2 must intersect, as illustrated in Fig. 2. In this case, how-
ever, v=v for t<tl and v=o for t>tl. (15) and (16) still hold. Denote the case
where c<O by 11.1 and the case where c> O by 11.2.
By applying the same argument as in case I, there must now be a negative
jump in b at tI. Since cv> O for all t, financial capital must be positive when
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extraction ends, i.e. b(tl»O. Also b(T)=O according to (11), RO that financial
capital is positive in the post-extraction period, except at t =T. In case 11.1,
(16) 8lim~'8that unless {J is "very high", lending abroad increases over time
in the extraction period. b must he falling towards zero at T. The sign of b is
ambiguous. In case 1I.2 the same pattern is to be expected for t <fl' although
real consumption now increases over time. If b <O for t >t1, it follows from
(16) that b<O in this case in the post-extraction period, which means that the
country reduces its holdings of foreign bonds at an increasing rate.
Borrowing Restrictions
In case I, the possibility of borrowing restrictions emerges, Suppose that such
Il situation exists, and that t"E[O, ti]. In this situation the optimal path of v
(and c) is determined by (14). Differentiating [l'p,. =Q2Pc and solving for c
we now obtain, using (4) and (14):
c= U'( )(-(y-{J)+(!+n)/U". (17)
In this situation (17) shows that the absolute rate of real consumption per
capita does not depend on the rate of interest. Instead the percentage rate of
change in the price of the resource enters the expression. (17) therefore says
that when the real rate of return from keeping the resource in the ground is
higher (lower) than the social rate of discount (plus any relative rate of in-
crease in population), real consumption is increasing (decreasing) along the
optimal path. This is mere ly a reflection of the fact that savings now take the
form of reduced resource usc instead of reduced borrowing. Using (4), (17)
and the fact that c=[pvv+(ex-n)b+z]/pc+c in this case, we obtain the fol-
lowing expression, from (14), for the rat€ of change in resource extraction:
ti = epe/Pv + (IX - n)zjpv -yv +(J(c - c)Pc/Pv' (18)
(18) says that the absolute rate of change in resource extraction along the
optimal path depends on four factors: the change in consumption along the
optimal path, increased interest on the debt since borrowing takes place
throughout at a maximum rate and changes in the price over time, if any, of
the resource and of imported consumption goods along their optimal paths.
(18) shows that in general there is no reason a priori to expect a lalling optimal
path ol re..~ource extra-eli-on in this model. This conclusion contrasts with the
result in models of optimal resource usc in open economies where financial
transactions are assumed away.
Opti~l Policy Sequences
To obtain somewhat more specific results about the optimal paths of finance
capital, the case where the elasticity of marginal utility U"'c/U' equals a
constant Q) and where the exogeneous component in consumption is constant,
is analyzed in the Appendix. Based on the conclusions of the Appendix, we
obtain the following results for optimal policy sequences:
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- b(t), v(t)
ti ----------------- ---- ---------~
-z
F B D T
Fig.3
For the time being, the values of o: and " are such that case I does not seem
very relevant.' However, it is of general interest and may become relevant
in the future. In the Appendix it is shown that regardless of whether or not
consumption per capita is increasing along the optimal path, borrowing is in-
creasing until resource extraction begins, except under extremely unrealistic
conditions regarding the values of e, o: and {J. The optimal policy sequence is
then FD. Since borrowing is increasing in F it is also possible that borrowing
reaches its "ceiling" at t' <tl' so that at t' the economy is in C. For t' <t < tI
the optimal policy is B, where the resource is extracted for direct import pur-
poses as a supplement to debt-financed consumption (which is decreasing over
time in this regime, due to the servicing of the debt). The optimal policy
sequence is then FCED, as illustrated in Fig. 3.
Reduced borrowing over time in case I is possible only in an extreme defla-
tionary situation where import prices are falling and the nominal rate of
interest on bonds is very low (see Appendix).
In case II finance capital is always positive, and the optimal policy sequence
is DF. Borrowing does not take place and the resource is never extracted
for direct import purposes. For the time being, this is the economically most
relevant case.2
III. Discussion of the Results
l. Some policies will always be nonoptimal:
(i) In a resource-exporting economy, which is not confronted with any inter-
national borrowing restrictions, resource extraction at less than the maximal
rate is always inoptimal.
1While this was true when the first draft was written, the reverse is true at the time of
the final revision (June, 1979).
2 See footnote 1 .
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(ii) If resource extraction takes place at less than its maximal level, resource
use for financial accumulation purposes or for debt repayment cannot be
optimal Conversely, if financial investment is optimal, resource extraction at
less than the maximal rate is always inoptimal.
(iii) When resource extraction takes place in order to import consumption
goods, it is inoptimal to borrow less than the maximum amount of money
abroad at any time. Equivalently, it is nonoptimal to borrow less than the
possible maximum abroad as long as thc resource good is exchanged for
consumption goods abroad. It follows that in a situation with no (effective)
upper bound on borrowing abroad, resource use in exchange for consumption
import cannot be optimal.
2. When the rate of growth in the price of the resource is greater than the
rate of interest on financial claims (case I), it pays to keep the resource in
the earth as long as possible. The optimal policy sequences therefore have the
following typical properties:
(i) Resource extraction always takes place at, a maximal rate at the end of
the planning period.
(ii) Borrowing abroad in the first part of the planning period and repay-
ment at the end is optimal. The foreign debt is increasing throughout until
repayment hegins and decreasing throughout the repayment period until it
·is zero at the time horizon.
(iii) The broad aspects of optimal resource usc and financial transactions
mentioned above are independent of the value of the social rate of discount,
the rate of population growth and the rate of growth in the price of consump-
tion goods.
(iv) If the social rate of discount plus the rate of increase in population is
greater (less) than the rate of increase in the price of the resource (or the rate
of interest on bonds if there is no effective upper limit on borrowing) minus
the rate of growth in the price of consumption goods, the optimal path of
consumption per capita is decreasing (increasing) over time.
(v) Except under extreme economic conditions, borrowing increases during
the borrowing period, and the borrowing restrictions may become effective
before the repayment period begins.
(vi) Resource extraction mayor may not be optimal during the borrowing
period. If it is optimal, it is for the purpose of direct import of consumption
goods only. Such a policy can only be optimal if borrowing possibilities arc
exploited at their maximum.
3. When the rate of growth in the price of the resource is less than the rate
of return on financial assets (case II), it pays to shift the resource into financial
assets as fast as possible. The optimal policies then have the following typical
properties:
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(i) Resource extraction takes place at a maximal rate at, the beginning of
the planning period until the resource is exhausted.
(ii) During the resource extraction period the country lends abroad. When
this period is over,. the proceeds on, and the foreign bonds themselves, are
spent for consumption purposes.
(iii) The optimal consumption over time will be decreasing (case 11.1) or
increasing (case 11.2) depending on whether the social rate of discount plus the
rate of growth in population is greater Ol' less than the rate of interest on
bonds minus the rate of increase in the price of consumption goods.
4. To gain more insight into the conditions in the economy under which dif-
ferent policies will be optimal, consider partial changes in the data of the
problem. An increase in the initial exogenous consumption Co would in all
cases "lift up" the consumption profiles over time. An increase in the initial
value of the resource Pv.oxo or a fall in the initial price of the consumption good
Pe.o' would have the same effect. A higher social rate of discount fl would,
according to (15) and (17), increase the rate of decline in consumption in cases
I.l and 11.1 and reduce the rate of growth in consumption in cases 1.2 and 11.2.
In both cases, initial consumption would increase. An increase in the rate
of population growth n has the same effects on consumption. The higher the
upper bound on borrowing z is, the less likely it is that resource extraction for
direct import purposes takes place as part of the optimal policy. If there is
no upper bound on the rate of resource extraction t), repayment of the debt in
case I would take place immediately before T with v(t) .....00, or in case II, the
regime in which ti> O would he infinitely short at the start of the planning
period with an infinitely high extraction level. An increase in the growth rate
of the price of consumption goods p leads, according to (15) and (17), to a-
faster fall for c in cases I.l and 11.1, or a slower increase in cases 1.2 and 11.2.
The effect of a change in p on initial consumption is a priori ambiguous. The
reason is that a change in p has two opposite effects, similar to a- substitution
and an income effect. If p is e.g. reduced, future income in real terms is in-
creased. This is the income effect. However, a reduced p also increases the
"price" of initial consumption, relative to consumption in the future. This is
the substitution effect. The substitution effect would tend to reduce initial
consumption, while the income effect works in the opposite direction. (This
result was originally reported in Strøm (1974) and is elaborated there.) A fall
(rise) in p would therefore not automatically lead to reduced (increased) initial
consumption and borrowing in cases I.l or 11.1, although this is the best guess.
Similar reasoning holds for cases 1.2 and 11.2. Without borrowing restrictions,
the extraction path is not affected by a change in p. When the restrictions are
effective, a rise in p would, according to (18), affect the optimal rate of change
in extraction in two ways: negatively through the falling growth rate of
consumption and positively through a steeper rise in the price of imports
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relative to the resource price. The total effect is therefore unpredictable on the
basis of the theory. An increase in the rate of change in the price of the resource,
y, may change the optimal policy from case II to case I. The rate of change
in consumption along the optimal path will be affected if, and only if, bor-
rowing possibilities are exploited at their maximum. Then, c falls less fast in
case I.l and increases faster in case 1.2. Regarding initial consumption, the
effects will be of a type similar to those for a change in {J. \Vhen y increases,
future income increases, whereas the "price" of initial consumption increases,
and there is an income and a substitution effect working in opposite directions.
If borrowing restrictions are effective, v is, according to (18), affected positively
from a positive shift in y through the term c and negatively through the term
-yv, since less resources are then needed to pay for a given amount of consump-
tion. The total effect on the rate of change in resource extraction is therefore
again ambiguous. Finally, an increase in the rate of interest on bonds Il may
change the optimal policy from case I to case II. Without borrowing restric-
tions, a higher Il leads, according to (15), to a slower decline in c in cases I.l
and 11.1 and a faster increase in cases 1.2 and 11.2. A higher rate of interest
on bonds would therefore tend to postpone consumption in both cases, either
to evade some of the higher costs of borrowing (case I) or to profit from the
higher yield on bond holdings (case II). When borrowing restrictions are effec-
tive, the rate of change in consumption along the optimal path is not affected
by a change in the interest rate.
5. Compared with the earlier studies mentioned in the introduction, the main
effect of allowing financial investment or disinvestment in a model of resource
extraction in an open economy, is to separate the optimal consumption stream
over time from the optimal path of resource extraction. If borrowing pos-
sibilities are unlimited, the separation will be complete. The results with
respect to the optimal path of resource extraction in a closed economy as
obtained by e.g. Vousden (1973) or in an open economy without borrowing
possibilities as obtained by e.g. Strøm (1974) arc then no longer valid. These
results are typically that resource extraction (and consumption) should be
decreasing along the optimal path, while in this model optimal resource extrac-
tion is always either zero or at its maximum. Resource extraction takes place
in the beginning or at the end of the planning period, depending solely 011
whether the rate of interest on foreign bonds is higher or lower than the ratc
of increase in the resource price. This is in contrast to Vousden (1973), where
the optimal path of resource extraction depends on the social rate of discount
and on the properties of the utility function, or Strøm (1974), where in addi-
tion the rate of increase in the relative price of the resource also enters the
resource extraction function. An optimal consumption path is then brought
about by financial transactions. In addition to the properties of the social
welfare function and the social rate of discount, which determine the optimal
consumption path in Vousden (1973), this path is now-when there is no
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effective limit on borrowing-also determined by the rates of change in the
world-market prices of consumption goods combined with the rate of interest
on bonds and population growth.
When borrowing possibilities are fully exploited, the result given in (18)
does not correspond to the result obtained by Strøm (1974) for all open eco-
my without financial transactions. The reason is the servicing of the debt.
Because of this, the change in the value of resource extraction over time is
not equal to the change in the value of consumption. It should also he noted
that in contrast to the results in the contributions mentioned above, there is,
in this model, no reason to expect a priori that optimal resource use is falling
over time.
In conclusion, compare the relative rate of increase in total consumption,
alter the existence of the resource has been acknowledged in the optimal plan,
with the growth rate belare the resource was taken into account. From (15')
in the Appendix we solve for IX- (J:
(19)
The expression corresponding to the RHS of (19) before the resource is acknow-
ledged in the plan, is
,u{-w)+e+n.
Whether gl <,u therefore depends on whetherIX-{J <,ut -w) +e +11,. Reasonable
values for the constants (see Appendix) indicate quite clearly that gl <fl. The
optimal reaction to a newly discovered resource is therefore a positioe shift in
initial consumption combined with a reduced relative rate of growth in con-
sumption, as compared to the situation before the resource was discovered.
Appendix
Assume that the elasticity of marginal utility w = U" .clU' is a constant. (15)
may then be written as
c=glc(t) where gl={-{IX-{J)+e+n)/w
so that
(15')
c(t) = e(O)eQd•
When v=O, we have that b-(IX-n)b= -Pete-c). To simplify, suppose that
the exogenous component in consumption is constant. It may then, without
loss of generality, be set equal to zero. In case I, b{O)=0 and the solution
for b(t) is
(i) b(t)=PC.~{O){e<",-nJl_e(Ql+Plt); t<t
l
,
where k=gl +{J- (IX-n).
J. Aarrestod
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When -h=z, which may occur only in case I, (18) now simplifies to
where
g2 = (- (y -(J) +e +n)/(o.
Assuming gl +(J=t-ex-n, (i) shows that b(t)<O as long as v=O. From (i)
b = Pc. oc(O) (ex- n) e(~-n)t - (gl + (J) e(Q, +(JJI),
k
so that t-.» and the foreign debt is always increasing as long as 1'=0. Further
ex-n is positive. li is then always negative, except if gl +{J is negative and
greater than ex- n in absolute value. Disregarding n, this means gl +{J< - ex.
Inserting for gl and using - 2 as a reasonable guess for cO, this implies e >3ex+{J.
"Realistic values" for e, ex and {J are 0.02-0.04, 0.07-0.09 and 0.05-0.07,
respectively. We may therefore safelyassume that b <O, so that borrowing
increases over time in case I.
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ON LABOUR ALLOCATION, SAVINGS AND
RESOURCE.EXTRACTION IN AN OPEN ECONOMY
By Jostein Aarrestad
1. Introduction.
Dating back to Ramsey's classical article [6J, the problem of
optimal accumulation of physical capital has been given much
attention in the literature. Especially since the midsixties,
wide ramifications and generalizations of the Ramsey model have
been given. Natural resources do not enfer these types of models
in an explicit way. On the other hand, economic analysis of
natural resources has traditions back to Malthus and Ricardo.
The basis for the modern treatment of the best use of an exhau-
stible natural resource is the classical article by Hotelling
[3"] .• ~ately the problem has also been analyzedfrom a macro-
economic point of view by e.g. Koopmans [5) and Vousden {9l. In
these models either all consumption in the economy is provided
from the resource, or an additional source of consumption, out-
side the model, is postulated. The assumption of no alternative
sources of consumption is extreme and unrealistic. The assump-
tion of an alternative, exogenous, source of consumption has
been introduced by Vousden in [9] as "a con~enient simplification
of the relevance of the rest of the economy to the resource-use
decision". But except for foreign aid and the most primitive
type of subsistence agriculture, the time path of the alternative
consumption will depend on the amounts of labour and physical
capital in the rest of the economy and the savings ratio together
with the growth in labour supply and technological progress. It
seems reasonable to think that e.g. the optimal savings ratio
will depend on the availability of natural resour~es in the
economy. On the other hand it does not seem reasonable to assume
that the optimal path of resource depIction will be completely
independent of e.g. the stock of physical capital in the economy
and the resulting potentiality for consumption from sources other
than the current resource extraction. This shows the need for an
intergrated model of the economy where optimal savings and re-
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source extraction can be determined simultaneopsly. The purpose
of this paper is to present and analyze such a model for a small,
open economy.
The interrelationship between the optimal rate of investment and
the optimal depletion of natural resources has been explored by
Heal and Dasgupta [2J. However, th~ir model is fat_er different
from the following model, which has the recent petroleum dis-
coveries in the North-Sea as its background. As Strøm [7), we
shall consider an open economy where the resource good is ex-
changed for other goods in the world market. Also, resource
extraction is controlled directly in [2] by "turning the tap",
whereas in this model extraction is controlled ~y the employment
in the resource sector. Since labour must be rel~a~ed from the
rest of the economy in order to extract resourC~$, labour allo-
cation over time between the two parts of the _conomy must be
optimized. Finally, marginal extraction costs ar e constant in r 2],
whereas in this model they are increasing due ~Q the increasing
alternative cost of labour. The problem of optimal extraction
of a non-renewable resource in an open economy has earlier been
analyzed by Vousden [10], Kemp and Suzuki [4], van Long [8] and
Str Øm [7]. Comm on to aIl the sec on tri but ion s are that the re 1s
no physical capital accumulation in their models, so that the
pro~lem of determining the optimal accumulation of capital,
together with resource extraction disappears. In this paper the
central issues will therefore be:
(l) What is the optimal intertemporai pattern of physical capital
accumulation in an open economy with a considerable stock of
an exhaustible resource,
(2) What is the optimal intertemporai pattern of labour allocation
and resource extraction when extraction depends on the amount
of labour released from the rest of the economy,
(3) How are the decisions implicit in (l) affected by conditions
in the resource sector, and
(4) How are the decisions implicit in (2) affected by conditions
in the rest of the economy.
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2. The Mode 1.
The following variables will be used:
c total consumption per capita
y = total production per capita in market value
s = the (average) savings ratio
~= production per capita, exclusive of resource extraction,
in physical units (and market value)
Y2= resource extraction per capita in physical units
k = physical capital per capita
1.= the part of labour allocated to sector i (i=1,2)
1
P = the net price of the resource relative to the "price"
of all other goods in the world market
x = the stock of the resource per capita
u = instantaneous social welfare
p the social rate of discount (constant and positive)
n the rate of growth in to ta 1 population
11.- the rate of depreciation of physical capital
a = the marginal (and average) productivity of labour 1n
resource extraction (a constant).
The problem is then:
(1) maximize J = f~ U(c(t»e-pt dt
subjectto
(2)
(3)
(4 )
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
(11 )
(12)
c Ct ) = (1-s(t»y(t)
y(t) = Y1 (r ) + P(t)Y2(t)
Y1 (t) = 11 (t)f (k(t) /11 (t»
Y2(t) = a12(t)
k(t) = d k(t)/dt = s(t)y(t) - Ak(t)
A=n+11
-~(t) ~ Y2(t) + nx(t)
O < s I t ) 2. 1
O < Y2(t) 2. Y2
11(t) + 12(t) 2 1
11 (t) .:::.O, O 2 122 12
k(O) =kO (given); x(O) = xo (given)
lim x(t) > O, lim k(t) free
t-.oo
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p,n,~,a exogenously given constants, p It ) exogenously given.
Stated in words, the problem is to find such paths over time
for total savings and labour allocation between the two sectors
that the nresent value of social welfare is maximized. The
planning horizon is infinity and intantaneous welfare depends
on consumption per capita. In (l) we assume that U'>O, U"<O
and lim U~c)= 00. Total nroduction. evaluated at world-marketc~o .• -
prices, is divided between consumption and saving. All net
earninRs form resource extraction are used for import. In (4),
f is invariant over time and we assume f'>O, £"<0 and f'(O»;\.
(4) is derived from a production function in capital and labour
homogeneous of degree one. By (5), resource extraction depends
on labour only. (5) is derived from a production function with
fixed coefficients for both labour and physical capital, assuming
that labour is never underemployed. The reason is that oil
production in an open economy is easily financed abroad. Necessary
capital equipment is rented abroad and ne~d not be financed otit
of domestic savings. The problem of allocating ppysical capital
optimally between the two sectors is therefore avoided. o(t)
is net of capital costs per unit of the resource and assumed
independent of the amount exported ("small country" argument)
In contrast, labour is assumed not to be imported. Thus domestic
labour allocated to oil production (actual ~roduction, catering,
supply, administration, government supervision, etc.) must be
released from the rest of the economy.
(6) is the expression for the change in the capital intensity,
well-known from growth theory. (8) says that the stock of the
resource per capita is at any time reduced by the extraction
per capita and is also diluted by nx beaause of the growth in
population. By (9), s must be non-negative, and it cannot exceed
one. Resource extraction is by (10) irreversible. An upper bound
Y2 on resource extraction is also assumed, due to e.g. limited
pipe-line capacity or loading facilities. The point is that the
transport capacity had been created without being optimized from
the point of view of the producing nation. Another justification
for an tipper bound is membership in a production cartel with
production quotas for each member. For simplicity it is assumed
that this upper bound is independent of time. By (11) and (12)
employment in the two sectors cannot exceed the total labour
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force and employment in each sector must be non-negative. Also,
due to (10) there is an upper bound 12 on 12, such that Y2=a12.
Finally, the initial stocks of capital and the resource are
given and there is no restriction on the capital stock at any
time, whereas the stock of the resource must always be non-
negative.
In addition to the assumption of a balanced current account, the
structure of the model above also assumes:
a) No search activity for new resources.
b) No uncertainties. In particular the future relative price
of the resource is assumed known.
c) The stock of the resource does not affect social welfare or
the extraction conditions, except that it restricts total
extraction.
d) External effects are disregarded. Examples might be pollution
due to oil-spill, blow-outs, reduced fishing possibilities or
the fact that two (or more) countries are extracting petro1eun
from the same reservoir.
e) The producing country does not use the resource as an input.
Assumption a) to e) are not trivial. Still, this model contains
aspects from "real life" not found in any of the countributions
quoted above.
3. Optimality conditions and policy regimes.
To solve the above problem, form the Lagragean expression1)
L e-Pt{U (1-s) (11f(k/11) + pa12) ] + Q1[s(11f(k/11)
(13) + pa12)-Ak]-Q2(a12 + nx) + w(1 - 11+ 12)},
where we have inserted for c, y, Y1 and Y2' q1 and q2 are co-
state variables associated with the equations of motion (6)
and (8) and w is the shadow price of labour (the shadow wage).
1) The time argument in the functions will from now on usually be
dropped.
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di 1) fl' h bl hNecessary con 1t10ns or a so ut10n to t e pro em are t en
that there exist continuous q1 (t; ) and q2 (t ) such that
(15) (p+n)q2
C
< O if s = O
(16) -U' + q 1 = O i f O < s < 1
> O if s = 1
(17) U'[(1-s)(f-(k/11)f')] + q1s(f-(k/11)f') - w < O and
O if 11 > O
(18) U'[(1-s)pa] + q1spa - q2a - w ~ O and = O if 12 > O.
From (1), (16 ) and (17), w > O sot hat (11) alway s hol ds as an
equality. A number of regimes are possible in the optimal solu-
tion, see table 1, where the value of the main variables in the
different regimes are given, assuming th~t pet) is a constant, for
simplicity equal to one. Given k , q1 and 02' (16), (7) and (18)
determine set), 11(t) and 12(t) so that production, consumption,
resource extraction and capital accumulation are determined. We
shall study each regime in turn.
1) Stich a solution will really be optimal, since
a) (13) is concave in k, x, s , v, 11 and. 12 for given q1'92 and t, and
b) it will be shown later th~t x(t) will be exhausted in
finite time a~d that q1 and k approach finite limits as
t goes to infinity.
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At the outset regimes A, B and C are analyzed together since
they are based to a considerable extent on (14) and (16) which
are valid in all three regimes. Since 01
it follows from (14) that
(19 ) (- f I + P + A) q1 (r )
so that
(20)
U' in these regimes
where k*, the "modified golden rule" capital intensity, is
defined by fl(k*) = P + A. As long as the economy is in any of
these regimes, the overall caoital intensity of the economy, k,
approaches the optimal value l1k*. q1 is stationary for the
same capital intensity. Stationaries for k in the (q1,k)-plane
are found from inserting for s = s(01,k) from (16) in (6) with
k = O. Implicit differentiation then yields
This expression is well-known from the standard optimal growth
model, as presented in e v g , [1]. For f' >«) A, k = O has a
negative (positive) slope in the (Q1,k)-diagram. The nhase-
diagram is given in figure 1, where k is the maximum sustainable
capital/labour ratio.
CtjO
( 2I) -f'+Aasy--a q1
=
q'1
~~the optimal
pat h
'" "-.
~------------------------------------------------~~~----------- kk
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k > O «O) for points above (below) the k = O curve. It is
intuitive (and easy to show) that (qt, 11k*) is a sadd1epoint
in the (q1,k)-p1ane. The optimal policy in these regimes are
therefore:
1) If k o
be stationary,
is such find q1= q1 and the system will
i.e. all variables are constant over time.
2) If k such that k < 11k*, find that unique 1ead s1S > q1 o thato o ,
the sy st em towards (qt, 11 k*). For each k the optimal q1 ,o musto
lie on the "separatrix" marked the optimal path in the figure.
Consider now each of the regimes A, Band C.
A: In this regime no resource extraction takes place, since the
social value of the marginal product of labour in the rest of
the economy - Ul (f-kfl) - is greater than the social value of
the marginal product of labour in resource extraction - (LJI-Q2)a.
q2 is the user cost of the resource, reflecting the fact that
what is extracted "today" cannot be used "to~orrow", since
the resource stock is finite. q2 denotes the addition to the
optimal value of the criterion function of leaving the marginal
unit of the resource at t unexp1oited. The user cost must be
subtracted from the marginal utility of consumption to obtain
the social value of resource extraction. In regime A, 11 = 1
and the optimal policy is identical to the standard one-sector
growth model, see e v g . [1] ch . 11.
B: In B resource extraction is at its maximum and the social value
of the marginal product of labour is higher in this sector than
in the rest of the economy. As long as the economy is in B,
k/l1, where 11 = 1 - 12, approaches k*. q1 is stationary for
the same value of k. Thus, as time elapses in B, k approaches a
stationary value together with sand c. The higher 11 is, the
higher is this stationary value. Since the resource stock is
finite the time period where the economy is in B must also be
finite.
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C: (The Interior Solution):
In C resource extraction takes place, but at less than its
maximal rate. From (17) and (lB) the allocation of labour
over time between the resource extraction sector and the rest of
the economy is governed by
( 22) Q. [f-(k/11)f']1
Rearranging (22) as
(23)
it can be seen that, because of the user cost, for resource
extraction to take place, the monetary value of the marginal
product of labour in resource extraction, pa, must exceed the
monetary value of the marginal product of labour in the rest of
the economy, f-(k/11)f'. The social value of this difference
- q1[pa - (f-(k/11)f'1 - must be equal to the user cost - aq2-
of employing labour in resource extraction. The discrepancy
increases through time, since the user cost grows exponentially.
With k given initially when regime C becomes effective, wea
may now distiguish two cases:
1. ka < 1* k* with 1* given by (22). By the reasoning in con-1,0 1,0
nection with fig. 1, kil; must in this case increase along the
optimal path. From (22) the optimal 11(t), l;(t), depends on
q1 (t), q2(t) and k f t ) . To study the optimal allocation of
labour over time, differentiate (22) with respect to time and.
salve for i1(t):
(24) 1*
1
[ql[a-(f-(k/l~)f')l + "lap -
a~2)+ (l~/k)k.
We want to show that ~n this case 1* must be increasing
1
in c.
l) A time- dependent p(t) has now been re-introduced.
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Consider the case where k/l1 < k* in B. k ~s then increasing
in B. At t', say, the economy switches to C where 12< 12.
By continuity of the co-state variables in (22) and (16) there.
can be no jump in 12 or k at t', so that k f t ' + E) > O for
E > O and sufficiently small. To show that k must be increasing
everywhere in C, assume the opposite, i.e. that k reaches a
maximum at til > t', after which it decreases. But according
to (24), 1
1
would then be increasing in til, hence k/1
1
cannot
be increasing in til. This r s a contradiction and k must be
increasing everywhere ~n C. From (24) it then follows that
l~ increases over time ~n C so that resource extraction falls
over time in this regime when k < 1*1 k*. When the initiala ,o
regime in the economy is C, it will be shown below that even-
tually the economy must switch to A. In that case the above
result can be shown in a similiar way by going backwards ~n time
from A. Since ql falls in this case, c increases.
2. k > 1* k*, q > O
a 1,0 1
(24) the sign of i~ ~s
If the initial k/11 ~s very high, so that q1 increases very fast,
an initiaL phase of increasing resource extraction over time
and kil; must decrease. c falls. From
generally undetermined in such an economy.
cannot be excLuded. In the long run, however, Q2' which increases
exponentially, will dominate the right-hand side of (22) so that
sooner or later the allocation of labour to the resource sector
must decrease - eventually towards zero - also in this case.
Regime C wiLL Last onLy for a finite time untiL extraction stops
and the resource is exhausted. From (23), optimal allocation of
labour between the two sectors in regime C is governed by
( 25) [pa-(f-(k/l )f'] ·U'{(l f(k/l )+a12]111
} (p+n)taq 2 e, a
In ( 25) , the limi t of the RHS as t-+OOis plus infinity, while the
LHS for a positive 12 is less than the LHS for 12 = O which ~n
turn is less than plus infinity. Thus (25 ) cannot hold for t-+oo
and there is some finite t, T, where L2 goes to zero and the
extraction period is over. With a finite T, the transversality
condition for x is
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( 26) o, -pTe 02(T) > O.
Since q2(t) lS always positive, (26) lS only satisfied for
x(T) = O. The same conclusions hold for regime F.
D,E,F: it = O=>q1 1 U'f'/p+A so that:
(27) dq1dkl· 0=. q =
1
f"U' + U"f' < O.
p + A
Since k is falling, q1 must be increasing along the optimal path.
In these regimes physical capital per worker is so abundant ini-
tially that its shadow price is less than the marginal utility
of consumption per worker. Hence saving (and investment) is inopti-
mal. In F, (24) also holds.
Having studied the optimal behaviour of the economy within each
policy regime, we now proceed to an analysis of possible switches
between these regimes to find optimal policy sequences over time.
Since situations where the initial capital intensity of the
economy is less than the modified golden rule capital intensity
are probably most relevant attention will be focused on them.
Switches from initial situations in D, E and F will therefore not
be cons idered .
4. Optimal policy sequences with constant prices.
The necessary conditions for the various swiches to take place
are summarized in table 2 below where, again, p = 1. For sim-
plicity, g(.) is defined as f(.) - (.)f'(.). A zero means that
no switch is possible. Even if there are two co-state variables
in this model, piecing the different policy regimes together is
simple since q2 is growing exponentially.
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Table 2: Necessary conditions for policy switches.
Sw itch
to
A B C
Swi tch
from
A . O O
B O . qrUI [( 1-S) [11f (k/11 ) +
+a(1-~ )]
q1[g(k/l1)] =(q1-q2)a
C q {Ul [( 1-s)f (k)]
q1[g(k)]=(q1-q2)a O .
Consider the possible optimal sequences from an initial situation
in B. The shadow price of physical capital is equal to the mar-
ginal utility of consumption and falling so "that consumption is
increasing over time. The economy is accumulating capital. The
resource is extracted at a maximal rate, since, at the margin,
the social value of the productivity of labour in resource
extraction is higher than in the rest of the economy. A plausible
example of an actual economy that might correspond to this
picture is the UK after the recent petroleum and gas discoveries
in the North-Sea. Policy B is transient. Since the user cost
of the resource is exponentially increasing, thereby steadily
reducing the social value of resource extraction, policy B cannot
be sustained ad infinitum. Sooner or later the economy therefore
switches to C, where the resource is extracted at less than its
maximal rate and where resource extraction o~er time is reduced.
This is accomplished by allocating a steadily increasing part
of the labour force away from the resource sector into the rest
of the economy. During the process, consumption always increases.
Again, the initial situation may also be in C. The Norwegian
case, where initial oil and gas production is deliberately kept
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lower than the maximum possible, seems to correspond well to
this regime. When the social value of the product of "the last
person" employed in resource extraction is less than its value
in the rest of the economy, resource extraction ends and the
whole labour force is employed in the rest of the economy.
Extraction goes gradually towards zero and it ends in finite
time as the resource is completely exhausted. The economy then
switches to A, the final policy, which, once established will
last for ever as the economy approaches the optimal steady state,
identical to the optimal development in the standard one-sector
optimal growth model. The optimal policy sequence is therefore
either BCA or CA. It is always optimal to reduce extraction
gradually before it stops altogether. Maximal extraction until
extraction stops is non-optimal. Such a policy would require
a jump in one of the co-state variables, which is impossible
by the maximum principle.
5. Effects of changes 1n data, including pCt).
Consider first the effects of a positive shift 1n k , everythingo
else being equal. Write (23) as
C23b)
where g f(o)-(o)f' Co) o
C23b) must hold in regime Co Sequence BCA is illustrated in fig.
2 by variables with superscrip zero.
164
Q1(t),
RHS of
(23b)
(23b) holds
te'
1~ aq2(t )/[a-g (k)]
t
Figure2.
Until tI' the economy is in B and resource extraction is maxi-
mal. From tI to t2 it 1S in C, after which it is in A. In
B and A the RHS of (23b) is always increasing since aq2 is
always increasing, and the denominator is always decreasing since
k increases along the optimal path. A higher k would implya l~er
o
q1 (t) everywhere. If not, c would decrease for some t which is
clearly inoptimal. This is illustrated by q~ (t) in the figure.
q~ (t) also falls less st.eepLy over time tha~ q~(t) - this follows
from (19). In addition, a higher k also means a higher ko
everywhere along the optimal path (except 1n the optimal stationary
state), so that the curve aq~(t)/[a-g(k)] is shifted upwards if
k gets a positive shift. From the figure it is then clear that
o
a higher k would, cet. par., also mean a lower q2 . If not,o ,o
the intersection of q~ (t) and aq~(t) /[a-g(k)] would take place
for t < t2 so that the extraction period would be shortened. Also,
for (23b) to hold in this period, with a lower q1 (t)everywhere,
the denominator of the RHS of (23b) must increase for every t,
so that 12 must be reduced for every t. But reduced extraction
for every t and a shorter extraction period cannot exhaust the
resource, hence it is inoptimal by the transversality condition
( 26) •
Suppose then that q2 falls so that the extraction peridd is• o
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1
unchanged, indicated by q2 (t) in the figure. Going backwards
1from tI' s i nc e q1(t) is less steep than Q1(t), the difference
between the two curves - q1 (t) and aq2/[a-g(k)] - is less in the
new situation, except for t=t2, and the discrepancy increases
as we approach zero. Therefore, when (23b) holds, the denominator
of the RHS of (23b) must be greater for all t. But with an
extraction level everywhere less than before k was shifted up,
a
the resource cannot be exhausted at t2, hence the optimal
extraction period is lengthened when the initial capital inten-
sity of the economy gets a positive shift. Regarding a positive
shift in xo' it can be shown along the same lines that q1(t)
and q2(t) must fall. Resource extraction and consumption increase
and the extraction period is increased.
Consider next the effects of changes in the social rate of
discount p. An increased p has two effects: (i) the modified
golden rule level of capital per worker - with or without activity
in the resource sector - is reduced, and this r~duces q1 for
every given k (or k/11) so that the optimal s i~ lower for every
k. (ii) The shadow price of the resource, q2(t), rises faster over
time. The latter effect leads to a faster extraction of the
resource by concentrating extraction more towards the beginning
of the planning period. Consumption is also increased for some
time in the first part in the planning period, but as the economy
approaches steady state, consumption will decrease as p increases.
An increase in the rate of growth in population has the same
effects.
Consider finally the effects of an exponential trend in pet)
Stso that pet) = poe (22) may now be written as
which shows that for S < p+n, the optimal development in the
economy will, in principle, be the same as when S = O. For rates
of increase in the price of the resource higher than the social
rate of discount plus the growth rate in popu Lation, (24) shows
that a rising resource extraction over time cannot be excluded,
especially if Cz1 is small, i.e. when k/l1 is "near" k*. An
extreme variant of this case is that it is optimal to leave the
resource in the ground for some time to profit from its increasing
value over time. Whether a society can "afford" such
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a strategy, depends on how abundant the initial capital intensity
of the economy is.
6. Comparing the results with earlier models.
The results obtained on the optimal path of resource use in this
combined model are somewhat more general than those found in
earlier contributions. With constant prices and the capital
intensity less than or equal to the modified golden rule capital
intensity, extraction is either constant for some initial
period and then falling, or always falling. The extraction
period is finite and the resource is always exhausted when
extraction ends. All these results are similar to those found
by Vousden in [9]. However, the result on the effect on the
optimal extraction path from changes in the initial resource-
stock does not bear any resemblance to the result in [9J that
"the optimal time of exhaustion will increase as the alternative
source of consumption, G, falls". Since the welfare function is
the same in both models, the contrast in the solutions must be
due to the difference in supply conditions. In the resource model
the resource may be used for co~umption purposes only. Extracting
the resource is the only source of consumption in addition to
the exogenous component. Since consumption from the resource
is subject to a finite upper bound on cumulative extraction,
society must - in order to survive - stretch out the use of the
resource when the alternative source of consumption falls. In
the comined model, the value of the resource extracted may also
be used for caoital-formation purposes, and survival can be
secured on basis of the physical capital stock alone. The future
benefits to be achie~ed from an extra unit of the resource
extracted for investment purposes is higher the smaller the caoital
stock alreaqy attained. The optimal resource use in the combined
model is therefore slowed down when the initial capital intensity
gets a positive shift. Also with an initial capital intensity
higher than the modified golden rule, a rising extraction is
possible for some time. In such a contracting economy, an increas-
ing shadow price of capital (equal to the marginal utility of
consumption), which makes investment and consumption more
valuable in the future, tends, cet. par., to make it optimal to
postpone extraction; this effect must be balanced against a
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rising user cost of the resource. The combined effect may well
be to keep back production for some time, in contrast to the
ordinary case where a falling shadow price of capital and an
increasing user cost of the resource both lead to a higher
extraction now than in the future. While a contracting economy
may be of limited practical interest, the relevance of the
capital intensity on optimal resource use is obvious in the
case of a rising price of the resource. In that case the
increasing user cost is counteracted by the rising resource price.
In a model without capital, extraction rises if the rate of
growth in price is higher than in the user cost. In a model
with capital, this pattern is accentuated if capital is above
its optimal steady-state level, since then the social value
of capitalover time increases as well. If capital is scarce,
however, its shadow price is falling and it may fall so fast
that it offsets the rate of increase in the resource price over
and above the user cost. In that case optimal extraction would
still be falling over time. Such a country is too poor to afford
to wait for the higher prices, at least for some initial period
until the capital stock of the economy is built up.
In the opposite direction, the question of how the optimal
savings and consumption plan of the economy is affected by
conditions in the resource sector can be studied by assuming
that a new source of natural resources, like a new petroleum
resevoir, is discovered and exploited at t .a
As surne that extraction begins at a
immediately after t , 12 = 12, Thea
rest of the economy is then ka /11
Possible optimal sequences from to have been explored earlier.
maximal rate at t so that
a
capital intensity in the
where k was the capital
a
intensity of the economy immediately before resource extraction
started. The optimal paths of, s, 'c,
- >on whether ko/11 < k*.
and k from t then dependa
(a) If, by accident,
q1 = O as lang as 12 = 12,
sis aconstant s given by
k is constant over time.
"s =
Ak a
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and c is a constant 2 given by
in this interval. Assume then that the system switches to an
"-interior solution 12 at t. Immediately after t, k /11< k* and'" ofalls which means that c increases for t>t. This development
continues beyond tI' when extraction ends. Assuming the economy
was on an optimal growth path before t , k was then less than k*,o
and c and k were increasing. Since total production per ca~ita
jumps up at t , while k is kept constant for t E [t ,tl,
o o
savings and the optimal savings rate must shift down at
optimal consum~tion path is illustrated below.
total
t Theo
c (r )
r r
I
'"t t
Figure 3.
For t < t , c increases along the optimal growth path of ano
economy without natural resources. At
is
t , when the resource
o
discovered and exploited maximally for some period, c jumps
up to a constant level which is kept as long as extraction
is maximal. The "extra" c enjoyed in this period includes not
only the extra production due to the resource; in addition the
absolute amount of savings per capita falls at t . As the economy
o"-
reaches the point t where maximal extraction stops, it has
exactly the same amount of physical capital as in t , whicho
means that it is poorer in physical capital than it would have
been without the resource (where k always increases along the
"-
optimal path if k < k*). After t, c and k increases over time,o
both in the ~eriod where the resouce is extracted at a decreasing
rate, and after the resource is exhausted, when c and k again
approach their steady-state levels c* and k* asymptotically.
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(b) > k*, 41 > O and k 1S falling for t E[t ,tlo
Since q = U'1 '
Since k falls,
this means that c is falling in this period.
absolute savings also falls at t compared too
the level before the resource was discovered and exploited, so
the extra consumption enjoyed is greater than the value of the
resource extraction. As k/l1 approaches k*, consumption and
~ Asavings per capita approach the constant levels c and s found
A
in case (a). At t the economy enters the stage where resource
extraction decreases, with k/11 > k*. Provided ko 2 k* there
must therefore be a point t* > t where k/11 = k* so that
q1 = k = O in t*. For t > t*, q1 is therefore negative and c
and k increase towards their optimal steady-state levels. c and
k have a minimum in t*. The optimal consumption path when
ko/l1 > k* is illustrated below.
c(t)
c*
t
Figure4.
t*
An initial situation where the economy is in the neighbourhood
of the optimal steady state before t is also included here,- o
which shows that consumption may well be above the longrun
optimal level in most of the resource extraction period in this
case. The time profile of consumption will have a maximum at the
beginning of the extraction period. The aggreBBt~ecapital
intensity of the economy will now be lower after the period of
maximal resource extraction than it was initially, and for an
initial capital intensity near k*, the actual capital intensity
may well be less after the extraction period is over and for
some time in the post-extraction period.
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(c) ko!11 < k*. In this case q1 is decreasing, c is increasing
resource extraction is maximal.
and k is increasing for all t > t ,o
The capital
including the period where
intensity in the
economy when resource extraction is maximal is now less than
the optimal capital intensity when 12 = 12, Even so, there
will be a positive jump in consumption per capita 1n t o
This is because, for t E[t ,fJ, the economy "aims for" aa
lower capital intensity than it did for t < t • This means
a
that the optimal absolute amount of savings 1S less for L2: ta
than for t < t ,o
consumption path for this case is
sot hat c sh if ts up att • Th e a p tirna1
a
illustrated below.
c*
c(t)
T
~--------------~-----------------------A~------------------~--------------- t
t
FigureS.
To summarize: The optimal savings rate and also the absolute
amount of savings are always shifted down wh~n exploitation of
a new resource begins, so that total consumption increases by
mope than the value of the new resources extracted.
Optimal capital accumulation should be slowed down, even if
the long run optimal steady-state capital intensity remains the
same. With resource extraction, a given level of capital intensity
will be reached after a longer period. The optimal pattepn of
economic development is thepefope to slow down capital accumula-
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tion when pesoupce extpaction is stapted UP and for the period
extraction lasts, compared to a situation without resource
extraction. When the resource-extraction period is over, the
stock of physical capital is therefore lower than it would have
been at the same time without resource extraction, but it is
higher than when resource extraction started if the capital
intensity then was less than, or equal to, the modified golden
rule capital intensity. Thus, the widespread notion that savings
and capital accum1ation should increase when a natural resource,
like petroleum, is discovered and exploited, is not substantiated
in this model.
In cases (a) and (b) above it is obvious from the figures that
the relative (and absolute) rate of change in consumption is
reduced when extraction starts. Concerning case (c), differen-
tiate q1=U' with respect to time and use (19). The relative rate
of change in consumption along the optimal path may thus be
written as
(28) c/c (-f' v+ p + A)/W
where ~ = c • U"/U' is the elasticity of marginal utility. When
extraction starts, 11 is reduced so that f' is reduced. With ~
(approximately) constant in the relevant range, (28) shows that
the relative rate of growth in consumption is reduced when
extraction starts. The optimal peaction to a newly discoveped
pesource is therefope a positive shift in initial consumption
combined with a reduced relative pate of growth in consumption,
compared to the growth rate before the resource was discovered.
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On the Optimal Development of a Small,
Open Economy with an Exhaustible Resource
by
Jostein Aarrestad
l. Introduction
Optimal extraction of exhaustible natural resources over time
has been analyzed from a macroeconomic point of view by e.g.
Koopmans [6], Vousden [7] and Heal & Dasgupta [3]. These
contributions assume a closed economy. Optimal resource ex-
traction in open economies has been analyzed by Vousden [8],
Kemp and Suzuki [5], Aarrestad [l] and Heal, Dasgupta &
Eastwood [4]. In [5] and [8], however, accumulation of
physical or financial capital is disregarded, i.e. all con-
sumption in the economy is provided from the resource and no
borrowing and lending abroad is assumed to take place, which
clearly resistricts the relevance of the models for actual
decision making in resource rich open economies. In [l], a
model for an open economy is presented where optimal savings
and resource extraction can be determined simultaneously.
Since there is no financial capital in the model, savings
take the form of physical capital accumulation only. In [4]
financial capital is also incorporated. The purpose of this
paper is to provide an alternative, and in some respects more
general, model of optimal resource use in an open economy where
optimal paths of resource extraction, consumption, financial
transactions and savings in physical capital can be determined
simultaneously. After having presented the model and related
it to [4], the analysis of optimal policies and an economic
discussion of the results follow. A comparisonwith earlier
res ult8 will begi ven at the end.
2. The Hodel and Optimality Conditions
The folowing variables will be used:
c (t)
v (t)
k (t)
f(k)
m (t)
b(t)
x (t)
Pv (t)
Pm (t)
C(v)
Il(v)
U
P
n
u
Y
S
r
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= total consumption per capita
total resource extraction per capita
physical capital per capita
production per capita, exclusive of resource
extraction
import per capita
stock of foreign bonds or, if negative, foreign
debt per capita
the stock of the resource per capita
the price of the resource in the wo rLd market
the "price" of import in the world market
total' extraction costs per capita in real terms
net proceeds from resource extraction per capita
social welfare
the social rate of discount
the rate of growth in total population
the rate of depreciation of physical capital
the rate of change in the resource price over time
the rate of change in the price of import over time
the rate of return on foreign bonds or the rate
of interest on debt.
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
The problem is then
co
Max f U(c(t»e-Ptdt
to
s.t. (i) k (t) = f(k(t» + m (t) - c (t) - Ak (t)
(ii) -x (t) = v (t) + nx (t)
(iii) })(t) = rb(t) + Il(v(t» - Pm (t)m (t) - nb (t)
(iv) IT (v Lt ) ) = Pv (t)v (t) - Pm (t) C (v (t))
(v) A = \...l+n
(vi) Pv (t) = Pv,oe yt
(vii) Pm (t) = StPm,oe
(viii) c (t) > O-
(ix) m (t) > O
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(x) b (t)!p (t)
m
> - z when b < O
(xi) v(t) (> a when C" > O
lE[o,v{t)] when C" = O
(xii) k(O) = ka, x(O) = xo' b(O) = O
(xiii) lim k(t) is free, lim x(t) > O, lim b (t)~ (t) > O
m
t -+ 00
(xiv) p,n,~,Y,8,r,pv,o'Pm,o exogenously given constants.
Stated in words, the problem is to find such paths over time
for resource extraction, physical capital formation and foreign
lending/borrowing that the present value of total social welfare
is maximized. The control variables of the problem are c, v and
m and the state variables are k, x and b. The planning horizon
is infinity. Instantaneous welfare depends on consumption per
capita only and we assume that U' > O, U" < O and that
lim U' (c) = +00.c-+O
The total population is assumed to grow at the same rate as the
labour force. Consumption per capital is given implicitly in (i),
the equation for the increase in the capital intensity of the
economy, k. (i) says that the capital intensity of the economy
increases by the domestic production and import per capita minus
depreciation and consumption per capita. (ii) says that the stock
of the resource per capita is reduced by the extraction per capita
and is also dilluted because of population growth. By (iii) finan-
cial investment per capita equals the interest on foreign assets
plus any net proceeds from resource extractionminus the value
of imports minus a population-effect, all in per capita terms •.b may also be naga tive, in which case there is a negative
financial investment. b may be negative as well, in which case
the society owes money abroad. The only good exported is the
resource, which is extracted for export purposes only. Net
proceeds from resource extraction is given by (iv). Pv is
independent of the amount exported ('small country' argument).
The real extraction costs consist of input of the "macro-good".
Expressed in value~ the costs are then Pm(t)C(v(t». The analysis
is carried out with two different assumptions on extraction costs:
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(a) that marginal extraction costs are constant (C'>O, C"=O) -
an assumption implicit in most of the macroeconomic literature
on optimal resource use, or (b) marginal extraction costs are
rising when extraction per unit of time increases (C'>O, C">O) -
a more realistic assumption.
By (xi), when marginal extraction costs are constant, we shall
assume there is some upper bound on per capita extraction per
unit of time due to technical reasons as e.q. limited pipe-line
capacity or loading facilities for tankers.l) The point is that
the transport capacity has been created without being optimized
from the point of view of the producing nation. A different
justification for an upper bound on production is memebership in
a production cartel with production quotas for each member. In
addition (xi) says that resource extraction is irreversible. By
(viii) and (ix) consumption and imports are also non-negative 2)
and by (vi) and (vii) the prices of the resource and of the macro-
good grow each at a constant rate which may be positive, negative
or zero.3) (x) says that when the country has debt, there is an
upper bound on the~eal value of the debt-increase per capita
per unit of time. The reason is existing convensions in financial
circles on how much a country of a given size may borrow abroad
during e.g.one year and a fear on the part of the national
government of losing control of economic policy due to pressure
from abroad. By (xii) the stocks of physical capital and the
resource are given initially, and initially the country has no
debt or claims abroad. Finally, by (xiii), the stocks of the
resource and of the real value of foreign claims must be non-
negative as time approaches infinity, while no restriction is
needed on the stock of physical capital. The main simplifications
of the model are:
a) No search activity for new resources
b) No uncertainties. In particular the future relative
price of the resource is assumed known.
c) The stock of the resource does not affect social welfare
or the extraction conditions, except that it restricts
total extraction.
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d) External effects are disregarded. Examples might be
pollution due to oil-spill, blow-outs, reduced fishing
possibilities or the fact that two (or more) countries are
extracting petroleum from the same reservoir
e) The producing country does not use the resource as an
input.
Assumption e) is avoided in [4]. Uncertainty is also introduced
in one variant of the model, which causes considerable compli-
cations. On the other hand, it is in [4] assumed constant
extraction costs, constant prices, no borrowing restrictions
and instant and costless transformation of financial capital
into physical capital and vice versa. Specific functional
forms are also used to obtain unarnbigous results. In those
respects the model in [4] is less general than the model pre-
sented above.
To analyze the problem, form the (present value) Lagrangean:
(l) L = e- Pt {U(c (t» +ql (t)[f(k(t.l ) +m (t)-c (t)-Ak (t) ]
+q2 (t)(-v(t)-nx (t» +q3 (t)[rb (t)+II(v (t.) -Pm (t)m(t)
-nb(t) ]+~lc(t)+~2m(t)+~3 [z+rb(t)+II(V(t»-Pm(t)m(t)
-nb(t) ]+~4v(t)+~5(v-v(t)}
where ql' q2 and q3 are co-state variables associated with k,
x and b respectively,4) and where ~i(i=l, •.,5) are Lagrangean
multipliers associated with the constraints (viii) - (xi). It
is easily verified that necessary conditions for a solution to
the problem are
(2 ) U' - ql + ~l = O
( 3) -q2+q3II'+~4-~5+~3II'= O
(4) ql-Pmq3+~2-~3Pm = O
(5 ) ql = (-f'+p+A)ql. (p+n)q2(6) q2 =
(7) <13 = (-r+p+n)q3 -~3 (r-n)
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( 8 ) ].ll~O, ].llC = O•
(9 ) ].l2~O, ].l2m = O
(10) ].l3~O, ].l3[ z+rb+TI-p ffi-nb]= Om
(11) ].l4~O, ].l4V= O
(12) ].lS~O, ].lS[v-v]= O
3. POlicy Regimes
3.1 No Borrowing Restrictions.
Due to the assumptions on the U-function, c is always positive,
so that ].lI= O. Consider now the case with no restrictions on
borrowing so that ].l3= O. Assume also that imports are positive
so that ].l2= O. Instead of (3), (4) and (7) we then get
( 3 I )
(4 I )
-q2+q3TI'+].l4-].lS= O
Q1-Pmq3 = O
q3 = (-r+p+n)Q3·( 7 I )
a) When marginal extraction costs are constant, write p for
the linetprice" Pv - Pm C', .so that TI'=p , Hith this cost
structure, (3'), together with (11) and (12), show that
(13) v* (t) =
v if Q2 < PQ3
E[o,v] if Q2 = PQ3
O if Q2 > PQ3
so that optimaZ extraction is either maximaZ or zero.
Differentiating (4') with respect to t and using (S) and (7'),
we obtain
(14) f' +u = r-S.
(14) is an obvious condition for optimality: Marginal returns
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on the two types of assets considered there should be equalized.
The marginal product of physical capital minus its rate of de-
preciation, i.e. the net marginal productivity of physical
capital should be equalized to the real rate of interest on
bonds (the nominal interest on foreign assets minus the percentage
rise in prices on imported goods). Optimal use of the third
asset - the resource - is governed by (13). Consider first the
case when prices are constant. Then, from (6) and (7') the
relative rate of change in q2 is greater than in q3' This means
that initially q2 < pq3S)and the resource is extracted at a
maximal rate. At T, say, q2 = pq3 and the optimal solution for
v is singular. For t>T, however, Q2>pq3 and resource extractiqn
stops. Since the interior solution does not last more than
"an instant of time", the resource is extracted at a maximaZ
rate untiZ extraction stops. With a finite stock of resources
initially, xo' T must be finite. The transversality condition
for x(t) is then
(15) -pTe Q2 (T) > O.
Since Q2(t) is always positive, (15) can only be satisfied for
x(T) = O. At T the resource will therefore be exhausted.
With constant prices there is no positive return on the resource-
asset. With constant extraction costs, it is therefore optimal
to extract the resource as fast as possible and convert it into
assets with a positive return. This need not be the case when
prices are rising. Suppose the "net price" p(t) = p (t) - p C'atV mincreases at a constant rate a so that p(t) = p e . Of course,o
if p is a constant, a=y. Then the relative rate of change inm
Q2 is greater than the relative rate of change in P(t)Q3 as long
as a ~ r, i.e. when the percentage rise in the net price of
the resource is less than the nominal rate of interest. From
(13) optimal extraction policy with fixed extraction costs is
then the same as in the case with constant prices. If, however,
a > r, the rate of growth in the net price of the resource is
greater than the rate of interest on financial claims. It then
pays to keep the resource in the ground as long as possible. A
model with infinite planning horizon is not well suited to
analyse this case. In a model where the planning horizon is
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finite, however, it can be shown that extraction should not
take place until the end of the planning period, where the
resource is extracted at a maximal rate until it is exhausted
at the terminal date. In this case the country would obviously
always be a net borrower.
USing (4') in (2), (2) and (7') leads to
(16) c = (U'/U") (p+n-r+S)
which shows that, in the absence of any change
(S=O), consumption per capita will be steadily
(decreasing) if r is greater (less) than p+n.
in impqrt prices
increasing
This merely
reflects the fact that unless r-S = p+n, the capital intensity
of the economy in this model does not approach the modified
golden rule level k* definedby fl (k*)-ll= p+n , as in the standard
model of optimal economic growth,6) but a level given by (14).
Suppose that initially the stock of physical capital is below
this level; it is then instantly adjusted to this optimal
level7) since there is no upper bound on import (or debt-increase)
in this regime - provided the value of the resource stock is
sufficient to permit such an increase in k. Depending on the
discrepancy between the initial capital stock and the optimal
stock and the rate of maximal extraction, the society may be
a net borrower or lender initially in this case. Due to (xiii),
however, the country must be free from debt when extraction
ends, since the resource is the only export-good. In the opposite
initial situation when the real rate of interest on bonds is
higher than the net productivity of capital, the country will
be a net lender and the capital intensity of the economy must
shrink until f' = ll+r-S. An extreme variant of this case is
when (4) holds with an inequality sign. Imports are then zero
and the stock of foreign assets is built up at a maximal rate.
Of course, the country may also enter the "post-extraction"
period (t>T) with a stock of foreign assets.
If import prices are rising, (16) shows that consumption will
be increasing along the optimal path as long as the percentage
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rise in import prices is less than the (positive) difference
between the rate of interest and the social rate of discount,
plus the rate of growth in population. If the rise in import
prices is greater, consumption will fall along the optimal
path.
b) Alternatively, when C">O, there is no upper bound on
extraction, so that ~5=O. When v*(t) is positive,
~4=O. Differentiating (31) with respect to t we then
obtain
l .
v*(t) = TI"q3(q2
Inserting for q2 and q3 and using (31) this simplifies to
(17) v*(t) = rTII/TI".
(17) shows that with constant prices and increasing marginaZ
costs ~ extraction is fa ZZ1~ngover t1~me as -lonq as the resource
is extracted. H,riting out (31) in' full,
(18) (pv-Pm Cl (v»UI[f(k}+m-k-Ak] = q e(p:-n)t2,0
In (18), lim RHS = 00, while cet. par. LHS(v) < LHS (o)<oo(since
t-+oo p -,n Cl (o)~ 00).v +ru
cis always positive. Thus (18) cannot hold for t -+ 00 and
there is some finite t where v goes to zero and the extraction
period is OVer. At this time the resource is exhausted. This
follows from the same argument as when extraction costs were
constant. When marginal extraction costs are increasing, (14)
and (16) still hold. Optimal policies ,with respect to physical
and financial capital are therefore in principle unchanged,
except that the optimal resource extraction path is modified
due to another cost structure. v*(t) is somewhat different now
since the gains in interest of converting the resource into
financial capital must be balanced, against the increasing ex-
traction costs per unit of time, as evidenced by (16), which
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shows that the optimal ~ate of extraction is determined by
the rate of interest on financiål claims and the properties
of the cost-function.
When marginal extraction costs are rising and prices are
functions of time, differentiation of (3') yields
(17' ) v* = [rIl'- II' (v const. )J/Il"
where IT' (v const.) = p - p C' is the rate of change inv m
marginal proceeds from resource extraction at a constant-output
rate. (17') shows that a change in the marginal proceeds at a
constant-output rate now also affects the optimal resource' use.
Cet.par. an exponential rise (fall) in marginal proceeds would
tend to reduce (increase) the rate of fall in extraction along
the optimal path. Inserting for II' and rearranging, (17') shows
that when p is a constant,m
(19) > <v* - O as r -y/(l-p c'lp ).< > m v
Since o <p C'lp < l, the RHS of (19) is always greater then y.m v
When marginal extraction costs are rising, the price rise on
the resource needed to make an increasing path of resource use
optimal may therefore be somewhat less than the rate of interest
on bonds. Again (14) and (16) hold.
3.2 Restrictions on Borrowing.
Consider first the case when extraction costs are constant.
When imports are positive, ].12= O. Instead of (4'), we now
have
(4")
(2), (3), (5), (6) and (7) still hold.
From (4"), using (5) and (7), it can be seen that
(14')
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In the presence of borrowing restrictions, the net marginal
productivity of physical capital will exceed the real rate of
interest. The reason is, of course, that a restriction on
borrowing in turn implies a restriction on imports. The stock
of physical capital can therefore not be adjusted instantly to
the level where marginal returns on the two assets are equalized.
Inserting for 113 in (3) from (4"), the analogue to (13) is now
tv when Pmq2<pql(13') v*(t) = E[o,v] when Pmq2 = pqlo when Pmq2>pql
Assuming again that the "net price" of the resource, p(t),
increases at the constant relative rate a, it follows from
(vii), (5) and (6) that the relative rate of change in Pmq2
is greatest if, and only if, f'-l1>~-B. In that case the
resource is extracted immediately at a maximal rate until it
is exhausted. If not, the resource is extracted at a maximal
rate at the end of the planning period, and it is exhausted
at the terminal date. Consequently, if and onZy if there are
effective restrictions on borrowing is the optimaZ extraction
path affected by the physicaZ capitaZ intensity of the economy.
The rate of interest isthen irrelevant for the resource-use
decision. Prom (2), the analogue to (16) is now
(16 ' ) c = (U ' IU") (p +A - f ' )
where f'-l1 has replaced r-B in (16). (16') is identical to
the formulae for the absolute growth of consumption per capita
in the standard optimal growth model.
When extraction costs are rising, differentiating q2 = qlIT'/Pm
yields, after some manipulations
(17") v* = [( f '-11+B ) IT' IT' (v const. ) ]/IT"
With borrowing restrictions and constant prices (B=Y=o), (17")
shows that the optimal rate of extraction is determined by the
net marginal productivity of physical capital together with the
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properties of the cost function. The rate of interest is
again irrelevant. With changing prices an exponential rise
(fall) in the marginal proceeds from resource extraction, or
an exponental fall (rise) in the price of ,imports, would cet.par.
tend to reduce (increase) the ~ate of fall in extraction along
the optimal path. Inserting for II'and rearranging, it foJ.lows
from (17")_that, for a constant p ,m
(19') • > <v -o as f'(k)-y/(l-p 'C'/p )+ll.< > m. v
(14') and (16') hold also when extraction costs are rising.
The questLm remains whether the "candidate" optimal policies
analyzed above are really optimal. First of all, the Lagrangean
(l) is concave in k, x, b, m, v and c. When extraction is
falling over time, lim e-Ptql(t) (k(t)-k*) = O, x(t) will be
exhausted in finite time and (with one exception to be mentioned
later) b(t) will also go to zero in finite time. In that case
the solution to the problem is really optimal. If optimal ex-
traction is increasing over time, and the horizon is infinite,
conditions ensuring that the candidate policies are really
optimal are not satisfied. With a finite horizon, however,
the necessary conditions are also sufficient for optimality
due to the concavity of the Lagrangean.
3.3 Effects of Changes in Data.
Based on the previous analysis of the workings of the model,
consider partial changes in the data of the problem. A higher
social rate of discount, p, does not affect the extraction path.
It reduces the rate of growth in consumption, when consumption
is growing along the optimal path and increases the fall rate
when consumption is falling. In both cases, initial consumption
would increase. An increase in the rate of growth in population
has the same effects. An increase in the nominal rate of
interest on bonds, r, would by (14), lead to a lower capital
intensity in the economy. Without borrowing restrictions,
the rate of change in consumption is affected as from a fall
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in the social rate of discount. With borrowing restrictions, the
rate of change in consumption is not affected by a change in r.
Without borrowing restrictions, optimal resource extraction
depends on the rate of interest such that a higher rate of
interest leads to a faster extraction. When borrowing restrictions
are effective, the rate of interest does not affect extraction
policy. An increase in the relative rate of growth in the price
of the resource, y, always affects the optimal extraction policy
such that extraction tends to be postponed. The rate of change
in consumption is not affected. An increase in the rate of growth
in the price of imported goods, B, leads to a lower real rate
of interest and therefore to a higher capital intensity in the
economy. The optimal extraction policy is affected differently
by a change in B depending on whether there are restrictions on
borrowing or not. With free borrowing, an increase in B would,
cet.par. reduce net proceeds from the resource over time through
the cost term. By (17') this would tend to speed up resource
use by concentrating extraction more towards the beginning of
the planning period. With borrowing restrictions, this effect
is still present. In addition the optimal rate of depletion is
now, by (17'), also affected by B per se. Thus, in this case,
even if net proceeds from resource extraction were constant
over time an increase in the rate of change in import prices would
increase the optimal fall rate of extraction. The rate of change
in consumption is affected by B in the absence of borrowing
restrictions only. By (16), the rate of increase in c is reduced
when B increases or the rate of fall is increased. If the initial
physical capital intensity, k , is increased, the discrepancyo
between the initial net productivity of physical capital, f'-~,
and the real rate of interest, r-B, is reduced. Provided f'-~>r-B,
borrowing needs are therefore reduced, or the loan potential is
increased. When k increases, the situation may change from one
o
where restrictions onborrowing are effective to one with free
borrowing. In that case it follows from the discussion in the
next section, that resource extraction would be postponed. Also
if borrowing restrictions are still relevant, a reduction in the
difference between f'-~ and r-B brought about by a positive shift
in ko would postpone extraction, as shown by (13') and (17").
Hence a positive shift in the initial capital intensity of the
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economy leads to a less intense resource exploitation at the
beginning of the p lann i nq period and to a lengthem:ng Qf the
resource extraction period if extraction costs are increasing.
If extraction costs are constant, the resource-extraction period
may be shifted from the beginning to the end of the planning
period. By (16') the rate of change in consumption is reduced
(increased) if consumption is increasing (falling), if, and only
if, there are borrowing restrictions. Of course, there is also a
wealth effect from a positive shift in k , so that the consumption
o
are always "lifted up". An exogenous positive
of the initial stock of
profiles over time
shift in the value the resource,p x,V,o o
would also "lift up" the consumption profile over time. If
p x shifts up, the economy may borrow a greater total amount.v,o o
Thismeans that the difference between f'-~ and r when borrowing
must stop is reduced, and the economy may also enter the phase
where the constraint in borrowing is no longer effective. By
(13') and (17"), extraction of the resource is then less intense
in the extended part of the borrowing period made possible by
the shift in p x, and a fortioro if borrowing restrictionsv .o o
are no longer effective. If z, the ceiling on borrowing, is
increased, effects on resource extraction of a somewhat similar
character results. This is so since the ceiling may then no more
be effective, and even if it is, f'-~ falls faster towards r-8.
In both cases the rate of extraction is slowed down. If the
ceiling on borrowing is a function of the value of the resource
stock of the economy, which is not unreasonable, the effects
mentioned above of a shift in the initial resource stock will
be strengthened due to increased international "creditworthyness".
In general, therefore, a positive shift in the initial value of
the resource stock of the economy would lead to a less intense
exploitation of the resource.
4. Discussion.
a) With constant marginal extraction costs, an interior solution
for resource extraction cannot be optimal for more than "an
instant of time". When there are no borrowing restrictions
internationally, the resource is extracted as fast as possible
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until the resource is exhausted if, and only if, the rate of
increase in the "net price" of the resource is less than the
nominal rate of interest on bonds (type I path). If not,exctraction
is postponed until the end of theplanning period, when, again,
the resource is extracted at a maximal rate until it is ex-
hausted at the terminal point in the planning period (type II
path). The stock of physical capital is instantly adjusted
so that its net marginal productivity equals the real rate of
interest (given exogenously). We have here a situation with
three assets, two of which with exogenous marginal returns.
The asset with lowest (highest) return - the resource - is
therefore converted into another asset as fast (slowly) as
possible. Consumption per capita is permanently increasing
(decreasing) if the real rate of interest on financial assets
- equal to the net marginal productivity of phystcal capital -
is less (greater) than the social rate of discount plus the
rate of growth in population. If the extraction path is of
type II, the country will initially be a net borrower, if it
is of type I, the country may initially be a net borrower depen-
ding on 8, r, ko and pv. If fl (ko)-v<r-8, then obviously the
initial stock of physical capital is "too high", and no borrowing
is needed. If, however, f' (ko)-v>r-8, an immediate expansion
of the capital intensity of the economy is undertaken, whether
this results in an initial loan depends on pv. The higher the
discrepancy between marginal returns to physical and financial
capital is initially, the more probable it is that the country
borrows money, even if it exports the resource at a maximal
rate.
When the country is a net borrower, the possibility of borrowing
restrictions emerges, in which case net marginal returns to
physical capital will exceed the real rate of interest on bonds.
With borrowing restrictions, type I (II) path above will be
optimal if, and only if, the net marginal productivity on
physical capital exceeds (is less than) the percentage rate of
change in the net prlce of the,resource relative to the percentage
rate of change in the price of imported goods. This is because
borrowing restrictions imply import restrictions, and the
resource is in such a situation extracted for direct import
purposes. The returns to converting the resource to physical
capital through imports, f'-V, must then be compared to how
much more a unit of the resource will command in terms of import
goods when kept in the ground, a-8.
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It might be noted here that the conditions for the fastest
possible resource extraction are less stringent when borrowing
restrictions are effective in the sense that type I path may
then be optimal under conditions which would make resource use
of type Il optimal in a situation without such restrictions.
With borrowing restrictions, when S=O, r<f'-~, so that a<r would
imply a<f'-~ and type I extraction-path. With S>O, a-S<f'-~
a fortioro. The other way around this means that with borrowing
restrictions the fastest possible resource use is optimal in
situations where the percentage price rise for the resource is
higher than the rate of interest on bonds. First of all it is
necessarily the case as long as crS~r, i.e. a~r+S,and secondly,
even if a>r+S, type I extraction path may be optimal since
r<f'-~. To what extent the percentage price rise for the resource
may exceed the rate of interest on loans in a situation where
type I resource extraction is optimal therefore depends on the
percentage increase in import prices and on how seriously
the borrowing restrictions are felt.
The absolute rate of change of consumption along the optimal
path with a borrowing constraint is given in (16'). Since
f'-~>r-S, consumption will be steadily increasing for r-S>p+n.
For r-S<p+n, however, there may be an initial period of increasing
consumption (as long as f'-~>p+n) before consumption culminates
and then decreases, when f'-~<p+n. When borrowing is restricted,
the optimal path of consumption is related to the capital
intensity of the economy. These relations will be explored
in full in the final section.
When the country borrows maximally, two possibilities exist.
Either the optimal stock of physical capital has not been
reached when repayment of the loan must begin, or the optimal
capital stock is reached at, say t*. For t>t* restrictions
on borrowing are then not effective. If the optimal extraction
path with borrowing restrictions is of type I, it is then
possible that when the restrictions cease to be effective at
t*, the optimal extraction path will be of type II. This means
an optimal policy sequence such that extraction is maximal as
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long as borrwoing restrictions are effective. When this regime
ends, however, it is optimal to leave the rest of the resource
in the ground until it is exploited maximally at the end of the
planning period. The optimal time profile of resource extraction
is then maximal extraction at the beginning and at the end of
the planning period.
b) Nhen marginal extraction costs are rising and there are no
restrictions on borrowing, the optimal depletion rate is deter-
mined by the (exogenously given) nominal rate of interest on
bonds, the relative rate of change in the net price of (or
marginal ~roceeds from) the resource and the properties of
the cost function. If the net price of the resource is constant,
optimal extraction is always falling over time. A rising net
price of the resource reduces the optimal fall rate in extraction.
If the extraction path is falling over time, it can be shown that
extraction goes to zero in finite time when the extraction period
is over. At that time the resource is exhausted.
Except that the gains in interest from converting the resource
into financial capital must now be balanced against increasing
extraction costs, asset management is the same as when extraction
costs are constant. This means that, if possible, the stock of
physical capital is instantly adjusted to its optimal level,
where f'=~+r-8. Again if this implies borrowing, a situation
with borrowing restrictions may be'relevant. In that case the
depletion rate is independent of the rate of interest, whose role
is now taken over by the net marginal returns to physical capital.
In addition to the percentage rate of change in the marginal
proceeds from the resource, the percentage rate of change in the
price of imported goods per se now also affects the optimal
depletion rate for the same reasons as when extraction costs are
constant. From (17") it can be seen that cet.par. extraction is
slowed down if the capital intensity of the economy increases,
if the increase in marginal proceeds from the resource shifts
upwards and if the rate of change in import prices shifts down.
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The combined effect of price changes may be to keep back
production for some time, in contrast to a model with constant
prices where a falling shadow price of capital and an increasing
user cost of the resource both lead to a higher extraction now
than in the future. The relevance of the capital intensity on
optimal resource use is obvious in the case of a rising price
of the resource relative to the price of import-goods. In that
case the increasing user cost is counteracted by the rising
relative resource price. In a model without capital, extraction
rises over time if the rate of growth in the relative price is
higher than in the user cost. In a model with capital, this
pattern is accentuated if capital is above its optimal level,
where f'-~<p+n, since then the shadow price or the social value
of capital (or consumption) over time increases as well
(cll>ofrom (5}). If capital is "scarce", however, its shadow
price is falling and it may fall so fast that it offsets the
rate of increase in the relative resource price over and above
the user cost. In that case optimal extraction would still be
falling over time, even if the percentage rate of growth in
the relative price of the resource is higher than the percentage
rate of growth in the user price of the resource. Such a country
is too poor to afford to wait for the higher prices~ at least
for some initial period until the physical capital stock of the
economy is built up.
In general (19') shows that the higher the relative price trend
is, the lower must the capital intensity be for falling resource
use to be optimal, or conversely; the higher the capital
intensity of the economy is~ the lower is the relative price-
rise needed to make a rising extraction path optimal.
5. Comparingthe Results with Earlier Models.
a) Resource Models
The results obtåined on the optimal path of resource use in this
model are somewhat more general than those found in earlier
contributions. The optimal extraction path now depends on
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conditions in the rest of the economy, in particular on the
stock of physical capital in the economy and on the borrowing
possibilities. A main effect from allowing financial investment
or disinvestment in a rrodeL ofresource extraction in an open
economy, is to separate the optimal consumption stream over
time from the optimal path of resource extraction. If borrowing
possibilities are unlimited, the separation will be complete.
As noted in [4], this is to be expected as an analogue to the
standard result in static trade theory, to the effect that an
open economy's optimum production point is independent of its
preferences, and determined entirely by world prices. When mar-
ginal extraction costs are constant, we have shown that resource
extraction should either be zero or at its maximum. This is
so even if the social welfare function in the model is concave.
A comparison with the results in the model by Vousden [8] is
therefore not completely straight fort.~arn. In his model marginal
extraction costs are constant. At the same time v is interior
and falling, which is incompatible with the necessary conditions
for optimality in this model. When marginal extraction costs
are rising, however, an interior solution for v is relevant also
in this model. With constant prices and the capital intensity
less than or equal to the modified golden-rule capital intensity,
extraction is always falling. The extraction period is finite
and the resource is always exhausted when extraction ends. All
these results are similar to those found by Vousden in [8]. But
whereas in his model the depletion rate is determined by ·the
social rate of discount and properties of the instantaneous
utility function, the depletion rate is now independent of these
factors. Instead it is - in the absence of price changes and
borrowing restrictions - determined by the nomInal rate of
interest in the world financial markets and properties of the
cost function in resource extraction, factors that are easier
to deal with from an empirical point of view.
However, the result on the effect on the optimal extraction
path in this model from changes in the initial capital or
resource stock when borrowing restrictions are effective, bears
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little resemblance to the result in [8] that "the optimal time
of exhaustion will increase as the alternative source of con-
sumption, C, falls".
Since the welfare function is the same in both models, the
contrast in the solutions must be due to the difference in
supply conditions. In the resource model the resource may be
used for consumption purposes only. Extracting the resource is
the only source of consumption in addition to the exogeneous
component. Since consumption from the resource is sUbject to
a finite upper bound on cumulative extraction, society must -
in order to survive - stretch out the use of the resource when
the alternative source of consumption falls. In this model, the
resource extracted may also be used for physical and/or financial
capital formation purposes, and survival can be secured on basis
of the capital stocks alone. The future benefits to be derived
from an extra unit of the resource extracted for physical
investment purposes is higher the smaller the capital stock
already attained. The optimal resource use in this model with
effective borrowing restrictions is therefore slowed down
when the initial physical capital intensity gets a positive
shift.
In contrast to [4], we have distinguished between situations
with and without borrowing restrictions. This distinction is
essential since the international borrowing possibilities
affect extraction policies. International credit rationing at
the going market rate of interest may necessitate resource
extraction for direct import purposes. A liberalization or
removal of credit limits therefore slows down optimal resource
use. A positive shift in the initial resource stock have similar
effects since it increases the total debt a country may incur;
it may also ease or remove existing borrowing constraints
through improving the country's international creditworthyness.
Finally, also in contrast to [4], price trends for the resource
and for imported goods have been introduced in this model.
It is worth noting that the effects of these trends on extrac-
tion and consumption depend on whether borrowing restrictions
are effective or not.
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b) Optimal Growth Models
Consider finally the optimal development of consumption and the
physical capital intensity in this model in relation to optimal
development in the standard model for optimal exonomic growth.
In the sequel the reasonable accumption of a decreasing resource
exploitation over time is made. Recall the definition of the
modified golden rule capital intensity, k*, as
f' (k*)-~=p+n.
From (5) and (16'), it follows that c = k = O when k = k*,
so that k = k* is also a stady-state in this model. Since the
capital intensity in this model in the absence of borrowing
restrictions is determined by the exogenously given real rate
of interest on finance capital, a distinction must be made as
to whether
>r-S< p+n.
A A A
Define k by f'(k)-~ = r-S. Assume safely that ko< k. If r-S=
p+n and there are no borrowing restrictions, k is instantly
adjusted to k*, and k and c are kept constant over time. With
restrictions on borrowing, k is gradually adjusted towards
k*. If k* is reached before the borrowing possibilities
are exhausted, optimal development from then on is to keep k
and c constant. Till then c also increases, according to (16').
If borrowing possibilities are exhausted while k < k*, c is
always increasing by (16'). Repayment begins while k is
increasing asymptotically ~k*. This is so since to reduce
the stock of physical capital in order to repay debt would
obviously be inoptimal because the net productivity of physical
capital is higher than the real rate of interest. The remaining.
alternative, to keep k constant, implies from (i) that c = m.
(since k = O). Since c is increasing, imports must then increase,
which contradicts the assumption of debt repayment. Hence k
must increase in the repayment period. When repayment is over,
k increases asymtotically towards k* as in the standard optimal
growth model. c increases also.
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A
If r-S<p+n, then k is adjusted towards k>k*. Without borrowing
A
restrictions, adjustment to k is instant. By (16), c is then
Adecreasing, while k is kept constant at k. The reduction in
c must therefore take place through a fall in imports over time.
Whether the country initially was a net borrower or not, there
must be some point in time, ti, where net finance capital
is non-negative. The economy may also at T enter the "post-
extraction phase" with positive finance capital. Since c is
falling, and the marginal returns to financial capital is constant,
finance capital is gradually reduced towards zero at, say ~.
AFor t>t, m=b=v=x=o so that the model collapses into a standard
model of optimal economic growth with the initial capital intensity
Ak greater than the optimal steady-state capital intensity k*.
AFor t>t the capital intensity and consumption in the economy
will therefore decrease asymptotically towards their steady-
state values. The optimal development of the economy under
these assumptions and with negative financial capital initially
is illustrated below in fig. l. t denotes the time when extrac-o
tion begins.
c(t)
b(t)
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With borrowing restrictions, the optimal development under the
same assumption regarding the real rate of interest on bonds,
would be somewhat modified, since k cannot be instantly adjusted
to its optimal level. If ko<k*, there is therefore a first
phase where k<k*, and c is growing, according to (16'). As k.
increases and k=k* is reached, at t=tl, c is zero. For k>k*,A A
C decreases as k approaches its optimal value k. If k is reached
at t=t2, the optimal development from then on is as explained when
borrowing restrictions were ineffective. The optimal development
of the economy in this case is illustrated in fig. 2 below.
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A
If the borrowing potential is exhausted while k*<k<k, k does
not reach its optimal level. Since f' (k)-~>r-8, k is non-
decreasing while the debt is being repayed. When repayment is
over, k begins to shrink asymptotically towards k*. c is de-
creasing as long as k>k*. The borrowing potential may also be
exhausted while k<k*, in which case the optimal development
of the economy is as described in the similar case when r-8=p+n.
A
The final possibility is r-8>p+n, in which case k<k*. Consumption
grows according to (16), while the physical capital intensity is
constant at k=~. The growth in consumption must therefore
originate in the proceeds from a steadily increasing finance
capital, also in the post-extraction period.
(16') may be rewritten as
(20) ~/c = (-f' + p + A)/~
where ~ = CU"/U' is the elasticity of marginal utility. When
Aextraction starts, provided kQ<k, k increases faster than before
the extraction period. With ~ (approximately) constant in the
relevant range, it follows from (20) that the relative growth
in consumption is reduced when extraction starts. The optimal
reaction to a newly discovered resource is therefore a positive
shift in initial consumption combined with a reduced relative
growth in consumption. Figures l and 2 show that with resource
extraction q1 (t) is less than ql(t) without extraction for all t,
including t>T. This means that also in the post-extraction
period society will enjoy higher levels of consumption per
c~pita than it would have done without a resource extraction
period.
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Notes.
* I am indebted to Erling Steigum, jr. and Michael Hoel who
have read earlier versions of this paper and given valuable
comments.
l) Suppose that for this reason there is a constant upper
bound V on total extraction per unit of time. In that
case v(t) = V/L(t)_, where L(t) is total population.
Since L(t) = L ent, it follows that v(t) = ve-nt where
v =V/L o oo o·
2) One might object here that export of the macro-good should
be possible. However, since we want to focus on the conse-
quences of exploiting a resource for export purposes, the
sharpest results are obtained by assuming that the resource
is the only export-good in the economy. In part, an economic
justification for this would be that, except for the
"epoch" connected with the exploitation of the resource,
it is the aim of the Government always to balance the
current account.
3) An alternative would be to use the.macro-good as a numeraire
so that p ~ l. But because it is of interest to distinguish
m
between real and nominal terms in this analysis, this
approach has not been taken, although it would simplify
some of the expressions.
4) The time argument in the functions will from now on
usually be dropped.
5) If initially Q2>pq3' the resource would not be used at
all, which would make the problem economically uninteresting.
See e.q. the presentation given in (2), ch. Il.
7) This shows that initial jumps in the state variables kand
b are a feature of the optimal solution to the problem.
However, it can be shown that for t>t no such jumps can
occur. A mathematically more complic~ted formulation
of the control problem that allows for initial jumps in
the state variables can be given. This formulation yields
the same necessary conditions for t>t as the formulation
used here. Hence our Simpler formula~ion assumes that the
initial values of kand b have been adjusted properly.
